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Abstract 
 
 
This aim of this study is to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s individual 
and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with 
the question of living well, where it will be suggested that living well 
necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the 
forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment 
brings. In particular, this study will make an original contribution to existing 
Deleuzian studies by arguing that what legitimises this conception of living well, 
and what can motivate us to engage in such a practice, is that a life that becomes 
aware of and explores the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise 
that each moment engenders is a life that reflects, or that is lived in accordance 
with, the challenging ontological account that can be discerned throughout 
Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work; a life lived in accordance with his 
open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal theory of Being or what I will suggest 
he came to refer to simply as ‘Life’. In addition, I will argue that in so far as 
each individual human being is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent 
expression of Life, an immediate expression of Life understood as a universal, 
impersonal and pre-individual dynamism, then a life that strives to explore the 
forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment 
brings - a practice that I shall propose also necessitates that each individual 
strives to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are 
continually hindered, thwarted and negated - is not only a life that strives to live 
in accordance with the temporal dynamism of Life, but is also a life lived in 
accordance with our own dynamic and thoroughly temporal being.   
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 4 
Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate the manner in which Gilles Deleuze’s 
individual work, and his collaborative work with Félix Guattari, can be 
productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well. In 
particular, I am going to argue that their work can be understood as suggesting 
that living well necessitates that we become aware of the manner in which each 
moment of our lives provides us with a plurality of forever renewed present 
possibilities, with an ‘open field’ of present possibilities for ‘living otherwise’. 
However, I am also going to argue that Deleuze’s work is profoundly concerned 
with the diverse ways in which our possibilities for living otherwise are 
continually hindered, thwarted and negated by the often restrictive, self-limiting 
modes of life that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that 
continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. In doing so, I shall 
propose that rather than seeking to simply make us aware of our present 
possibilities for living otherwise, the individual and collaborative work of 
Deleuze entails that living well is also concerned with exploring our present 
possibilities, a practice that necessitates that we continually attempt to resist the 
diverse ways in which those possibilities are hindered, thwarted and negated. 
However, in seeking to make us aware of, and in seeking to encourage us, to 
explore the possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders, 
Deleuze does not then move on to provide us with a fixed conception of what 
the content or the direction of our lives should be, he does not provide us with 
an organised, rigid plan for how our lives ought to be lived. This is to say that 
beyond seeking to make us aware of, and seeking to encourage us to explore, the 
forever renewed present possibilities for our lives, a practice that necessitates 
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that we also continually attempt to resist the diverse ways in which those 
possibilities are often occluded and constrained, Deleuze’s work does not 
address the question of living well by providing us with a fixed, overarching 
plan of how our life’s possibilities ought to be actualised. Rather, I am 
suggesting that his work seeks to raise and respond to the question of living well 
by sensitising us to the diverse ways in which our life’s possibilities are 
hindered, thwarted and negated such that, with this awareness, we are then better 
prepared to actively explore the possibilities for our lives and move beyond the 
often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that we have inherited and that 
continue to occlude our present possibilities for living otherwise. 
It is therefore possible to understand Deleuze’s individual and 
collaborative work as presenting a practical challenge to the manner in which 
we live our lives, a challenge that has its basis in a provocative accusation of the 
manner in which our lives are often, and have habitually been lived. This is to 
say that his work can be understood in terms of an accusation that all too often 
we do not live well, that all too often we are guilty of what Henry Miller called 
‘the great crime’, ‘the great crime of not living life to the full’.1 Understood as 
such, Deleuze’s work is not only an accusation that the open field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise are hindered, thwarted and negated, but also 
that we are all too often complicit in the circumscription of these possibilities, 
that we all too often fail to see, let alone explore and exploit the possibilities for 
living otherwise that each moment provides.
2
 However, while Deleuze’s work 
can be understood as an accusation that we are often guilty of the crime of not 
living life to the full, it ought not to be understood as a resentful accusation, an 
accusation that is animated by recrimination and that seeks to engender within 
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us a sense of hopelessness, a sense that things cannot be otherwise. This is to say 
that his work ought not to be understood as an accusation that would seek to 
engender an overwhelming sense of guilt about how we have lived so far, a 
restrictive sense of shame at how our possibilities have been constrained or how 
we have unreflectively actualised our possibilities in accordance with what he 
proposes are the increasingly meagre and mundane modes of existence that 
characterise contemporary society.
3
 Rather, I am suggesting that Deleuze’s work 
can be understood as a provocative accusation, an accusation that seeks to 
challenge us to become aware of the manner in which the forever renewed 
present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders have been 
constrained, and the manner in which we have been complicit in such 
constriction. This is to say that Deleuze’s work can be understood as seeking to 
sensitise us to the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that we have 
inherited in order to then challenge us to live well, to sensitize us to the diverse 
ways in which our present possibilities are circumscribed in order to then sting 
us into activity, to provoke us to begin to explore the open field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. 
But why should we take up this challenge, why should we concern 
ourselves with becoming aware of the present possibilities for living otherwise 
that each moment brings? What is the legitimacy or authority of the suggestion 
that living well necessitates becoming aware of and exploring our present 
possibilities, and what can motivate us to participate in such a practice, a 
practice that also necessitates that we become aware of, and continually attempt 
to resist, the ways in which those possibilities are occluded and constrained? 
The answer, I shall suggest, is that a life that strives to become aware of and 
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explore the open field of present possibilities that each moment brings, a life 
that strives to resist the ways in which life’s present possibilities are continually 
hindered, thwarted and negated, is nothing less then a life that reflects, or that 
strives to live in accordance with, what Deleuze came to refer to simply as ‘Life’. 
Before discussing this further, however, before discussing the relation between 
living well and Life, it is important to note that the term Life appears 
intermittently throughout Deleuze’s individual and collaborative texts, and when 
it does appear it is presented in a characteristically difficult, obscure and even 
quasi-mystical manner. For example, in A Thousand Plateaus, it is suggested 
that ‘not all Life is confined to the organic strata: rather, the organism is that 
which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more 
intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic’.4 In a similarly complex 
formulation in Essays Critical and Clinical - and in relation to the work of 
Samuel Beckett in particular - Deleuze proposes that: ‘Becoming imperceptible 
is Life, “without cessation or condition”…attaining to a cosmic and spiritual 
lapping’.5 However, Deleuze’s employment of the term Life receives its most 
explicit, although no less complex, treatment in Immanence: a Life, the last brief 
and difficult text that was published shortly before his death in 1995. In 
particular, Life is explicitly associated with the notion of immanence, with the 
notion of a ‘pure immanence’ or an ‘absolute immanence’, an immanence that is 
not immanent to something above and beyond it and which has therefore 
‘purified’ itself of any notion of transcendence. For example, Deleuze writes 
that: ‘We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is 
not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing else is itself a life. A 
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life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, 
complete bliss’.6  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the manner in which Deleuze’s individual 
and collaborative works make reference to a variety of figures from across the 
life-sciences, the notion of Life, and Deleuze’s work more generally, has 
commonly been presented within that context. Therefore, prior to discussing 
how I propose to understand the notion of Life, I want to briefly highlight the 
manner in which Deleuze’s work has been employed in relation to the growing 
concern with open systems and complexity theory, along with recent 
developments in evolutionary theory and bio-philosophy, in so far as it provides 
the context from which I want to distinguish this study, and its concern with the 
relation between living well and Life. In order to first highlight the employment 
of Deleuze’s work in relation to open systems and complexity theory, it is 
important to note the suggestion that towards the end of the twentieth century 
there was, as it were, ‘a paradigm shift’ in the scientific study of biological life.7 
In particular, rather than attempting to understand, for example, a living 
organism in terms of its constituent parts, there was a focus on the organizing 
relations and processes between those parts, and therefore an understanding of 
the organism as a dynamic system. This is to say that it is insufficient to attempt 
to understand a living organism by solely attending to its DNA, proteins and 
other molecular structures, because one must also, as Capra has suggested, 
attend to ‘the ceaseless flow of energy and matter through a network of chemical 
reactions, which enables a living organism to continuously generate, repair and 
perpetuate itself’. 8  In addition, this systems view of organisms and natural 
phenomena more generally involves the awareness that, rather than being 
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conservative, ‘closed’ or, for all practical intents and purposes, isolated from 
their surroundings, most systems in nature are ‘open’ and therefore subject to 
continuous flows of matter and energy through them.
9
 One of the central factors 
that has accelerated this new systemic understanding of natural phenomena has 
been the advent of powerful digital computers that have made it possible to give 
a visual representation - or what is technically referred to as a ‘phase portrait’ - 
of the behaviour of a given system, and this has enabled the perception of an 
underlying order beneath the seemingly chaotic behaviour of systems. In 
particular, the creation of a phase portrait involves identifying a system’s 
relevant aspects or its ‘degrees of freedom’ - such as its velocity, position, 
pressure and temperature - and then condensing all that information into a single 
point such that, as the system changes, the point representing the system also 
changes and thereby traces or draws a given trajectory.
10
 While a given system 
may commence in a variety of ways it subsequently adopts a characteristic long-
term behaviour or dynamic form such that the visual representation of that 
system’s trajectory forms a pattern, and this patterned visual representation is 
referred to as an ‘attractor’ because, metaphorically speaking, the system in 
question is attracted to this pattern whatever its starting point may have been.
11
      
While a variety of attractors have been discerned in natural systems, 
including the strangely tangled shapes that represent seemingly chaotic 
behaviour and that are therefore referred to as ‘strange’ or ‘chaotic’ attractors,12 
one of the most startling features of attractors is their ability to spontaneously 
mutate into another attractor. This is to say that while a given natural system 
will display a characteristic long-term behaviour, and is thus guided by one 
attractor, any changes in the system’s degrees of freedom will subtly change the 
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existing attractor until, at a certain crucial point - what is technically referred to 
as a ‘bifurcation point’ - the attractor suddenly mutates into a different attractor 
and the system thereby adopts a different dynamic form.
13
 What is of central 
importance, however, for an understanding of the relation of Deleuze’s 
individual and collaborative work to open systems and complexity theory is the 
discovery that, rather than each physical system possessing its own specific 
attractor, there is only a limited number of attractors such that entirely different 
material systems can, as it were, ‘share’ the same attractor. Therefore, Manuel 
Delanda has suggested that attractors and bifurcations can be understood as 
‘abstract’ or ‘virtual mechanisms’, as a form of ‘nonorganic life’ that is 
‘incarnated’ in different physical systems, and yet are not analogous to Platonic 
Forms - if by this we mean that attractors have an independent existence in some 
supra-sensible, transcendent realm; as he makes clear, attractors and bifurcations 
‘are intrinsic features of the dynamics of physical systems, and they have no 
independent existence outside of those physical systems’.14 However, DeLanda 
goes on to suggest that attractors are to be understood as a limited and ‘abstract 
reservoir of resources’ that are available for many different physical systems, 
and he identifies such an abstract reservoir with what Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to as ‘the machinic phylum.’15 Thus, he writes that:  
 
I introduce the term “machinic phylum” to designate a single 
phylogenetic line cutting through all matter, “living” or “non-living,” a 
single source of spontaneous order for all of reality. More specifically, 
the attractors define the more of less stable and permanent features of 
this reality (its long term tendencies), and bifurcations constitute its 
source of creativity and variability. Or to put it more philosophically, 
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attractors are veritable “figures of destiny,” for they define the future of 
many systems.
16
         
 
In addition to its application to open systems and complexity theory, however, 
Deleuze’s work has also been situated within the tradition of modern bio-
philosophy which is said to run from Charles Darwin and August Weismann 
through to Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud, while also incorporating the 
work of a diverse range of thinkers including Raymond Ruyer, Gilbert 
Simondon and Jacob von Uexkull.
17
 While the details of this complex work will 
not be discussed here, a productive way to illustrate the employment of 
Deleuze’s work in relation to this tradition is through the work of the 
contemporary zoologist Richard Dawkins and, in particular, his notion of the 
extended phenotype. Thus, Dawkins proposes that the current and prevailing 
orthodoxy in evolutionary theory is to think of genes as having a manifest effect 
- or what is technically referred to as a phenotypic expression - that produces 
attributes or behaviours that are confined to, and that benefit, the individual 
organism in which those genes reside.
18
 For example, an organism can be said to 
possess a gene that finds phenotypic expression in that organism’s tail size, or 
another gene that finds phenotypic expression in the organism’s dam building 
behaviour. In addition to this, however, Dawkins suggests that the genes of an 
organism can extend beyond the organism in which they happen to reside, such 
that those genes find phenotypic expression in a second organism. For example, 
while the intended or definitive host of fluke parasites is birds, the flukes invade 
the horns of snails and manipulate their behaviour with regard to light, such that 
the snails engage in positive light seeking behaviour; in doing so, the snails 
venture up and out onto open sites where their horns, visibly pulsating with 
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fluke parasites, are eaten by birds - the flukes’ definitive hosts - who mistake the 
pulsating horns for insects.
19
 What is important to note here is that the genes of 
the fluke extend beyond the confines of its own body, they no longer merely 
have phenotypic expression with regard to its own attributes or behaviour, but 
influence the behaviour of the snail, such that the snail’s behaviour is to be 
understood as a phenotypic expression of fluke genes; as Dawkins notes: ‘The 
genes in one organism’s cells, then, can have extended phenotypic influence on 
the living body of another organism; in this case a parasite’s genes find 
phenotypic expression in the behaviour of its host’.20   
Following this, Dawkins moves on to discuss ‘genetic action at a 
distance’ in which the genes of parasites can influence the behaviour of their 
hosts without physically living inside those hosts - such as the manner in which 
a cuckoo chick, through ‘supernormal stimuli’, manipulates the behaviour of an 
adult reed warbler such that the warbler feeds the cuckoo to the detriment of its 
own offspring.
21
 What is important to note about Dawkins’ notion of the 
extended phenotype, however, is not merely the extended phenotypic effects of 
genes, but the manner in which the phenotypic expression of genes is able to 
traverse species and genera such that, for example, the genes of a fluke are able 
to have phenotypic expression in a snail. As he makes clear: ‘From internal 
parasites we moved via cuckoos to action at a distance. In theory, genetic action 
at a distance could include almost all interactions between individuals of the 
same or different species. The living world can be seen as a network of 
interlocking fields of replicator power’. 22  With striking similarity, Deleuze 
illustrates such ‘transversal communication’ between different species - as well 
as the symbiotic relationships between those species - with the example of the 
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manner in which some varieties of orchid, in order to ensure their own 
reproduction, manipulate the behaviour of wasps; in particular, he proposes that: 
‘The wasp becomes part of the orchid’s reproductive apparatus at the same time 
as the orchid becomes the sexual organ of the wasp.’23 The significance of such 
transversal communication between different species and genera is that it 
challenges the notion that evolution occurs exclusively in terms of filiation and 
descent in which the phenotypic expression of genes are confined to the 
organism in which they happen to be situated and are passed onto that species’ 
descendents. Indeed, when considering evolution - or what is referred to 
variously as ‘non-parallel evolution’, ‘nuptials’, ‘blocks of becoming’ or simply 
‘involution’24 - Deleuze makes it clear that ‘movement occurs not only, or not 
primarily, by filiative productions but also by transversal communications 
between heterogeneous populations’.25 Therefore, with respect to the productive 
connections between Deleuze’s work and modern evolutionary theory, Ansell-
Pearson has suggested that the extended phenotype comes very close to what 
Deleuze and Guattari mean by transversal communication, ‘communication of 
matter and information across phyletic lineages without fidelity to relations of 
species and genus’.26 In particular, he proposes that: ‘The extended phenotype 
which communicates beyond the confines of the organism is a good way of 
capturing the significance of what Deleuze and Guattari call the machinic 
phylum in which evolution takes place via modes of symbiosis and contagion’.27   
The employment of Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work in 
relation to the life-sciences, as the foregoing brief overview begins to indicate, 
can therefore be understood as a challenging and stimulating area of research. 
However, there are also increasing examples of the manner in which Deleuze’s 
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notion of Life, rather than being situated within the context of the life-sciences, 
is being investigated in relation to more traditional, philosophical concerns. For 
example, Claire Colebrook has recently discussed the meaning of Deleuze’s 
employment of the term life by presenting it within the context of ‘the life of 
meaning’ and - by connecting Deleuze’s notion of life to his notion of sense - as 
the life of that sense that makes meaning possible. Thus, she proposes that 
Deleuze ‘gives the meaning of life as the life of meaning, the life that yields a 
sense that is grasped through meaning but which is irreducible to meaning’.28 
Moreover, rather than presenting life as the stable ground of sense, as that 
clearly demarcated horizon which would definitely explain sense, life is 
presented as an open, impersonal and dynamic power, as ‘the potentiality of 
sense’ such that ‘life is the giving of sense that can itself never be definitively 
said’. 29  Similarly, the manner in which Deleuze’s immersion within the 
philosophical tradition, and his concern with ontology in particular,
30
 can be 
employed to investigate the traditional philosophical question of how one might 
live can be evidenced in Todd May’s Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction. In that 
work May argues that while both Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida approach 
the question of how one might live by rejecting ontology, Deleuze seeks to 
approach that question within the context of ontological inquiry. As May 
suggests:   
 
For both Foucault and Derrida any approach to the question of being that 
goes by means of an account of an unchanging, pure nature or essence is 
misguided, for either historical or linguistic reasons. Misguided, and 
worse than misguided: harmful. To address the question of being by 
means of an account of what there is would seem to constrain human 
behavior to a narrow conformity. It would fail to keep alive the question 
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of how one might live. And that is the point at which they diverge from 
Deleuze, who approaches the question of how one might live not by 
abandoning ontology, but by embracing it.
31
  
 
It is therefore within this context that I want to situate Deleuze’s notion of Life 
and the manner in which the question of living well can be understood in 
relation to it. This is to say that rather than investigating the notion of Life, and 
Deleuze’s work more generally, within the context of the life-sciences, I shall 
suggest that the concept of Life can be productively understood in ontological 
terms. Indeed, while Alain Badiou has produced one of the most provocative 
critiques of Deleuze’s philosophy32 - a critique that I shall argue Deleuze’s work 
is able to address - Badiou proposes that the name that Deleuze came to attribute 
to being, understood as an impersonal or neutral power, was Life.
33
 However, 
rather than simply being understood as an impersonal power, I shall argue that 
Life, understood in ontological terms, ought to be conceptualised in terms of an 
impersonal, temporal and thoroughly immanent power that is free from any 
remaining vestiges of transcendence.
34
 Indeed, in associating Life with an 
absolute immanence, with an immanence that excludes any notion of 
transcendence, Giorgio Agamben has noted the manner in which such 
immanence is to be understood in ontological terms and, in particular, in terms 
of an ontology of univocity. For example, he writes that: ‘The principle of 
immanence, therefore, is nothing other than a generalization of the ontology of 
univocity, which excludes any transcendence of Being’.35 However, in addition 
to arguing that Deleuze’s notion of Life can be understood in ontological terms 
as the impersonal, immanent and temporal nature of reality itself, I shall propose 
that Deleuze’s ontology, and his engagement with the philosophical tradition 
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more generally, also provides the conceptual tools by which to formulate a 
coherent account of the manner in which the living human being can be 
understood as an ongoing expression of Life. In particular, I shall suggest that 
the temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understand as 
an ongoing expression of Life itself, an immediate or immanent expression of 
the universal, impersonal and thoroughly temporal nature of reality, such that a 
life that strives to become aware of and to explore the open field of present 
possibilities that each moment brings, a life that strives to resist the diverse ways 
in which those present possibilities are continually occluded and constrained, is 
not only a life that reflects, or that strives to live in accordance with Life, but is 
also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic and thoroughly temporal 
being.  
The intimate relation between Life and the living being, the manner in 
which each individual can be understood in terms of an expression of the 
universal temporality of Life itself, can perhaps begin to be evidenced most 
clearly in Deleuze’s Immanence: a Life. In particular, the notion of Life, or what 
he refers to as ‘a life’, and its relation to the living being, is explicated by means 
of a scene from Charles Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend in which a roguish, 
disreputable man, held in contempt by everyone, is discovered lying on the floor 
and on the verge of death. Suddenly, however, those watching over the dying 
man are said to ‘manifest an eagerness, respect, even love, for his slightest sign 
of life’ and, in doing so, they frantically try to save him and to save his life.36 As 
the dying man unexpectedly begins to recover, however, the people that 
moments before were trying to save his life, begin to turn colder towards him as 
once again he becomes for them the roguish, disreputable man that they had 
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held in contempt. Deleuze moves on to discuss the events surrounding the 
roguish man, and his relation to Life, by suggesting that:   
 
Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a 
life playing with death. The life of the individual gives way to an 
impersonal and yet singular life…a “Homo tantum” with whom 
everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude…a life of pure 
immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject 
that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad.
37
  
 
In reading this, it perhaps becomes clearer to see why it has been suggested that, 
while representing Deleuze’s mature metaphysical reflections, the tenor of 
Immanence: a Life is, as it were, ‘almost spiritual’.38  However, despite the 
seemingly obscure and spiritual tenor of this account of a life, it can 
provisionally be suggested that Deleuze is proposing that what the onlookers 
encounter when attending to the roguish man is Life understood as a universal, 
impersonal and immanent power. Indeed, it is precisely at that point when the 
rogue’s individual life begins to disperse that a life, Life understood as an 
impersonal power, becomes manifest and it is precisely this impersonal power, 
‘neutral, beyond good and evil’, that the onlookers wish to save in so far as it is 
that universal and impersonal Life that their own specific lives ‘incarnate’ and 
with whom everyone is said to empathize.  
Despite its brevity and its difficulty, what is therefore important to note 
about Deleuze’s presentation of a life in Immanence: a Life is that it can not 
only be understood as an attempt to elucidate the general characteristics of what 
I have referred to as the notion of Life, the manner in which it is to be 
understood as an impersonal, universal and immanent power, but there is also an 
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attempt to situate Life firmly within the context of the individual lives of human 
beings that are its incarnation or its ongoing and immanent expression. Indeed, 
while Dickens’ account is employed by Deleuze to suggest that a life can be 
encountered when an individual is on the point of death, it is suggested that a 
life can also be witnessed at birth, with babies and small children who are yet to 
fully develop the individual life and personal qualities that are present in older 
children and adults. As Deleuze makes clear, ‘very small children all resemble 
one another and have hardly any individuality…[and]…through all their 
sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an immanent life that is pure power 
and even bliss’.39 Moreover, while a life is said to be witnessed most clearly at 
the birth of the individual - when the individual’s life and personal qualities are 
yet to develop - and also at the death of the individual - when the individual’s 
life is about to disperse - a life is presented in terms of an impersonal power that 
continually co-exists with every moment of an individual’s life. As Deleuze 
notes, ‘we shouldn’t enclose life in the single moment when individual life 
confronts universal death. A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given 
living subject goes through’.40 Therefore, motivated by Deleuze’s concern in his 
last published work with the notion of a life and its place within the lives of 
human beings, this study will seek to make an original contribution to existing 
Deleuzian studies by formulating an account of the manner in which each 
individual, as an ongoing and immanent expression of the dynamic nature of 
Life, is presented with forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. 
In particular, I will suggest that living well necessitates that the individual 
becomes aware of and explores these present possibilities such that what 
legitimises this conception of living well is that it is a life that not only strives to 
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live in accordance with Life itself, but is also a life lived in accordance with our 
own dynamic, temporal being. 
To clarify, the aim of this study is to investigate the manner in which 
Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as 
being concerned with the question of living well, and the manner in which living 
well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the 
forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment 
brings. In particular, I am suggesting that what legitimises this conception of 
living well, and what can motivate us to engage in such a practice, is that a life 
that becomes aware of and explores the open field of present possibilities for 
living otherwise that each moment brings is a life that reflects Life itself, a life 
that is lived in accordance with the open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal 
nature of reality. Moreover, to the extent that each individual is to be understood 
as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, then a life that strives to 
explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each 
moment engenders - a practice that also necessitates that each individual strives 
to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are continually 
hindered, thwarted and negated - is not only a life lived in accordance with the 
dynamic nature of Life, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own 
dynamic, temporal being. Therefore, in so far as Deleuze and Guattari’s 
individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being 
concerned with the question of living well, and in so far as living well is to be 
understood as living in accordance with Life, then the question of living well in 
Deleuze’s individual and collaborative works is intimately connected to the 
open and thoroughly temporal ontological account that is present throughout 
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those works. Before moving on to examine this in detail, however, it is 
important to note that in suggesting that a life that strives to explore our forever 
renewed present possibilities is a life that strives to live in accordance with Life 
itself then Deleuze’s work can be understood as possessing what might be 
referred to as ‘a Stoical orientation’.41 Indeed, it is productive to briefly clarify 
and distinguish what I am here referring to as Deleuze’s stoical orientation from 
the philosophical orientation of the Stoics in so far as it brings into relief 
important aspects of the relation between both Life and living well, and the 
human being and their present possibilities.  
In order to do this, however, it is first necessary to clarify the meaning of 
the Stoic imperative to live in accordance with life, or what is sometimes 
referred to as living in accordance with nature, and to suggest that it should not 
be understood as advocating that we abandon the trappings of civilisation and 
return to nature, and still less does it mean that we should ‘throw off the 
shackles’ of civilisation and live as we see fit. As Staniforth has suggested, 
according to the Stoics the chief end of man is happiness and ‘happiness was 
attained by “living in accordance with Nature”. This celebrated phrase is too 
easily misunderstood by the modern reader. It does not mean living the simple 
life, or the life of the natural man; still less does it mean living just as one 
likes’.42 Rather, to live in accordance with nature is to live both in accordance 
with the nature of the universe, and to live in accordance with one’s own nature; 
in doing so, there is said to be no conflict between the two in so far as our 
natures are to be understood as being a part of the nature of the universe and 
also because we are by nature rational beings, the attribute that we share with 
and derive from the universe itself.
43
 What is important to note about this 
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relation, however, is that if the universe is said to possess a specific and 
determinate nature, if the universe is said to be ‘rational, and alive and 
intelligent’44 and therefore governed by reason, a reason that we share with and 
derive from the universe, then to live in accordance with nature would seem to 
suggest that we ought to act in accordance with, and therefore actualise the 
specific possibilities dictated to us by, the rational principle that organises 
nature.
45
 Indeed, the manner in which living in accordance with nature appears 
to suggest a fixed, overarching plan of how our life’s possibilities ought to be 
actualised can be discerned in Diogenes Laertius’s suggestion that: ‘[T]he goal 
becomes “to live consistently with nature”, i.e., according to one’s own nature 
and that of the universe, doing nothing which is forbidden by the common law, 
which is right reason, penetrating all things…So Diogenes says explicitly that 
the goal is reasonable behaviour in the selection of things according to nature, 
and Archedumus [says it is] to live carrying out all the appropriate acts’.46     
For Deleuze, however, living in accordance with Life does not entail a 
fixed, overarching plan of how the possibilities for our lives ought to be 
actualised. This is because Life, understood in ontological terms as a universal, 
impersonal and thoroughly temporal power, does not possess some definite, 
fixed determination that would dictate how our possibilities ought to be 
actualised, but is instead to be understood as that which is continually becoming 
different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that 
continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable 
drive to continually produce forever renewed present possibilities for being.
47
 
Indeed, in stressing the importance of the centrality of difference for Deleuze’s 
work, and his ‘philosophy of life more generally’, Colebrook suggests that: 
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‘Deleuze’s philosophy of life is necessarily, avowedly and manifestly composed 
along a line of internal incoherence: philosophy must, if it is philosophical, think 
difference, even if difference is that which cannot be thought. Such an 
impossibility is not confined to philosophy and has to do with the very positivity 
of life’.48 Therefore, while chapter one of this study will begin by providing an 
account of Life as an impersonal and expressive power through the employment 
of Deleuze’s ‘Spinozist concept of expressionism’,49 I shall move on to suggest 
that a formulation of the ‘positivity’, or thoroughly open and dynamic nature of 
Life can only be completed through the employment of Deleuze’s account of 
time, or what he refers to as ‘the passive synthesis of time’,50 that itself rests 
upon a challenging conception of the dynamic and ongoing return of difference. 
Moreover, while chapter three will formulate an account of the manner in which 
our forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are continually 
hindered, thwarted and negated, and will seek to do so within the context of 
‘nihilism’ - where nihilism must be understood as possessing a technical and 
specifically temporal sense - chapter four will formulate an account of how we 
might practically respond or ‘resist’ this circumscription of our present 
possibilities and, by doing so, not only become aware of, but also begin to 
explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each 
moment brings. 
Deleuze’s account of the passive syntheses of time, therefore, will be 
central to this study as whole, and while that account of time is not only 
complex and challenging but, as Deleuze himself acknowledges, profoundly 
paradoxical,
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 then it will be given a detailed exposition in chapter two of this 
study. However, in order to highlight the thoroughly temporal nature of Life and 
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the manner in which living in accordance with Life does not, in contrast to the 
Stoics, suggest a fixed, overarching plan of how the possibilities for our lives 
ought to be actualised, it is here productive to note that there are three passive 
synthesis of time. Briefly stated, the first synthesis or what Deleuze refers to as 
‘Habit’ is a retention, contraction and synthesis of all past moments into the 
present to create the present lived expectation of the future, while the second 
synthesis of time or ‘Memory’ is a contraction of the totality of the past into and 
co-existence with the present, a contraction and co-existence which ensures that 
the present passes. For example, in highlighting the names that he attributes to 
the first and second synthesis of time, along with the relation between those two 
syntheses, Deleuze writes that:  
 
The passive synthesis of habit in turn refers to this more profound 
passive synthesis of memory: Habitus and Mnemosyne, the alliance 
of sky and ground. Habit is the originary synthesis of time, which 
constitutes the life of the passing present; Memory is the 
fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the past 
(that which causes the present to pass).
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While the first two syntheses of time draw heavily upon the work of Henri 
Bergson,
53
 I shall suggest that one of the central innovations of Deleuze’s work 
is the third synthesis of time. In particular, I shall argue that what is central 
about the third synthesis of time is that it not only creates and connects the past 
and the future either side of the present moment, but that it is also that which 
establishes the continual or ‘eternal return’ 54  of a new or different present 
moment that simultaneously cuts the past from the future, thereby providing 
each individual with an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise 
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and ensuring the continual overcoming of Life’s present identity or 
determination. 
What I have referred to as the Stoical orientation of Deleuze’s work, 
however, can not only be discerned in the suggestion that living well is living in 
accordance with Life. Rather, to the extent that I have suggested that each 
individual is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life 
then Deleuze’s work can be understood as possessing a general Stoical 
orientation in the sense that the Stoics, as we have seen, proposed that human 
beings were an intimate part of nature, deriving their nature from the nature of 
the cosmos.
55
 Again, however, caution is needed with respect to what is meant 
here. In suggesting that the individual is a part of nature, a nature that is 
governed by a rational, organising principle, then the Stoics were suggesting that 
each individual derives their nature from nature at large, that human beings were 
‘by nature’ rational beings. 56  For example, in highlighting the centrality of 
rationality to human being, Marcus Aurelius concisely proposed that: ‘A little 
flesh, a little breath, and a Reason to rule all – that is myself’.57 However, if 
human beings are to be understood as possessing a specific and determinate 
nature, a nature that we share with and derive from the universe, then our 
natures would seem to suggest that we ought to act in accordance with, and 
therefore actualise the specific possibilities dictated to us, by the nature that we 
derive from the universe. Indeed, the manner in which the Stoics and, in 
particular, late Stoicism suggested that human beings were by nature rational 
beings, and the manner in which this determination of the nature of human being 
began to circumscribe the individual’s open field of present possibilities for 
living otherwise, can be understood as being highlighted by Foucault in his work 
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on the emergence and transformation of the epimeleia heautou or ‘the care of 
the self’ throughout classical and late antiquity. In particular, Foucault notes that 
in early Stoicism the care of the self was understood as being concerned with 
treating one’s life as a work of art, an ‘aesthetics of existence’, in which the 
central problem was one of personal choice, the choice of which of life’s 
possibilities to actualise in order to create and to live a beautiful life.
58
 In late 
Stoicism, however, he notes how the problem of choice, the personal choice of 
which possibilities of living to actualise, gives way to the imperative or the 
obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance with that 
dictated to it by reason, understood as the central characteristic of human being. 
Thus, he makes it clear that: ‘In late Stoicism, when they start saying, “Well, 
you are obliged to do that because you are a human being,” something changes. 
It’s not a problem of choice; you have to do it because you are a rational 
being’.59 
Indeed, it is instructive to briefly examine Foucault’s suspicion of any 
formulation of the universal, natural or essential characteristics of human being, 
and of universal structures more generally, in so far as it brings into relief a 
central difference between Foucault and Deleuze regarding the possibilities for 
living that are available to human beings, and helps us understand the latter’s 
commitment to ontology more generally.
60
 Simply stated, Foucault’s works can 
be understood as being concerned with taking that which has been presented as 
universal, essential and necessary, such as the ‘ultimate nature of human being’ 
or the ‘ultimate nature of reality itself’, and exposing such universal postulates 
as historical and contingent.
61
 Indeed, in outlining his methodological approach, 
he makes it clear that our critical and practical philosophical question ought to 
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be: ‘In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is 
occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints?’ 62  In seeking to pursue this question, Foucault’s concern is to 
investigate the manner in which that which has been presented as universal and 
necessary has been employed to regulate human conduct and to establish and 
enforce, for example, certain sexual, psychological and emotional norms. This is 
to say that Foucault is concerned with the manner in which constraints and 
limits have been placed on the possibilities of living that are available to human 
beings in the name of the essential characteristics of human being, or the 
universal structures of reality. For example, if we suggest that the essential and 
universal characteristic of human being is rationality, a position that I have 
suggested Foucault sees late Stoicism moving towards, then those human beings 
that do not accord with the dominant conception of what rationality is, what 
rational human beings ought to do, say and think, risk being considered as 
irrational, abnormal or even as ‘not fully human’.63 Indeed, it is in this sense that 
we can understand Foucault’s suggestion towards the end of his life that the 
primary objective of his work had been to give a history of the different ways in 
which ‘human beings are made subjects’.64 This is to say that he was concerned 
with examining the manner in which human beings were ‘made subjects’ in so 
far as their subjective identity, who or what they understand themselves to be, is 
made or produced by being tied to a specific, historically contingent conception 
of what it is to be a human being, but also made subjects in the sense of being 
made subject to others by control and dependence on the basis of that 
conception of human being.
65
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In seeking to expose candidates for universality as being historical 
contingencies, Foucault is not concerned with then establishing his own 
conception of what the essential characteristics of human being are, or what the 
fundamental structure of reality is.
66
 Rather, he is seeking to expose such 
candidates for universality as historical contingencies in order to then open up 
the field of present possibilities available to human beings, to combat the 
manner in which one’s possibilities for living have been constrained in the name 
of essential characteristics and universal postulates. For example, in stating the 
aim of his critical and practical critique, he makes it clear that: 
 
[T]his critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce 
from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to 
know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us 
what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what 
we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that 
has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far 
and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.
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For Foucault, therefore, that which is given to us as universal, any conception of 
the nature of being or of the nature of human being, is incompatible with an 
open field of present possibilities because such universalities entail that our 
possibilities for living give way to the obligation to actualise the possibilities for 
one’s life in accordance with that dictated to us by such universalities. Indeed, in 
characterising the manner in which the circumscription of our life’s possibilities 
are supposed to follow from that which is given to us as universal, May has 
suggested that if we accept that there are aspects of our world that are ‘immune 
from change’, then:  
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We must conform to the limits they place before us and order our world 
with those limits in mind. This is more deeply true, and more deeply 
constraining, when those limits are not merely placed upon us from the 
outside like barriers but are instead woven into the very fabric of human 
existence. To attempt to surpass such limits, to seek to live otherwise, 
would be futile. Far from being a sign of liberation, the project of living 
otherwise would be a symptom of abnormality.
68
            
   
It is therefore possible to discern an instructive, distinctive relationship between 
the work of Foucault and Deleuze in relation to what I have referred to as 
universal postulates, a relationship within which is woven the Stoics and the 
care of the self, and that brings into relief a central difference between the two 
philosophers regarding the commitment to ontology and the present possibilities 
for living otherwise that are available to human beings. As we have seen, 
Foucault is suspicious of any notion of the universal nature of being and the 
universal nature of human being in so far as such universalities seem, for him, to 
be incompatible with the care of the self - understood as an aesthetics of 
existence in which the central problem was one of personal choice, the choice of 
which possibilities of living to actualise in order to create our lives and to create 
ourselves. This is to say that any proposed ontological account, any account of 
the nature of being or of the nature of human being, and especially any 
imperative to come to know and live in accordance with these natures, would 
appear to be incompatible with the care of the self in so far as such universal 
postulates would then seem to determine what we ought to do, say or think. For 
example, Foucault makes it clear that ‘this idea that one must know oneself - 
that is, gain ontological knowledge of the soul’s mode of being - is independent 
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of what one would call an exercise of the self upon the self [i.e. the care of the 
self]’.69 As we have seen, this opposition is made evident in his distinction 
between the early Stoics, in which the central problem was which of life’s 
possibilities to actualise in order to create and to live a beautiful life, and the 
manner in which the problem of choice involved in the care of the self gives 
way in late Stoicism to the obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life 
in accordance with that dictated to it by reason, understood as the essential 
characteristic of human being and, more generally, the rational, organising 
principle of reality. For Foucault, therefore, the way to open up a field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise is to critically examine, and expose as 
historically contingent, candidates for the universal being of nature and, in 
particular, the ultimate nature of human being so that we may begin to move 
beyond the limits placed on the possibilities for living available to us, limits that 
have been legitimised in the name of, and said to necessarily follow from, such 
universalities.
70
  
Deleuze, like Foucault, is also critical of that which has been, and 
continues to be given to us as universal, critical of the manner in which such 
universalities have been conceptualised and employed to enforce the 
actualisation of a specific set of possibilities for living.
71
 However, one of the 
central and profound innovations of Deleuze’s work is that he provides a 
candidate for universality that does not circumscribe the field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise that are available to human beings. This is to 
say that although Deleuze can be understood as presenting a universal account 
of the dynamic nature of human being, a nature that is shared with and derived 
from the universal nature of Life itself, neither entail that we ought to actualise a 
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specific set of possibilities for living, neither entail an organised, rigid plan for 
how our lives ought to be lived. This is because Deleuze’s account of the 
dynamic and thoroughly temporal nature of Life and of human being is not 
conceptualised in terms of a fixed, determinate nature, it is not conceptualised in 
terms of that which is immune from change and which would oblige us to 
actualise a given set of possibilities dictated to us by that nature. Rather, 
Deleuze’s dynamic and thoroughly temporal ontological account - what I am 
referring to as Life, Life as a universal and impersonal dynamic power - is to be 
understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any 
given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that continually overcomes any 
present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce 
forever renewed present possibilities. As Hardt suggests: ‘Being differs with 
itself immediately, internally. It does not look outside itself for an other or a 
force of mediation because its difference rises from its very core’.72 Therefore, 
while Foucault seeks to open up a field of present possibilities for living, and 
thereby enable us to creatively work upon ourselves and upon our lives, by 
exposing candidates for universality as historically contingent, Deleuze provides 
a candidate for universality that engenders an open field of present possibilities 
for living, an awareness of which enables us to creatively work upon ourselves 
and upon our lives. This is to say that Deleuze can be understood as formulating 
a universal account of the nature of Life and its relation to human being, but it is 
a thoroughly dynamic and temporal account, an awareness of which enlivens us 
to the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment 
brings, and which thereby enables us to begin to engage with the problem of 
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which of Life’s possibilities to actualise in order to creatively work upon 
ourselves and upon our lives.   
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Chapter One: Expression 
 
I have suggested that Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be 
productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, 
where living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we 
also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that 
each moment brings. In doing so, we not only live in accordance with the open, 
dynamic temporality of Life itself but, to the extent that we are to be understood 
as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, then we also live in accordance 
with our own dynamic, thoroughly temporal being. My objective in this chapter, 
therefore, is to begin to formulate of an account of the manner in which each 
human being is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, 
the manner in which each human being participates in Life, and I shall do so 
within the context of what Deleuze, in relation to his work on Spinoza, refers to 
as the problem of participation.
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 Before introducing the problem of 
participation, however, I would like to briefly discus the reason for employing 
that problematic to discuss the relation between human beings and Life. In order 
to do this, however, it is important to recall that I have suggested that Life, 
understood in ontological terms as a universal, impersonal and dynamic power, 
does not possess some definite, fixed determination, but is to be understood as 
that which continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its 
interminable drive to continually produce forever renewed present possibilities. 
Moreover, in so far as I have also suggested that each human being is an 
ongoing and, in particular, an immanent expression of this dynamic power, then 
to live in accordance with Life does not entail that we live in accordance with a 
transcendent nature that would entail a fixed, overarching plan of how we ought 
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to actualise our present possibilities, but that we explore the open field of 
present possibilities that this dynamic power continually engenders. However, 
what the problem of participation, and the various historical responses to that 
problem, vividly illustrate is the manner in which the dynamic nature of Life, 
and the manner in which each human being is to be understood as an ongoing 
and immanent expression of Life, can be frustrated, thwarted and even negated. 
This is to say that the problem of participation, and the various historical 
responses to that problem, contain a number of interrelated and established 
ontological presuppositions that frustrate what I have suggested is the dynamic 
nature of Life and the manner in which it continually overcomes any present 
determination or identity, and also frustrate the manner in which each human 
being can be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life that is 
continually provided with an open field of present possibilities for living 
otherwise.  
I am therefore employing the problem of participation in order to 
formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life because an 
account of the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which the human 
being is an immanent expression of this dynamism, will be required to address 
and overcome the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical 
responses to the problem of participation. This is to say that the ontological 
presuppositions associated with the responses to the problem of participation 
provide a valuable context in which to formulate an account of the dynamic 
relation between human beings and Life because that account will be required to 
address the challenge that those established ontological presuppositions pose. In 
particular, that which would frustrate, thwart and deny the dynamic nature of 
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Life and of human being concerns the important notion of transcendence, along 
with a number of ontological presuppositions that are intimately related to this 
notion; namely, the notions of equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the positing of 
an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity over 
difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. In seeking 
to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life that 
addresses these presuppositions I shall employ Deleuze’s Spinozist concept of 
expression, developed most fully in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza,
74
 to 
argue that the relation between Life and human being ought to be understood as 
an expressive one. In being understood as such, I shall suggest that the notion of 
transcendence and the interrelated ontological presuppositions associated with 
the various historical responses to the problem of participation can begin to be 
addressed. In particular, the notion of expression will enable us to begin to think 
about how human beings can be understood as an ongoing and immediate 
expression of Life, a Life that remains immanent within all human beings in so 
far as they are its ongoing and immediate expression. In doing so, we shall begin 
to understand that rather than an ontological division and difference between the 
nature of Life and the nature of human beings, there is what Deleuze refers to as 
one ontologically univocal and ‘consistent plane of nature’ or ‘plane of 
immanence’,75 an immanent plane of Life upon which all human beings exist as 
Life’s ongoing and immediate expression and from which all human beings 
derive their ongoing, dynamic and temporal being.  
In beginning to elucidate the problem of participation, it is perhaps best 
to understand that problematic in terms of ontological inquiry, in terms of that 
which, in its Aristotelian formulation, is to be understood as an investigation 
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into ‘the study of things that are, qua being’, an investigation into being qua 
being.
76
 In particular, the problem of participation can be understood as being 
concerned with how, or in what manner, the multitude of manifestly different 
beings, the many different things that exist and populate the world, despite those 
manifest differences, come to ‘possess’, or come to ‘participate in’, that singular 
characteristic of existing, that one attribute of being. As Aristotle makes clear: 
‘There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is 
related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by 
a mere ambiguity’.77 As this formulation suggests, an important and traditional 
terminological distinction within ontological inquiry, a distinction that Deleuze 
himself will adopt in order to position himself against,
78
 is that between the 
‘One and the many’, or between ‘Being and beings’ - the former term 
commonly capitalised to emphasise this distinction and, often, to confer priority 
on it over the latter term. However, in order to formulate an account of the 
relation between human beings and Life and to begin to understand how this 
relation challenges the traditional ontological distinction between the One and 
the many, or between Being and beings, it is first necessary to note that the 
problem of participation can best be understood by beginning with the work of 
Plato. Indeed, Deleuze refers to the problem of participation as ‘the Platonic 
problem of participation’ and suggests that everything may be traced back to 
it.
79
 In particular, in attempting to address the problem of participation Plato is 
said to have proposed various schemes of participation, in which ‘to participate 
was to be a part; or to imitate; or even to receive something from a demon…’80 
However, his most celebrated answer to the problem of participation, his most 
celebrated answer to the question of how, or in what manner, the multitude of 
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manifestly different beings, the many different things that exist and populate the 
world, despite those manifest differences, come to possess or participate in that 
singular characteristic of existing, that one attribute of Being, is the so-called 
‘theory of Forms’ or ‘doctrine of Ideas’. 
As an attempt to address the problem of participation, the theory of 
Forms is to be understood as proposing that for every group of particular beings, 
for every class or set of things that exist and populate the world, there exists a 
single, transcendent Form or Idea and it is by virtue of participating in that Form 
that every particular member of a given group or set obtains its characteristic 
being. For example, assuming his interlocutor’s knowledge of the theory of 
Forms, Socrates suggests in the Republic that: ‘We are in the habit, I take it, of 
positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which 
we give the same name’.81 In particular, a given Form can be understood as an 
ideal pattern or exemplary model for which the corresponding group of 
particular beings are approximate instances, imitations or copies. Thus, in 
defence of the Forms against Parmenides, Socrates makes it clear that ‘these 
forms are as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things. The other things are 
made in their image and are likenesses, and this participation they come to have 
in forms is nothing but their being made in their image’.82 For example, the vast 
group of particular couches that exist and populate the world participate, as 
copies, in the single Form of Couch, an ideal Form that transcends or lies 
beyond both the sensible world and all the particular couches that populate it. 
Moreover, it is precisely by virtue of participating in the ideal, transcendent 
Form of Couch, a Form that serves as the exemplary model of what a couch is, 
that every particular couch that populates the world obtains its characteristic 
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being as a couch.
83
 Similarly, the group or set of particular just people that exist 
within the world are said to participate, as approximations, in the single Form of 
Justice, an ideal Form that transcends both the sensible world and all the 
particular just people that populate it; again, it is by virtue of participating in the 
ideal, transcendent Form of Justice, a Form that serves as the exemplary model 
of what it is to be just, that every particular just person that exists in the world 
obtains their characteristic being as just.
84
   
As a response to the problem of participation, therefore, Plato’s theory of 
Forms suggests that for every given group, class or set of particular things that 
exists, their also exists a single Form. In particular, a given Form is to be 
understood as an exemplary model that transcends those particular things, and it 
is by virtue of participating in the relevant Form that every particular thing that 
exists obtains its characteristic being. Now while Deleuze’s dynamic and 
thoroughly temporal theory of Being - or what I am suggesting he later came to 
refer to as Life - can be understood as challenging Plato’s answer to the problem 
of participation, it is important to note that Deleuze’s relation to Plato should not 
be understood in terms of a simple and outright opposition to Plato’s theory of 
Forms. For example, although he makes it clear that: ‘The task of modern 
philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism’, he also suggests that it is 
not only ‘inevitable’ but that it is also ‘desirable’ that this overturning should 
conserve many Platonic characteristics.
85
 In particular, by way of an 
examination of Plato’s own suggestion that some particular things that exist and 
populate the world are to be understood as bad or degraded copies of a given 
Form, Deleuze suggests that the status of those bad copies, phantasms or 
simulacra undermine Plato’s own account of the theory of Forms.86 Therefore, 
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Deleuze not only suggests that the overturning of Plato is to be discovered, as it 
were, within Platonism itself, a so-called ‘anti-Platonism at the heart of 
Platonism’,87 but he also suggests that at the end of the Sophist Plato himself 
discovers, ‘in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false 
copy, but that it places in question the very notions of copy and model’.88 In 
order to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life, 
however, I shall not pursue an overturning of Platonism in terms of simulacra; 
rather, I shall propse that Plato’s theory of Forms, as a response to the problem 
of participation, ought to understood as containing a number of interrelated 
characteristics or ontological presuppositions that the relation between human 
beings and Life is required to address and overturn.  
The first and most evident characteristic of Plato’s answer to the problem 
of participation - the most evident ontological presupposition that an account of 
the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an 
ongoing and immanent expression of this dynamism, seeks to overturn - is the 
concept of transcendence. This is to say that in so far as Plato seeks to address 
the problem of participation by positing a super-sensible Form for every given 
group or set of sensible beings, Forms that reside over, above or beyond the 
sensible world and every particular thing that exists within it, then 
transcendence can be understood as an explicit ontological supposition within 
Plato’s theory of Forms. Moreover, while it has been suggested that Plato’s 
employment of transcendence can be variously attributed to the influence of 
Orphism, Pythagoras and Parmenides’ notion of the One,89 in order to gain a 
fuller understanding of the Platonic notion of transcendence, it is instructive to 
recall Aristotle’s analysis of Plato’s possible motivation for introducing 
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transcendent Forms. In particular, Aristotle suggests that Plato became 
acquainted in his youth with the ideas of the Heraclitean philosopher Cratylus 
and, deeply influenced by such ideas, retained into his later years the 
Heraclitean view that ‘all sensible things are ever in a state of flux’.90 This is to 
say that Plato held the view that the multitude of particular things that exist and 
populate the sensible world, the multitude of beings that can be accessed via the 
senses, are in a continual state of flux, change or becoming.
91
 However, if the 
sensible world and the multitude of different beings that populate it are in a 
continual state of flux, if all sensible things are continually changing and 
becoming something other than what they are, then the question arises as to how 
anything can come to possess ‘definite’ or ‘determinate’ being, how anything 
that is in a continual state of flux can be something definite or determinate. As 
such, Aristotle suggests that Plato - influenced by Socrates’ ethical pursuit of 
universal definitions, such as the definition of holiness or piety, of sophrosyne 
or temperance, and of courage
92
 - was led to posit, over and above the multitude 
of particular, mutable beings that populate the sensible world, a transcendent 
world of Forms, where transcendence designates that which exists over and 
above the sensible world of becoming, and therefore designates that which is 
invariant and immutable, an eternal world of definite and determinate Being that 
the mutable beings of the sensible world ‘participate’ in.93      
In addition to the notion of transcendence in Plato’s theory of Forms, and 
intimately connected to it, is the ontological presupposition of equivocity. This 
is to say that in so far as Plato seeks to address the problem of participation by 
positing a transcendent realm of Forms and a sensible realm of continual 
becoming then he posits two irreducibly different realms of existence, two 
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irremediably different kinds of Being. In particular, the transcendent realm of 
Forms is to be understood as a world of immutable, definite and determinate 
Being that is accessed by the intelligence, and is therefore said to be an object of 
knowledge, while the realm of particular, sensible things is to be understood as a 
world of mutable, indefinite and indeterminate beings that is accessed via the 
senses, and is therefore said to be merely an object of opinion.
94
 Importantly, 
however, in presenting an equivocal ontological account, Plato’s answer to the 
problem of participation does not merely posit two irreducibly different realms 
of existence, but also proposes that one realm is to be understood as 
ontologically superior to the other, thereby introducing the presupposition of 
ontological hierarchy. This is to say that in so far as Plato posits a transcendent 
Form for every set of particular sensible things, then the Forms are to be 
understood as ontologically superior to all sensible things. For example, he 
suggests that if we consider the activity of a craftsman who makes particular 
couches then what he produces is not the Form of the couch, which is to be 
understood as what a couch ‘really is’, but merely makes a particular couch by, 
as it were, ‘fixing his eyes’ on the Form of the couch.95 This is to say that the 
craftsman takes the Form of the couch as the exemplary model for the particular 
couches that he produces but, in doing so, what he makes is not what a couch 
really is but something which resembles what a couch really is, an imitation or a 
copy of the real couch. As Plato makes clear, the craftsman ‘could not be said to 
make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that’, so in 
making a particular couch, in merely copying the Form of the couch, we ought 
not to be surprised that what the craftsman makes is merely a ‘dim adumbration’ 
in comparison with what really is; namely, the Form of the couch.
96
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In addition to the notions of transcendence, equivocity and ontological 
hierarchy, Plato’s answer to the problem of participation can also be understood 
as an ontological account that posits an immutable foundation or fixed ground. 
For example, while the set of particular just people participate in the Form of 
Justice as copies or approximations, the Form of Justice does not, in turn, 
participate in something other than itself, it does not obtain the quality of being 
just from somewhere else. Rather, the Form of Justice is its own foundation, a 
characteristic that Deleuze illustrates with his assertion that, within Plato’s 
theory of Forms, ‘Justice alone is just’.97 Moreover, in so far as a given Form is 
to be understood as its own foundation, then Plato’s answer to the problem of 
participation can also be seen to be characterised by the primacy of identity over 
difference and, ultimately, by the subordination of difference to identity. For 
Deleuze, the subordination of difference to identity has become so dominant 
within the Western philosophical tradition that it is embodied within the 
‘cognitive schema’ or the specifically representational schema which has come 
to constitute the very image of what it means to think.
98
 However, while 
examined in detail in relation to the work of Aristotle,
99
 as well as Hegel and 
Leibniz,
100
 the subordination of difference to identity can be discerned in Plato’s 
answer to the problem of participation. In particular, it can be discerned in the 
manner in which a transcendent Form, as an exemplary model, does not 
participate in something other than itself, does not obtain its specific quality 
from elsewhere but is, as it were, identical to itself. As Deleuze suggests: ‘The 
model is supposed to enjoy an originary superior identity (the Idea alone is 
nothing other than what it is: only Courage is courageous, Piety pious)’.101 In 
contrast, a given set of particular sensible beings are different from their 
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respective transcendent Form, as well as being different from each other; 
however, the status of those sensible beings as different from the transcendent 
Form and different from each other is dependent upon those sensible beings 
possessing an internal resemblance to the Form, as possessing an imitative 
similitude, and therefore as being copies, of that which eternally remains the 
same.
102
 Indeed, in so far as the identity of the Form is primary, and the copies 
resemblance or similitude to the Form is secondary then Deleuze makes it clear 
that ‘it is in this sense that difference only comes in third place, behind identity 
and resemblance, and can be understood only in terms of these prior notions’.103  
In seeking to formulate an account of the relation between human beings 
and Life, in seeking to formulate an account of the dynamism of Life, and the 
manner in which the human being is an immanent and ongoing expression of 
this dynamism, I have suggested that a productive place to begin is with the 
Platonic problem of participation. In particular, I have suggested that as a 
response to that problem Plato’s theory of Forms contains a number of 
ontological presuppositions that an account of the relation between Life and 
human beings will be required to confront, a number of ontological 
presuppositions that the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which the 
human being is an immanent expression of this dynamism, will be required to 
address. In particular, I have suggested that what can frustrate, thwart and deny 
the dynamic relation between human beings and Life concerns the important 
notion of transcendence, along with a number of ontological presuppositions 
that are intimately related to this notion: equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the 
positing of an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity 
over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. 
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Indeed, by addressing the primacy of identity over difference, by overturning the 
superior identity of any transcendent Form, we shall also see that the demand for 
an internal resemblance to the identity of a transcendent Form is also 
undermined in so far as there is no longer a superior, transcendent identity for 
any being to bear an internal resemblance to. For now, however, it is important 
to note that an overturning of Platonism ought not to be understood as simply 
being directed at the work of Plato. Rather, an overturning of Platonism is to be 
understood as being directed at any response to the problem of participation that 
retains the foregoing ontological presuppositions, and therefore at any response 
that can be understood as ‘Platonic’ more generally. Therefore, in order to 
illustrate the manner in which the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in 
which the human being is an immanent and ongoing expression of this 
dynamism, is required to not only address the ontological presuppositions 
contained in Plato’s theory of Forms, but will be required to address the 
challenge posed by Platonism more generally, I would now like to briefly 
examine two Post-Platonic responses to the problem of participation: the 
responses given by Neo-Platonism and Christianity.  
As I shall discuss, while both Neo-Platonism and Christianity retain a 
number of Platonic ontological presuppositions, they also afford an important 
break with Plato’s theory of Forms by introducing a significant degree of 
movement, dynamism and productive genesis into their accounts. Although this 
dynamism will be seen to be inadequate to account for what I have suggested is 
the dynamic nature of Life, it is important to note that Neo-Platonism and 
Christianity are able to introduce a significant degree of movement, dynamism 
and productive genesis into their response to the problem of participation 
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because they re-conceptualise the manner in which that problem is to be 
addressed. This is to say that in seeking to address the problem of participation 
Plato’s theory of Forms begins with the multitude of sensible beings that exist 
and subsequently considers how it is that they can come to possess that singular 
characteristic of Being, how the multitude of particular couches, for example, 
can come to posses their characteristic being as couches.
104
 In contrast, in 
seeking to address the problem of participation, the significant post-Platonic 
innovation that led to the introduction of movement, dynamism and productive 
genesis was to invert the manner in which the problem of participation was to be 
addressed. This is to say that for Neo-Platonism and Christianity, the problem of 
participation was no longer a matter of determining how it is that the multitude 
of sensible beings participate in, or come to possesses, that singular attribute of 
existing, but rather a matter of determining how it is that the one attribute of 
Being, that which is participated in, manifests itself in the plurality of sensible 
beings, the multitude of manifestly different participants. As Deleuze makes 
clear: ‘The primary Postplatonic task was to invert the problem. A principle that 
would make participation possible was sought, but one that would make it 
possible from the side of the participated itself.’ 105 Indeed, in discussing the 
manner in which Neo-Platonism in particular reformulated the problem of 
participation, Deleluze notes that: ‘Neoplatonists no longer start from the 
characteristics of what participates (as multiple, sensible and so on), asking by 
what violence participation becomes possible. They try rather to discover the 
internal principle and movement that grounds participation in the participated as 
such, from the side of the participated as such.’106  
 45 
In order to account for the manner in which that one attribute of Being, 
the participated, manifests itself in the plurality of sensible beings, the 
participants, the Neo-Platonic response to the problem of participation is to be 
understood in terms of emanation. In particular, the multitude of sensible beings 
that exist and populate the world are said to emanate from Being such that Being 
is understood to cause the manifest beings of the world to come into existence, 
conferring their existence upon them in the manner of a ‘gift’ or a ‘donation’.107 
In the Enneads, for example, Plotinus illustrates the concept of emanation with a 
variety of images, suggesting that it is analogous to the manner in which heat is 
produced by fire, how scent diffuses from perfume and, perhaps most notably, 
how light radiates from the sun.
108
 Despite inverting the manner in which the 
problem of participation is to be considered, however, Neo-Platonism’s 
emanative response continues to retain the ontological presupposition of 
transcendence, for although the plurality of sensible beings are said to emanate 
from Being, Being continues to remain transcendent in relation to those 
beings.
109
 For example, in illustrating the manner in which sensible beings 
emanate from Being, and the manner in which those beings are in a continual 
state of flux while Being remains in a transcendent state of ‘repose’, a state of 
eternal invariance that is above and beyond that which it produces, Plotinus asks 
us to: ‘Think of a spring not having another source, giving itself to all the rivers, 
and not being used up in the rivers but remaining tranquil by itself’.110 Moreover, 
as Plotinus’ metaphor illustrates, the emanative answer to the problem of 
participation can also be understood as being characterised by equivocity. This 
is to say that in so far as the participated remains distinct from that which 
participates in it, in so far as Being remains transcendent in relation to the 
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sensible beings that emanate from it, then the Neo-Platonic answer to the 
problem of participation posits two irreducibly different realms of existence, two 
irremediably different kinds of being. Thus, illustrating the manner in which 
Neo-Platonism is characterised by equivocity by drawing on the Neo-Platonic 
tripartite distinction between the imparticipable, the particpated and the 
participants, Deleuze concisely notes that: ‘The giver is above its gifts as it is 
above its products, participable through what it gives, but imparticipable in itself 
or as itself, thereby grounding participation’.111  
In presenting an equivocal ontological account, Neo-Platonism does not 
merely posit two irreducibly different realms of existence, but also introduces 
ontological hierarchy by suggesting that one realm is ontologically superior to 
the other. Indeed, for Plotinus, the direction of emanation is said to ‘proceed 
downward’ towards sensible beings112 such that, while dependent upon Being, 
they have a decreasing ‘intensity’ or ‘degree’ of Being.113  To illustrate this 
through Plotinus’ own examples, consider the manner in which heat diminishes 
by degrees as it moves further away from the source which produces it, the 
manner in which water becomes less powerful and less pure as it flows further 
from the spring or the manner in which the intensity of light diminishes as it 
radiates further from the sun. In addition, the Neo-Platonic answer to the 
problem of participation is also to be understood as being characterised by an 
immutable foundation in so far as Being does not, in turn, participate in anything 
other than itself but is the ‘first principle’ that gives the quality of Being to all 
sensible beings. Indeed, as an immutable foundation, the principle that gives the 
quality of Being to all sensible beings is itself said to be imparticipable such that: 
‘There is no question of the principle that makes participation possible itself 
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being participated or participable. Everything emanates from this principle, it 
gives forth everything. But it is not itself participated’.114 Moreover, in so far as 
it does not participate in anything other than itself, but is the imparticipable 
foundation upon which all beings depend, then emanative Being is also to be 
understood as possessing an exemplary similitude to itself, as being ‘identical to 
itself’, and thereby as possessing a ‘superior identity’. As such, Neo-Platonism 
can also be understood as being characterised by the primacy of identity over 
difference and, ultimately, by the subordination of difference to identity. This is 
to say that the hierarchical differences between sensible beings are dependent 
upon, and subordinated to, the superior identity, foundation or first principle that 
is the emanative cause of those differences. Indeed, in illustrating the primacy of 
identity over difference that characterises Neo-Platonism’s emanative response 
to the problem of participation, Deleuze proposes that: ‘Emanation thus serves 
as the principle of a universe rendered hierarchical; the difference of beings is in 
general conceived as a hierarchical difference; each term is as it were the image 
of the superior term that precedes it, and is defined by the degree of distance that 
separates it from the first cause or first principle’.115  
As may be evident from the foregoing, the answer to the problem of 
participation given by both Plato and by the Neo-Platonists can be understood as 
possessing a significant degree of resonance with Christian metaphysics.
116
 
Indeed, in his Confessions, Saint Augustine suggests that the books of the 
Platonists, while employing a different conceptual vocabulary, expressed the 
sense of the Christian teaching that it was through God that all things came into 
being.
117
 In accordance with Neo-Platonism in particular, Christian metaphysics 
can be understood as inverting the problem of participation by suggesting that it 
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is no longer a matter of determining how it is that the multitude of sensible 
beings participate in that singular characteristic of existing, but a matter of 
determining how it is that the one attribute of Being, that which is participated in, 
manifests itself in the plurality of sensible beings, the multitude of manifestly 
different participants. Rather than emanation, however, Christianity’s answer to 
the problem of participation is given in terms of creation in so far as the 
plurality of manifestly different sensible beings that exist and populate the world 
are said to have been created by God,
118
 to have had their existence conferred on 
them through an act of divine creation which, as McGrath has suggested, is 
‘especially associated with the image of a potter working clay into a 
recognizably ordered structure’.119 However, while the notions of emanation and 
creation can both be understood, broadly speaking, as forms of production, as 
types of productive genesis, their difference lies in the precise character of that 
production. In emanation the attribute of Being that is conferred on the plurality 
of sensible beings is to be understood as emerging out of the very substance, as 
it were, of Being, analogous to the manner in which heat emerges from fire, how 
scent diffuses from perfume and how light radiates from the sun. In contrast, it 
has been suggested that in divine creation God is to be understood as willing 
sensible material into existence and moulding the plurality of beings out of that 
material; for example, in illustrating this distinction between divine creation and 
emanation, May graphically writes that:   
 
Emanation is like creation in that there remains a distinction between 
the creator and the created. The difference is that what is created 
comes from the substance of the creator, emanates from it. If I were an 
artist who was able not only to mould the material before me but also 
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to will the very material to appear, I would be engaging in creation. If 
my art were instead torn from my flesh, I would be engaged in 
emanation.
120
 
 
As with Neo-Platonism’s emanative response, however, Christianity’s attempt 
to address the problem of participation in terms of creation continues to retain a 
number of Platonic ontological presuppositions. To illustrate this, consider the 
manner in which Saint Augustine, recounting his epiphany, proclaims that:  
 
What I saw was something quite, quite different from any light we 
know on earth. It shone above my mind, but not in the way that oil 
floats above water or the sky hangs over the earth. It was above me 
because it was itself the Light that made me, and I was below because 
I was made by it. All who know the truth know this Light, and all who 
know this Light know eternity.
121
 
 
In doing so, Saint Augustine can be understood as disclosing the manner in 
which Christianity’s response to the problem of participation in terms of 
creation continues to retain the presuppositions of transcendence, equivocity, 
ontological hierarchy and an immutable foundation in so far as God is not only 
the transcendent, eternal source of all sensible beings - and therefore 
irremediably different in kind from anything that exists on earth - but is also to 
be understood as ontologically superior to all sensible beings in so far as all 
beings, being made by Him, are below him. Moreover, Christianity’s creationist 
response is also to be understood as being characterised by the primacy of 
identity over difference in so far as God, not dependent upon anything else for 
His Being, possesses an exemplary similitude to Himself, and is the superior 
identity that creates the plurality of sensible beings that populate the world. 
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Indeed, with evident similarities to Plato’s theory of Forms, the plurality of 
human beings that exist are said to be made in God’s image such that He is the 
exemplary model that all human beings bear an internal resemblance or likeness 
to.
122
 As a consequence of sin, however, all human beings are to be understood 
as degraded or fallen copies that have lost their internal resemblance or likeness 
to God,
123
 a degraded form of existence that entails that the life of all human 
beings, as Armstrong has proposed, is of a nature that: ‘Only the God who had 
created them from nothingness in the first place and kept them perpetually in 
being could assure their eternal salvation’.124 In so far as God is understood as 
the superior identity who has created the plurality of human beings, human 
beings who, as a consequence of sin, have lost their internal resemblance or 
likeness to God, then the concept of difference for Christianity can therefore 
also be understood as being subordinated to the notion of a superior identity and 
a resemblance to this identity.  
In following Deleuze’s examination of the problem of participation, and 
in discussing the primary historical responses to that problem, I have sought to 
expose the ontological presuppositions associated with those responses, 
ontological presuppositions that would frustrate, thwart and deny what I have 
suggested is the dynamic nature of Life and its immanent relation to human 
beings. As I proposed at the beginning of this chapter, the ontological 
presuppositions associated with the various historical responses to the problem 
of participation provide a valuable context in which to formulate an account of 
the dynamic relation between human beings and Life because that account will 
be required to address the challenge that those ontological presuppositions pose. 
Therefore, in order to begin to formulate an account of the dynamism of Life 
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and its relation to human beings that does so, I shall now turn to the concept of 
expression that Deleuze discerns in the work of Spinoza.
125
 This is to say that I 
shall now turn to and employ Deleuze’s Spinozist concept of expression in order 
to suggest that the relation between Life and the human being ought to be 
understood as an expressive one, and that it is this concept of expression that can 
enable us to begin to understand how the relation between Life and human 
beings can be formulated in such a way that begins to address the ontological 
presuppositions associated with Plato’s theory of Forms, along with Neo-
Platonism’s emanative and Christianity’s creationist response to the problem of 
participation. This turn to Spinoza’s work, however, in order to discern and 
employ a concept of expression should not be considered an uncontroversial one. 
Indeed, not only has the validity of Deleuze’s discernment of the concept of 
expression in Spinoza’s work been called into question,126 but Deleuze himself 
acknowledges that discerning a concept of expression in Spinoza’s work is 
particularly challenging. For example, he proposes that many of the most 
respected commentators have taken little account of the notion of expression in 
Spinoza’s work, and have rendered it at best ‘mystical’ and at worst 
‘incomprehensible’.127 Similarly, he goes on to propose that for those that have 
attempted to account for the concept of expression in Spinoza’s work, some 
have given it ‘a certain indirect significance, seeing in it another name for some 
deeper principle’ and, in particular, mistakenly identifying the concept of 
expression with the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation.
128
   
Deleuze acknowledges, however, that this apparent difficulty with 
discerning the concept of expression within Spinoza’s work and with explicating 
that concept may be largely attributable to the manner in which it is dealt with 
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by Spinoza in the Ethics.
129
 In particular, the difficulty with discerning and 
explicating the concept of expression is attributable to the manner in which it 
can only be understood when one considers the nature of the relation between 
the principal conceptual terms in Spinoza’s Ethics, and not when those terms are 
considered in isolation or abstraction from one another. Thus, Deleuze proposes 
that ‘the idea of expression seems to emerge only as determining the relation 
into which attribute, substance and essence enter, once God for his part is 
defined as a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes…Expression does 
not relate to substance or attributes in general, in the abstract.’130 In order to 
therefore understand the manner in which the concept of expression is present 
within Spinoza’s work, and the manner in which that concept can be employed 
to formulate an account of the dynamic relation between Life and human being 
that addresses the aforementioned Platonic ontological presuppositions, it is 
necessary to briefly elucidate the ontological apparatus that is introduced within 
the Ethics. Thus, at the beginning of the Ethics Spinoza identifies God, ‘a being 
absolutely infinite’, with what he refers to as ‘substance’, where substance 
consists of an infinity of ‘attributes’ which, in turn, are to be understood as that 
which expresses the infinite essence of substance.
131
 In doing so, however, the 
attributes that express the essence of substance are to be understood as doing so 
in their own particular way. This is to say, for example, that while Thought and 
Extension are to be understood as attributes of substance, while Thought and 
Extension express the essence of substance, they express that essence into 
determinate forms such that substance or God can be comprehended both under 
the attribute of Thought and under the attribute of Extension.
132
 Therefore, in 
contrast to Descartes, Thought and Extension, and thinking thing and extended 
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thing in particular, are not to be thought of as distinct substances that are only 
contingently bound.
133
 Rather, as the attributes of substance, Thought and 
Extension remain the expression of one substance that, in expressing itself, 
expresses that one substance into particular, determinate forms.
134
  
Attributes express the essence of substance and in doing so determine 
that essence into different forms. Once this first expression has taken place, 
however, the attributes are in their turn expressed, expressing themselves in 
what Spinoza refers to as ‘modes’ which are to be understood as the variations, 
modifications or ‘affections’ of the attributes.135 For example, while Thought 
and Extension are two attributes of substance, a mode of the attribute of 
Thought would be a singular thought and a mode of the attribute of Extension 
would be a specific body.
136
 Therefore, expression is to be understood as 
occurring on ‘two levels’ or to be understood in terms of a ‘double movement’: 
the first movement of expression is from substance to attribute, in which the 
essence of substance is determined into particular forms - such as Thought and 
Extension - while the second movement of expression, from attribute to modes, 
involves the production of particular things - such as singular thoughts and 
specific bodies.
137
 However, in order to understand Deleuze’s Spinozist concept 
of expression, and the manner in which it can enable us to begin to understand 
how the dynamic relation between Life and human being can be formulated in 
such a way that addresses the ontological presuppositions associated with 
Platonism, it is also necessary to understand the role of immanence in Spinoza’s 
thought. Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘Spinoza’s entire philosophy could 
be seen as an ontology of pure immanence’,138 and that this ontology of pure 
immanence is evidenced in Spinoza’s equation of God with the whole of 
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nature,
139
 epitomised in Spinoza’s formula Deus sive Natura (God, that is, 
Nature’).140 To understand this equation of God with nature and the manner in 
which it reveals both the presence of immanence and expression in Spinoza’s 
work, it is important to note that God, understood as substance, is both 
expressive agency and the expressed enactments or products of that agency.
141
 
This is to say that seen from one perspective God is unlimited productive force, 
what Spinoza refers to as natura naturans, or ‘naturing’ nature, an agency that 
expresses itself in various attributes; however, seen from another perspective 
substance is just as much the products of this agency, the particular and specific 
modes that are an expression of the attributes, or what Spinoza refers to as 
natura naturata, or ‘natured’ nature.142    
Spinoza’s conception of God, therefore, is not to be understood in terms 
of a transcendent deity that remains over and above nature, God does not exist in 
a transcendent state of repose beyond the manifestly different beings of the 
world. Rather, there is an equality of being between God and nature that attests 
to a thoroughgoing immanence in so far as there is only one substance seen, as it 
were, from two sides: natura naturans as the expressive agency of this 
substance, and naturans naturata as the expressed products of this agency. 
Indeed, Wasser proposes that Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura, Spinoza’s equation of 
God with nature, ‘is the assertion of immanence par excellence, the fundamental 
gambit of a philosophy that attempts to differentiate itself from schemas of 
transcendence’, where some category such as the Good in Plato, the One in 
Plotinus or God in the Christian tradition is thought to be beyond, prior to, or 
superior to the empirical world.
143
 Spinoza’s Ethics can therefore be understood 
as seeking to develop an ontological account characterised by a thoroughgoing 
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immanence that eliminates any notion of transcendence and can be understood 
as doing so through the notion of expression.
144
 This is to say that substance first 
expresses itself in its attributes but, in doing so, substance is not to be thought of 
as transcendent to those attributes but remains immanent within them.
145
 
Substance then re-expresses itself on a second level which constitutes the 
movement from attributes to modes but, as modifications of the attributes, the 
modes are not to be thought of as separate from substance or God; as Deleuze 
suggests, ‘in the last instance it is always God who, but for the different level of 
expression, is designated by all things. Attributes designate God, but so also do 
modes, within the attribute on which they depend’.146 Therefore, in summarising 
the relevance of the Ethics for Deleuze, Beistegui has suggested that Spinoza’s 
‘primordial proposition’ is that there is one substance that possesses all 
attributes and all beings or ‘creatures’, where the latter - being modes or ways of 
being of substance - are contained in turn in the attributes of that substance.
147
 
Beistegui then goes on to suggest that the immediate consequence of this ‘is the 
levelling (or the ironing out) and the flattening - the aplanissement and 
aplatissement - of a vertical and hierarchical structure, of a sequence of concepts: 
there is no hierarchy, no sequence between the attributes, or between thought 
and extension, but a single fixed plane on which everything takes place. This is 
what Deleuze calls the plane of immanence’.148  
I am therefore suggesting that it is in its association with the principle of 
immanence that the concept of expression can be understood as enabling us to 
begin to understand how the relation between Life and human beings can be 
formulated in such a way that addresses the ontological presuppositions 
associated with the various historical responses to the problem of participation. 
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Indeed, more than a corollary or characteristic of the concept of expression, 
Deleuze is keen to stress that not only are immanence and expression not to be 
thought of as separate but neither is one notion to be thought of as having 
priority over the other; as he makes clear: ‘Immanence is revealed as expressive, 
and expression as immanent, in a system of logical relations within which the 
two notions are correlative’.149 However, despite the centrality of the Spinozist 
concept of expression in formulating an account of the relation between Life and 
human beings, there are dangers in adopting Spinoza’s tripartite distinction 
between substance, attributes and modes in order to develop that relation. Indeed, 
in highlighting this danger, Deleuze writes that ‘there still remains a difference 
between substance and the modes: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of 
the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on 
something other than themselves’. 150  This is to say that despite seeking to 
maintain that modes are an immanent expression of substance, as immanent an 
expression of substance as the attributes, Spinoza’s modes seem ‘at once 
removed’ from substance. Of course, as an expression of substance, modes are 
dependent on substance, but as a second level expression of substance, as a 
modification of the attributes, modes appear to be dependent on something that 
remains distanced, independent and even ontologically superior to them.
151
 As 
Piercey has suggested: ‘Spinoza, despite his preoccupation with immanence, 
seems at the end of the day to think that Being is not equally present in all 
entities. He seems to rank entities hierarchically, and to rank substance more 
highly than mode’.152 Thus, while the Spinozist concept of expression and, in 
particular, its correlative relation with imminence can be understood in terms of 
a systematic attempt to break from schemas of transcendence, the conception of 
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the relation between substance and modes and, in particular, the danger of 
understanding the former as being beyond, independent and even superior to the 
latter, threatens to reintroduce the various schemas of transcendence that 
Spinoza’s work seeks to overcome.153  
In suggesting that the expressive relation between Being and the 
manifest beings of the world must be understood in terms of an even greater 
immediacy than that suggested by Spinoza’s tripartite division, an immediacy 
that resists the re-introduction of transcendence and its associated ontological 
presuppositions, Deleuze stresses that: ‘Substance must itself be said of the 
modes and only of the modes’. 154  To understand this, to understand the 
immediate and thoroughly immanent nature of the expressive relation between 
substance and modes, between Being and beings or - to employ the terminology 
of the dynamic relation that I am seeking to formulate - between Life and human 
beings, it is productive to introduce two further notions that Deleuze highlights 
as being central to an understanding of the notion of expression: explication and 
involvement.
155
 To take the concept of explication first, this term entails that 
substance, Being or Life, in expressing itself, presses itself out into multiple 
modes, forms or beings such that: ‘Expression is on the one hand an explication, 
an unfolding of what expresses itself, the One manifesting itself in the many’.156 
However, if expressive Being were simply characterised by explication, by a 
pressing out of multiple beings or modes from Being, then expressive Being 
would risk falling back into a process of emanation or creation. This is to say 
that to simply assert that expressive Being presses itself into multiple forms 
suggests that Being remains distinct from the beings that it produces, that those 
beings are either created by Being or emanate from Being and, in doing so, 
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remain inferior to the superior, transcendent cause that produces them. What 
distinguishes expressive Being from emanation and creation, however, is that 
Being does not stand behind or above beings as their superior, distinct and 
transcendent cause, but is ‘woven’ into, as it were, each being that it expresses. 
Therefore, while expressive Being is characterised by explication, an unfolding 
of itself into multiple forms: ‘Its multiple expression, on the other hand, 
involves Unity. The One remains involved in what expresses it, imprinted in 
what unfolds it, immanent in whatever manifests it: expression is in this respect 
an involvement’. 157  This is to say that while expressive Being or the One 
expresses or explicates itself in terms of the multitude of beings that exist and 
populate the world, that multitude does not remain distinct from the One; rather, 
the One remains immanent within each of its expressions, involved or 
implicated within each of the many beings that are its expression.  
Is it possible to better illustrate the immediate, immanent nature of this 
relation? Is there, for example, an image that can help capture the intimacy of 
the expressive relation between Being and beings, an image that illustrates the 
manner in which expressive Being, while explicating itself as a plurality of 
beings, resists the reintroduction of the ontological presuppositions associated 
with Platonism? In his introduction to Deleuze, May can be seen to employ an 
image that goes some way to illustrating the manner in which expressive Being, 
while expressing or explicating itself as a multitude of modes or a variety of 
forms, continues to remain immanent, involved or implicated within those forms. 
In particular, he gives the image of the Japanese art of origami, the folding and 
refolding of a piece of paper into recognisable figures, such as swans, turtles, 
people or tress.
158
 Using Spinoza’s terminology, May suggests that the paper can 
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be understood as substance, or what I have referred to as expressive Being, 
while the arrangements that the paper is folded and refolded into can be 
understood as the modes or beings that expressive Being explicates or manifests 
itself as. What is important to note about the example of origami is that it not 
only illustrates the manner in which we can begin to think about the productive 
relation between expressive Being and beings, and ultimately between Life and 
human beings, without recourse to the concept of transcendence, but it also 
illustrates the manner in which expressive Being or the One (i.e. the sheet of 
paper) explicates itself into multiple forms or the many (i.e. the folded figures), 
and yet continues to remain immanent, involved or implicated within those 
multiple forms. In contrast to the analogy with origami, however, Deleuze can 
be understood as providing his own image of the expressive relation between 
Being and beings that perhaps illustrates not only the immanent nature, but also 
the ongoing dynamism, of this relation to a greater degree. In particular, Deleuze 
draws an analogy between Being and a voice on several occasions throughout 
his work,
159
 and it is this analogy that I wish to briefly reflect upon and develop 
in order to begin to illustrate both the intimacy and the dynamism of the 
expressive relation between Being and beings and, ultimately, move closer to a 
formulation of the manner in which human beings can be understood as an 
ongoing and immanent expression of the dynamism of Life.  
Consider, therefore, the manner in which a single human voice expresses 
itself as a multitude of manifestly different and diverse intonations, tones and 
modulations and yet, despite this vast differentiation, all those variations, all 
those different intonations, tones and modulations continue to be the expression 
of a single voice. In an analogous manner, consider Being or Life in terms of a 
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voice and consider the diverse, sensible beings of the world, including human 
beings, as the expressed intonations, modulations or modes of that voice. This is 
to say that the plurality of manifestly different beings, the multitude of different 
things that exist and populate the world, are to be understood as the expressed 
modes of Being or Life in a manner analogous to how the plurality and vast 
differentiation of vocal modulations are the expression of a single human voice. 
Indeed, it is in this sense that we can begin to comprehend Deleuze’s assertion 
that ‘there is a single ‘voice’ of Being which includes all its modes, including 
the most diverse, the most varied, the most differenciated’. 160  What the 
employment of the image of a voice expressing itself illustrates is that in 
explicating a multitude of diverse modulations, that voice does not remain in a 
transcendent, immutable state of repose, somehow existing over, above or 
beyond the vocal modulations that it produces. Rather, that voice remains 
involved, implicated or immanent within each and every vocal modulation that 
it produces in so far as all of those manifestly different vocal modulations are 
the expression of a single voice. Similarly, expressive Being or Life is not to be 
thought of as remaining in a transcendent and immutable state of repose, as 
somehow existing over, above or beyond the multitude of beings that are its 
expression - to conceptualise expressive Being in this manner would be to once 
more understand Being in terms of emanation or in terms of creation. Rather, in 
so far as all of the manifestly different beings that exist and populate the world 
are to be understood as an ongoing expression or explication of Being, then 
expressive Being is to be understood as remaining immanent within every 
sensible being that it produces, an intimacy that is analogous to the manner in 
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which the human voice remains immanent within every vocal modulation that it 
produces.  
This intimacy and immediacy that I am suggesting characterises the 
expressive relation between Being and beings, an intimacy that expresses a pure 
immanence that has eliminated any remaining vestiges of transcendence, entails 
that there are not two irremediably different realms of Being such that one can 
take precedence over the other, but that there is instead a thoroughgoing equality 
of being. Indeed, Deleuze makes it clear that ‘pure immanence requires as a 
principle the equality of being, or the positing of equal Being: not only is being 
equal in itself, but it is seen to be equally present in all beings’.161 This is to say, 
for example, that analogous to the manner in which the voice that expresses a 
plurality of diverse modulations is not to be thought of as somehow superior to 
those modulations, expressive Being is not to be understood as ontologically 
superior to the manifestly different beings that are its expression. However, in 
order to understand the full implications of the manner in which expressive 
Being resists the reintroduction of ontological hierarchy, then expressive Being 
must not be understood as expressing the multitude of beings in a serial manner, 
as it were, one after the other, but ought to be understood as expressing that 
multitude simultaneously. In order to elucidate this, it is necessary to extend 
Deleuze’s analogy between Being and a voice somewhat and conceive of a 
single voice that, rather than producing one vocal modulation, concluding that 
expression and then moving onto another modulation, is able to express, and 
continue to express, a vast plurality of vocal modulations all at once, to express 
a multitude of modulations in a simultaneous fashion. The simultaneously 
expressed modulations of the voice of Being, therefore, are not ontologically 
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inferior in relation to that voice, and neither are some modulations further away 
from that voice, somehow possessing a diminished degree of vocal, and hence 
ontological, participation. Rather, the voice of Being remains equally present, 
equally immanent within, each and every one of the modulations that it produces, 
equally present in each and every one of the manifestly different beings that it 
simultaneously expresses. Against the Neo-Platonic emanative response and the 
Christian creationist response to the problem of participation, therefore, in 
which Being or God is to be understood as the ontologically superior and 
eminent cause of all that is, the pure immanence that characterises expressive 
Being must be understood as being ‘opposed to any eminence of the cause…any 
hierarchical conception of the world’.162   
To the extent that the immanent and equal nature of expressive Being 
denies that Being reposes in some transcendent realm, ontologically superior to 
the plurality of manifestly different beings or modes that it produces or 
explicates, then expressive Being must also be understood as being characterised 
by univocity.
163
 Indeed, an ontological position of univocity is so important for 
Deleuze that Badiou has suggested that it is ‘the very core of Deleuze’s work’ 
and that it is ‘entirely reasonable to maintain that the sole function of the 
immense pedagogy of cases’ that Deleuze engages with in his individual and 
collaborative works - such as the ‘cinema, the schizo, Foucault, Riemann, 
Capital, Spinoza, the nomad, and so on’ - is to ‘verify tirelessly’ the ontological 
proposition that Being is univocal.
164
 Against Plato’s theory of Forms, therefore, 
and against the Neo-Platonic and Christian responses to the problem of 
participation, the expressive relation between Being and beings entails that 
Being is univocal, that everything exists on one ontological level or single, 
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ontologically consistent and immanent plane such that the expressive relation 
between Being and beings must not be conceptualised in terms of two 
irreducibly different realms of existence, two irremediably different kinds of 
Being. As Deleuze suggests, ‘expressive immanence cannot be sustained unless 
it is accompanied by a thoroughgoing conception of univocity, a thoroughgoing 
affirmation of univocal Being’. 165  What is important to note about this 
conception of univocity, however, is that although everything exists on a single 
ontological level, on an ontologically consistent and immanent plane, this does 
not entail that the vast plurality of manifestly different beings that exist, the vast 
differentiation of expressive Being’s modalities, are somehow really, 
fundamentally or ultimately the same.
166
 In a central passage for an 
understanding of the particular nature of the univocity that characterises 
expressive Being, Deleuze proposes that:  
 
In effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single 
and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its 
individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is the same for 
all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is ‘equal’ 
for all, but they themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single 
sense, but they themselves do not have the same sense.
167
  
 
In seeking to elucidate this, and the nature of the univocity that it proposes, 
consider again the example of a single human voice. In particular, note the 
manner in which a single human voice, while expressing and explicating itself 
as a multitude of differentiated vocal modulations, does not negate the 
differences between those modulations such they ought to be considered as 
‘really’, ‘fundamentally’ or ‘ultimately’ the same. Rather, those vocal 
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modulations maintain their differences despite being the expression of a single 
human voice. Similarly, while expressing and explicating itself as a multitude of 
differentiated beings, expressive Being does not negate the differences between 
those beings such they ought to be considered as somehow really, fundamentally 
or ultimately the same. As Deleuze concisely suggests: ‘Being is said in a single 
and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said 
differs’.168 The conception of the univocal nature of expressive Being that is 
being presented here can therefore be understood in terms of a complex, subtle 
and challenging attempt to distinguish expressive Being from the plurality of 
beings that it expresses, without expressive Being thereby being distinct or 
separate from the plurality of manifestly different beings that are its expression. 
This is to say that the specific conception of univocity that Deleuze seeks to 
maintain necessitates that expressive Being is considered as the ground of the 
variegated beings that are its expression, that expressive Being is distinguishable 
from the multitude of beings that it produces or explicates; however, in so far as 
expressive Being remains involved, implicated or immanent within the 
multitude of beings that are its expression, then expressive Being must not be 
understood as distinct or separate from those beings. It is precisely this attempt 
to maintain an ontological position of univocity while holding that expressive 
Being is distinguishable from the multitude of manifestly different beings that 
are its expression that Badiou can be understood as suggesting that Deleuze is 
unable to sustain.
169
 This is to say that in seeking to maintain that expressive 
Being is the distinguishable ground of the variegated beings that it explicates, 
Badiou suggests that Deleuze ultimately separates expressive Being from the 
beings that are its expression and falls into a position of equivocity, with 
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expressive Being remaining distinct - either ‘above’ or ‘beneath’, but most 
certainly ‘beyond’ - and therefore transcendent to, the manifestly different 
beings that it produces.
170
      
Badiou can therefore be understood as arguably Deleuze’s main 
interlocutor, and worthy of discussion for this study, precisely because the 
former’s critique would reintroduce the Platonic, ontological presupposition of 
transcendence into the latter’s philosophy, thereby threatening to frustrate, 
thwart and negate the attempt to formulate an account of the universal and 
impersonal dynamism of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an 
immanent and ongoing expression of this dynamism. By reintroducing the 
concept of transcendence, along with the ontological presuppositions associated 
with that concept, then the thoroughgoing dynamic temporality of Life, the 
manner in which it continually overcomes any present determination or identity 
in its interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities, forever 
renewed present possibilities for each individual to live otherwise, will be 
frustrated. This is to say that one’s present possibilities for living otherwise give 
way to the obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance 
with that dictated to it by the transcendence characteristic of Platonism. 
Therefore, in understanding the challenge that Badiou raises against Deleuze’s 
univocal account of expressive Being, it is important to note that Badiou 
correctly suggests that it is necessary for Deleuze to articulate his account of the 
univocity of Being from the point of view of Being and beings, from the side of 
expressive Being and also from the side of the multitude of different beings that 
are Being’s expression. Thus, Badiou writes that ‘Being needs to be said in a 
single sense both from the viewpoint of the unity of its power and from the 
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viewpoint of the multiplicity of the divergent simulacra [beings] that this power 
actualizes in itself’.171 This is to say that in order to maintain the univocity of 
expressive Being, Deleuze not only needs to suggest, from the perspective of 
Being, that Being expresses itself in a multitude of manifestly different beings, 
but also how it is possible to conceive of univocity from the perspective of those 
manifestly different beings: how is it that Being expresses itself in a multiplicity 
of divergent beings, while those many different beings are simultaneously an 
ongoing expression of Being? In order to address this, Badiou suggests that 
Deleuze employs a variety of ‘binary distributions’ or ‘doublets’ throughout his 
work,
172
 but notes that the principal doublet and distinction that Deleuze 
maintains is that between the ‘virtual’ and the ‘actual’.173   
As I shall discuss in detail in the next chapter, the virtual/actual doublet 
is central for an understanding of the manner in which Deleuze’s work can be 
employed to address the ontological presuppositions associated with Platonism, 
and to thereby formulate an account of the dynamism of Life, and the manner in 
which the human being is to be understood as an immanent expression of this 
dynamism. However, in order to gain an initial orientation with regard to the 
meaning of the virtual/actual doublet then what Deleuze refers to as the actual 
can be understood in terms of the multitude of manifestly different modes or 
beings that we encounter everyday, the many different ‘bodies’ that exist and 
populate the world, such as actual books, tables and people, along with actual 
sights, sounds or situations. In contrast, the virtual is not to be understood in 
accordance with the common phrase ‘virtual reality’, where this is taken to refer 
to a computer generated simulation of a three dimensional environment or, more 
generally, as referring to that which is artificial or not real. As Sherman notes: 
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‘We mustn’t think the virtual in the way that our digital culture does, as a 
shadowy realm of fantasy, games, and escape’. 174  Indeed, Deleuze himself 
makes it clear that: ‘The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The 
virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual’.175 In discussing and highlighting the 
importance of the virtual/actual doublet for Deleuze, Badiou notes that it is not 
only the doublet that appears most frequently across Deleuze’s own texts, but it 
is also the conceptual doublet that is most unequivocally employed to identify 
and distinguish expressive Being as the ground of the actual beings that are its 
expression.
176
 Moreover, Badiou also suggests that the virtual/actual doublet is 
that which Deleuze employs to illustrate the univocity that is supposed to 
characterise the nature of the expressive relation Being and beings; for example, 
Badiou writes that:  
 
“Virtual” is without any doubt the principal name of being in 
Deleuze’s work. Or rather, the nominal pair virtual/actual exhausts the 
deployment of univocal Being. But we are now familiar with the 
Deleuzian logic of the One: two names are required for the One in 
order to test that the ontological univocity designated by the nominal 
pair proceeds from a single one of those names. We require the couple 
virtual/actual to test that an actual being univocally possesses its being 
as a function of its virtuality. In this sense, the virtual is the ground of 
the actual.
177
  
 
It is precisely the attempt to maintain this distinction, however, the attempt to 
distinguish the virtual from the actual while maintaining a position of univocity 
that Badiou suggests Deleuze is unable to maintain. This is to say that in seeking 
to maintain that the virtual, or expressive Being, is the distinguishable ground of 
the variegated actual beings that it explicates, Badiou suggests that Deleuze 
 68 
ultimately separates the virtual from the actual beings that are its expression and 
thereby falls into a position of equivocity.
178
 As Badiou makes clear, however, 
in order to maintain a position of univocity then ‘the virtual must not be thought 
apart from the object itself…indeed, were we to separate the virtual from the 
actual object, univocity would be ruined, for Being would be said according to 
the division of the objective actual and the non-objective virtual’.179 Conversely, 
however, if the virtual is no longer distinguishable from the actual beings that 
are its supposed expression then Badiou suggests that the virtual collapses into 
the multitude of actual beings; this is to say that if expressive Being is no longer 
the distinguishable ground of the multitude of manifestly different beings that it 
supposedly explicates then the consequence of this, and the philosophical 
position that Badiou maintains, is that the conception of the virtual ground or 
expressive Being must be dismissed such that we are left with a multiplicity of 
actual beings. Thus, Badiou concludes that: ‘I must therefore return, as is the 
law in philosophy - that discipline of thought in which discussion is at once 
omnipresent and without any other effect than internal - to my own song: the 
One is not, there are only actual multiplicities, and the ground is void’.180 To 
summarise Badiou’s critique of Deleuze’s attempt to maintain a position of 
univocity within a schema of expressive Being, I am suggesting that Badiou 
proposes that we will be confronted with one of two choices. If we wish to 
maintain that expressive Being is the distinguishable ground of the multitude of 
variegated actual beings that it explicates then expressive Being must ultimately 
be understood as distinct or separate from those beings and we therefore 
establish ‘a renewed concept of the One’ that reinstates a position of equivocity 
and transcendence. However, if we want to maintain that expressive Being is not 
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distinct or separate from the multitude of actual beings that are its expression 
then Being, or the virtual ground, ultimately collapses into the multitude of 
actual beings such that there is only a multitude of actual beings and the notion 
of Being as the expressive ground of those beings is void.
181
   
For Badiou, Deleuze’s attempt to establish his particular conception of 
the univocal nature of expressive Being is therefore ultimately a failure. In 
particular, the attempt to distinguish the virtual ground, or expressive Being, 
from the plurality of actual beings that it expresses, without expressive Being 
thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its 
expression, collapses into the traditional, opposing relation between the One and 
the many. This is to say that Deleuze’s attempt to maintain that the virtual, or 
expressive Being, is the distinguishable, and yet not distinct ground of the 
variegated actual beings that it explicates, leads to the collapse of expressive 
Being into an equivocal position of transcendent Being (i.e. ‘a renewed concept 
of the One’) above the multitude of actual beings, or the dissolution of 
expressive Being into the multitude of actual beings (i.e. the many).
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 In doing 
so, however, Deleuze’s work becomes open to the charge of being a species of 
Platonism in so far as the opposing relation between the One and the many can 
be understood as precisely that which characterises the primary, historical 
responses to the problem of participation. This is to say that within Plato’s 
theory of Forms, the Neo-Platonic emanative response or the Christian 
creationist response to the problem of participation, that which is participated in 
- a transcendent Form, emanative Being or God - is to be understood as one, 
indeed as the One, in contrast to the many manifestly different beings of the 
world that either participate in their respective transcendent Form or emerge as a 
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consequence of an emanative process or a process of divine creation. In all three 
responses to the problem of participation, there is a clear distinction between 
Being and beings, between the One and the many, and this distinction is 
intimately connected to the ontological presuppositions of transcendence, 
equivocity, ontological hierarchy, an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the 
primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of 
difference to identity. What is important to note about Badiou’s critique, 
however, is that it suggests that on his own terms Deleuze fails to overcome the 
opposing relation between the One and the many that can be understood as 
characteristic of Platonism. This is to say that the virtual/actual doublet that 
Deleuze introduces to establish his particular conception of the univocal nature 
of expressive Being, and which is supposed to overcome the opposing relation 
between the One and many, and therefore the ontological presuppositions of 
Platonism, cannot be maintained.     
Against Badiou, however, is it still possible to formulate an account of 
the univocal nature of expressive Being in terms of the virtual and the actual that 
overcomes the opposing relation between the One and many, and therefore the 
ontological presuppositions of Platonism? To a certain degree, Deleuze’s 
analogy between expressive Being and a voice perhaps goes some way to 
illustrate how we might begin to think of the univocal nature of expressive 
Being without falling into the opposing relation between the One and the many. 
For example, the single voice that expresses itself can be understood as the 
distinguishable ground of the multitude of vocal modulations that it expresses, 
but we are not led to concede that the voice is therefore separate or distinct from 
the multitude of vocal modulations that the voice explicates, we are not led to a 
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position of equivocity in which the voice is considered as distinct from - and 
somehow above, beneath or beyond - the multitude of modulations that it 
produces. Rather, distinguishable and yet not distinct, the voice remains 
involved, implicated or immanent within each and every vocal modulation that 
it produces in so far as all of those manifestly different vocal modulations are 
the expression of a single voice. Beyond such analogies, however, is it possible 
to formulate an account of the univocal nature of expressive Being, as it were, 
on Deleuze’s own terms through the employment of the notions of the virtual 
and the actual? This is to say that without recourse to analogy, is it possible to 
understand the virtual or expressive Being as a distinguishable ground that is 
nevertheless not distinct from the actual beings that are its ongoing expression, 
and that thereby overcomes the opposing relation between the One and many? 
In chapter two, I shall argue that this is possible but that it necessitates a 
thoroughgoing ‘temporalisation’ of expressive Being and, in particular, a 
reconceptualisation of expressive Being in terms of what Deleuze refers to as 
the passive synthesis of time. In doing so, I shall argue that it is ultimately this 
temporalisation of expressive Being that enables a formulation of Life as a 
universal, impersonal and thoroughly dynamic power, along with the manner in 
which the human being is an immanent and ongoing expression of this 
dynamism, and that it is an understanding of the relation between Life and the 
human being in terms of the three passive syntheses of time that overcomes the 
opposing relation between the One and the many and therefore addresses the 
ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the 
problem of participation.  
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Chapter Two: Time 
 
In the introduction to this study, I suggested that Deleuze’s individual and 
collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the 
question of living well, where it was suggested that living well necessitates that 
we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed 
present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, therefore 
moving beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that are part of 
the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an 
awareness of our present possibilities. In particular, I proposed that what 
legitimises this conception of living well, and what can motivate us to engage in 
such a practice, is that a life that becomes aware of and explores the open field 
of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings is a life that 
reflects or that is lived in accordance with the challenging ontological account 
that is present in Deleuze’s work, his open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal 
theory of Being or what I have suggested he later came to refer to simply as Life. 
To live in accordance with Life, however, does not entail a fixed, overarching 
plan of how the possibilities for our lives ought to be actualised in so far as Life 
is to be understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is 
at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that continually 
overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to 
continually produce new present possibilities. Moreover, in so far as each 
individual is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, 
then a life that strives to explore the forever renewed present possibilities that 
each moment engenders, a practice that also necessitates that each individual 
strives to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are 
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continually hindered, thwarted and negated, is not only a life that strives to live 
in accordance with the dynamism of Life, but is also a life lived in accordance 
with our own dynamic being. This is to say that Life is to be understood in terms 
of a universal, impersonal and thoroughly temporal dynamic power and, in 
particular, in terms of a complex temporal structure that Deleluze refers to as the 
passive syntheses of time, a temporal dynamism that I will argue constitutes the 
dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s ‘living present’.183 
In order to begin to explore the manner in which each human being is to 
be understood as an immediate and ongoing expression of Life, a continual and 
immanent expression of this thoroughly temporal power, chapter one began to 
do so within the context of the Platonic problem of participation. In particular I 
suggested that an account of the dynamism of Life, and the manner in which 
each individual is to be understood as an immanent expression of this dynamism, 
will be required to address and overcome the ontological presuppositions 
associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation; namely, 
the presupposition of transcendence, equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the 
positing of an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity 
over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. In 
seeking to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life 
that addresses, challenges and overcomes these Platonic presuppositions, 
presuppositions retained by both Neo-Platonism and Christianity, I also 
suggested that the immanent relation between Life and human beings ought to 
be understood in terms of the Spinozist concept of expression, an immanent 
expressionism that entails a challenging conception of ontological univocity. In 
particular, the conception of univocity that Deleuze seeks to maintain was 
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presented in terms of a complex, subtle and challenging attempt to distinguish 
an expressive ontological ground from the plurality of beings that it expresses, 
without that ground thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of 
beings that are its expression. However, it is precisely this attempt to maintain 
an ontological position of univocity while holding that there is an expressive 
ontological ground that is distinguishable from the multitude of beings that are 
its expression that Badiou can be understood as suggesting that Deleuze is 
unable to sustain. For Badiou, Deleuze’s attempt to determine an expressive 
ontological ground as the distinguishable and virtual ground of the plurality of 
actual beings that it expresses, without that ontological ground thereby being 
distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression, collapses 
into the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many, 
reintroducing the Platonic ontological presupposition of transcendence along 
with the remaining ontological presuppositions associated with the historical 
responses to the problem of participation.    
To accept Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, therefore, would be to accept the 
introduction of the ontological presupposition of transcendence into the latter’s 
work, thereby threatening to frustrate this study’s attempt to formulate an 
account of the dynamism of Life, and the manner in which the human being is to 
be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of that dynamism. By 
introducing the concept of transcendence into Deleuze’s work, along with the 
other Platonic ontological presuppositions associated with that concept, then the 
dynamism of Life, along with the legitimacy of the conception of living well 
that rests upon it, is threatened by a conception of Life in terms of a 
transcendent, immutable identity and the obligation to actualise one’s 
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possibilities in accordance with that dictated to it by that transcendent identity. 
My objective in this chapter, however, is to argue that it is possible to provide a 
coherent account of the expressive and univocal nature of Life, to understand 
Life in terms of a distinguishable ground that is nevertheless not distinct from 
the actual beings that are its ongoing expression, and that by doing so the 
opposing relation between the One and many can be addressed - along with the 
ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the 
problem of participation. However, I also want to propose that this necessitates, 
as it were, a thoroughgoing temporalisation of Life, a conceptualisation of Life 
in terms of the three passive syntheses of time and, within the context of these 
syntheses, a reconsideration of Deleuze’s important distinction between the 
virtual and the actual. As a result, we shall be able to formulate an account of 
the manner in which each human being can be understood as an immediate and 
ongoing expression of Life, a continual and immanent expression of that which 
is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment. In particular, 
I will argue that a reconceptualisation of Life in terms of the three passive 
syntheses of time will enable a formulation of the manner in which Life can be 
understood as a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that constitutes the 
dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, as well 
as enabling us to understand how each moment of our lives provides us with the 
forever renewed present opportunity for moving beyond the often restrictive, 
self-limiting modes of life that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an 
awareness of our present possibilities. 
In order to address these various concerns, I want to begin with the 
manner in which our living present is to be understood as being constituted by 
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the three passive syntheses of time, the manner in which our living present is an 
immanent and ongoing expression of Life. In order to do this, however, I want 
to begin with an examination of two, brief examples that Deleuze employs in 
Difference and Repetition and which begin to disclose the nature or the 
character of the living present. The first example is what Deleuze identifies as 
David Hume’s account of the repeated series of couples of events or instances: 
AB, AB, AB…in which whenever an instance of A occurs we expect B to 
follow - in our living present an example of this repeated series would be the 
ongoing ‘tick-tock’ of a clock.184 The second example that Deleluze identifies 
and employs is Henri Bergson’s account of a series of repeated instances: A, A, 
A…in which whenever A occurs we expect another A to follow - an example of 
this type of repeated series in the living present would be the repeated chimes of 
a clock.
185
 While these examples will be seen to be illustrative for various 
aspects of the living present, what I want to suggest here is that they illustrate 
the manner in which our present, lived experience - such as our present 
experience of the repeated tick-tock of a clock or the present experience of 
hearing the repeated chimes of a clock - is constituted by virtue of the relation or 
synthesis that independent elements or instants enter into. Indeed, in relation to 
Hume’s example of hearing the repeated tick-tock of a clock, Deleuze makes it 
clear that what is at work here is a synthesis that ‘contracts the successive 
independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, 
present.’186 Through the employment of both Hume’s and Bergson’s examples 
to illustrate the temporal character of the living present we can therefore begin 
to suggest that underlying and constituting that living present, underlying and 
constituting the nature of our present, lived experience of, for example, hearing 
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the tick-tock of a clock or a clock’s repeated chimes, are independent instants 
that enter into a relation or synthesis that thereby constitutes that present 
experience.  
In addition to the two, brief examples given by Deleuze, however - in 
addition to Hume’s example of the repeated series of couples of events or 
instances and Bergson’s example of a series of repeated instances - it is 
productive to employ an example that is well established when discussing 
philosophical accounts of time; namely, the experience of hearing a musical 
melody in the living present.
187
 In particular, I want to suggest that the example 
of hearing a melody not only further explicates the manner in which the living 
present is constituted by a synthesis of independent instants, but that it will also 
be illustrative for various other aspects of the manner in which the temporal 
character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an ongoing 
expression of the passive syntheses of time. To begin to do so, consider the 
manner in which it is necessary, in order to hear the ongoing progression of a 
melody in the living present, that the notes that constitute that melody are heard 
as conjoined, and therefore experienced as an ongoing continuity. This is to say 
that in order to hear a melody in the living present then the multitude of 
independent notes from which it is composed must not be experientially 
independent, the multitude of independent notes which make up that melody 
must not be heard in isolation from one another, but must be experienced in the 
living present as conjoined, as an ongoing and progressive continuity. Therefore, 
while the multitude of independent notes from which that melody is composed 
are not experientially independent, while the multitude of notes that make up a 
melody are not heard in isolation from one another, they can be understood as 
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being independent from one another prior to our experience of them in the living 
present, as being, as it were, ‘logically independent’ or ‘logically isolated’ from 
one another. Indeed, in illustrating the logical independence of the instances that 
make up the lived experience of that which is not experientially independent and, 
in particular, the manner in which we hear four chimes of a clock in the living 
present as conjoined - thereby enabling us to determine that it is four o’clock - 
Deleuze makes it clear that ‘four o’clock strikes…each stroke, each disturbance 
or excitation, is logically independent of the other, mens momentanea’.188 This 
is to say that each instance, one tick or chime of the clock, or one note of a 
musical melody, is to be understood as being logically independent from every 
other in the sense that - prior to our experience of them in the living present - 
one instance, one chime of the clock, one note of the melody, does not appear 
unless the other has disappeared.
189
  
In supplementing the examples given by Deleuze with the example of a 
musical melody, and by drawing a distinction between that which is logically 
independent but not experientially independent, my intention is to begin to 
illustrate the manner in which our lived, present experience is constituted by, or 
an expression of, a particular temporal dynamic or synthesis which Deleuze 
refers to as the first synthesis of time or simply as Habit.
190
 Each individual’s 
living present is an expression of a dynamic synthesis which ensures that all of 
the independent instants that have disappeared or that have passed continue to 
be retained, contracted and synthesised into the present. As Deleuze makes clear: 
‘This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one another, 
thereby constituting the lived, or living present. It is in this present that time is 
deployed.’191 If we consider the example of the lived, present experience of 
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hearing a musical melody, then the first synthesis of time can be understood as 
ensuring that - rather than hearing the multitude of notes in isolation from one 
another - the previous notes of the melody are retained, contracted and 
synthesised into the experience of the present note, so that the present note is 
always experienced alongside or, as it were, against the background of the notes 
that have passed. As Hughes has suggested: ‘The first passive synthesis, 
undertaken by a spontaneous imagination, does nothing more than gather 
together sensibility’s passing presents. In doing so, it produces the temporal 
dimension of the ‘the present’’. 192  As has been noted elsewhere, 193  in 
characterising the first synthesis of time in terms of a retention, contraction and 
synthesis of the past into the present, Deleuze is here drawing upon and refining 
Bergson’s account of duree or duration in which our former conscious states are 
said to endure, coexist and meld into our present conscious state. Indeed, in 
discussing the manner in which the endurance of the past with the present that 
characterises duration presupposes the constituting activity of contraction, 
Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Saying that the past is preserved in itself and that it 
is prolonged in the present is tantamount to saying that the subsequent moment 
appears without the disappearance of the previous moment. This presupposes a 
contraction, and it is contraction that defines duration’.194 
In presenting his account of duration, at least in his earlier works, 
Bergson suggests that the ongoing endurance of the past with the present, an 
ongoing endurance that presupposes the contraction of the past into the present, 
is characteristic of the ongoing succession of our conscious states. For example, 
he makes it clear that: ‘Pure duration is the form which the succession of our 
conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live’, 195  such that our 
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conscious states ‘permeate one another, imperceptibly organize themselves into 
a whole, and bind the past to the present by this very process of connexion’.196 
All too often, however, it is suggested that we fail to notice the durational nature 
of our conscious states, all too often we fail to see the manner in which the past 
is retained, contracted and synthesised into the present, and we fail to do so to 
the extent that we commonly introduce an abstract and, in particular, a spatial 
conception of time into the lived, durational nature of our conscious states. As 
Bergson makes clear, ‘we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a 
way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside 
one another; in a word we project time into space, we express duration in terms 
of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, 
the parts of which touch without penetrating one another’.197 As I shall discuss 
below, the ongoing contraction of the past with the present that characterises 
duration and which Deleuze adopts in order to develop his account of the 
passive synthesis of time ought not to be understood as being confined to, and 
an exclusive property of, the individual’s conscious states, a displacement of 
‘psychological duration’ that Deleuze also discerns in Bergson’s later works.  
However, for now I want to suggest that rather than being solely understood as 
that which contracts all of the independent instants that have passed, the first 
synthesis of time also simultaneously establishes a further characteristic of the 
living present. This is to say that in addition to the ongoing contraction of all the 
particular independent instants into the present, Habit is to be understood as that 
which simultaneously ensures that each individual’s living present is also 
characterised by expectations of the future. As Deleuze makes clear, ‘the living 
present goes from the past to the future which it constitutes in time, which is to 
 81 
say also from the particular to the general: from the particulars which it envelops 
by contraction to the general which it develops in the field of its expectation’.198      
If we consider this additional aspect of the first synthesis of time within 
the context of the lived, present experience of hearing a musical melody, then 
this temporal dynamic does not simply ensure that the previous notes of the 
melody are contracted, retained and synthesised into the experience of the 
present note, so that the present note is always experienced against the 
background of the notes that have passed. Rather, the first synthesis of time also 
simultaneously creates an anticipation or expectation of the future, the 
anticipation or expectation that there are more notes of the musical melody to 
come. The ongoing contraction, retention and synthesis that characterises the 
first synthesis of time, therefore, must be understood as not only ensuring that 
each individual’s living present is characterised by an ongoing continuity with 
the past, but must also be understood as that which ensures that the living 
present is characterised by certain expectations of the future. As Deleuze 
suggests, both the past and the future must be understood as being deployed 
within, or belonging to, each individual’s living present, ‘the past in so far as the 
preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the future because its 
expectation is anticipated in this same contraction’.199 Therefore, in employing 
the example of a musical melody to illustrate the manner in which the living 
present is an expression of the first synthesis of time we can suggest that 
although the notes of a melody, prior to our experience of them in the living 
present, are instantaneous, discontinuous and logically independent from one 
another - in the sense that one note does not appear unless the other has 
disappeared - the first synthesis of time ensures that all of the notes that have 
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passed are contracted, retained and synthesised into the present. As a 
consequence of this ongoing contraction, however, the first synthesis of time 
simultaneously creates a general, ongoing anticipation or expectation of the 
arrival of future notes, an orientation towards the future that is possible ‘in so far 
as there is also a synthesis of the past within the living present’.200 It is this on-
going contraction, retention and synthesis of the past into the present which 
simultaneously creates an expectation of the future that can be understood as 
transforming the instantaneous, discontinuous, and therefore logically 
independent notes of a melody into the lived, present experience of its ongoing 
and dynamic continuity.  
However, to conceptualise the temporal character of the living present as 
being constituted by, and an expression of, the first synthesis of time or Habit, 
and thereby understand both the past and the future as belonging to, or 
continuous with the present, challenges what we might refer to as the everyday 
conception of time or, following Heidegger, ‘the ordinary understanding of 
time’. 201  In contrast to Deleuze’s account of the manner in which the first 
synthesis of time ensures that the living present is characterised in terms of an 
ongoing continuity with the past and the future, the ordinary understanding of 
time attempts to characterise the living present exclusively in terms of a series of 
successive and distinct present moments or ‘nows’ in which the previous ‘now’ 
is said to have gone, the future ‘now’ is yet to come and so only the present 
‘now’ is said to exist.202 Of course, Deleuze’s account of the first synthesis of 
time is not the first to call into question, and provide an alternative to, this 
ordinary understanding of time as a series of successive ‘nows’. Husserl’s 
account of ‘internal time consciousness’ in which our lived experience of the 
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present is composed of ‘primal impressions’, ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions’,203 
Bergson’s account of duree in which the succession of our conscious states are 
directly experienced or lived in such a way that our former conscious states 
endure, coexist and fuse into our present state,
204
 and Heidegger’s account of the 
‘ecstases’ of temporality in which Dasein, at any given moment, simultaneously 
‘stands’ in the past, present and future, 205  all provide critiques of, and 
alternatives to, the ordinary understanding of time.
206
 Indeed, prior to Husserl, 
Bergson and Heidegger, Aristotle raised a series of concerns about 
understanding time in terms of the ‘now’.207 For example, how are we to resolve 
the apparent experiential fact that we are continually presented with a series of 
new ‘nows’, that each of our present experiences is continually changing and 
different, and yet our experience always seems to occur within the same, 
apparently unchanging form of ‘now’?208 As Durie has suggested: ‘It is not 
simply that the content, so to speak of each experience is different; it is, rather, 
that each now, while still being now, is also a new now’.209    
Despite the manner in which the ordinary understanding of time has been 
highlighted as problematic and contested, at least philosophically, since the 
work of Aristotle, it has been suggested that in our everyday thinking about time 
it continues to persist, albeit dressed in modern day metaphors. For example, 
Sokolowski has proposed that: ‘When we try to explain how we experience 
temporal objects, we are usually tempted to say that we have a series of “nows” 
presented to us, one after the other. We tend to say that temporal experience is 
very much like a film being run, with one exposure (one presence) quickly 
following another’.210 Indeed, in his recent study, Consuming Life, Zygmunt 
Bauman has proposed that within modern consumer society, not only is time 
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widely conceptualised in terms of a series of punctuated or discontinuous 
present moments, but that it increasingly becomes the primary mode in which 
time is ordinarily lived.
211
 This is to say that in so far as consumer society 
associates happiness with an ever rising volume and intensity of desires and the 
prompt use, and rapid replacement, of the commodities intended to satisfy those 
desires then the meaning of time is renegotiated. In particular, there is a greater 
emphasis on the present, on continually renewed present desires and their 
immediate gratification such that, increasingly, the members of ‘liquid modern 
society’ come to live and experience time in a ‘pointillist’ manner, as a series of 
discrete points, spots or ‘nows’. As Bauman proposes: ‘Pointillist time is more 
prominent for its inconsistency and lack of cohesion than for its elements of 
continuity and consistency; in this kind of time whatever continuity or causal 
logic may connect successive spots tends to be surmised and/or construed at the 
far end of the retrospective search for intelligibility and order, being as a rule 
conspicuously absent among the motives prompting the actors’ movement 
between points’.212 Whatever our assessment of Bauman’s thesis regarding the 
proliferation and intensification of pointillist time in modern consumer society, 
the continued persistence of an understanding of time as a successive series of 
‘nows’, or independent instants, is important enough for Deleuze to stress the 
manner in which his account of the first synthesis of time ought to be 
distinguished from the ordinary understanding of time. For example, he asserts 
that: ‘A succession of independent instants does not constitute time any more 
than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of 
birth’.213 
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What is important for Deleuze about this ordinary understanding of time, 
however, is not merely the manner in which it prioritises the existence of an 
independent present ‘now’, but the manner in which the temporality, movement 
or passage of time is thought to occur by virtue of a passing series or succession 
of distinct presents. In the ordinary understanding of time, time understood as a 
series of successive ‘nows’, the present moment or ‘now’ is thought to become 
past when a new present moment arrives and reconstitutes the former present 
moment as past. Indeed, in illustrating and calling into question this ordinary 
conception of the passage of time, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘We are too 
accustomed to thinking in terms of the “present.” We believe that a present is 
only past when it is replaced by another present’.214 One of the main difficulties 
with this conception of time, however, an account that prioritises the present 
‘now’ and understands the passage of time in terms of a series of successive and 
distinct ‘nows’, is that it is unclear how one ‘now’ is to succeed another, how 
the arrival of a new present moment is supposed to constitute the former present 
moment as past. In highlighting the difficulties of this conception of the passage 
of time, Deleuze writes that: ‘In effect, we are unable to believe that the past is 
constituted after it has been present, or because a new present appears. If a new 
present were required for the past to be constituted as past, then the former 
present would never pass and the new one would never arrive’.215 In order to 
understand the problem that Deleuze highlights here, it is necessary to note that 
when time is understood in terms of a series of successive and distinct ‘nows’, 
then the present moment or ‘now’ is often understood in terms of a limit or a 
boundary that separates the past ‘now’ from the future ‘now’.216 However, if the 
independent present moment or ‘now’ is understood in terms of a boundary that 
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separates or divides the past ‘now’ from the future ‘now’, then the present ‘now’ 
would seem to be irremediably set adrift from the past and the future, both 
unable to traverse itself in order to become past and divorced from the 
possibility of being replaced by the arrival of a new ‘now’.  
In order to account for the manner in which the living present is 
characterised by the movement or passage of time, therefore, then that living 
present is also to be understood as being constituted by, or being an expression 
of, a second synthesis of time, a synthesis of time that Deleuze refers to as 
Memory.
217
 However, if the first synthesis of time challenges the ordinary 
understanding of time, then the second synthesis of time, when compared to the 
understanding of time as a series of successive and distinct present moments or 
‘nows’, must be understood as being profoundly paradoxical. In particular, the 
second synthesis of time entails that in order for the living present to be 
characterised by the passage of time, then every present moment must already 
possess, as it were, a past aspect to. This is to say that in order for the living 
present to be characterised by the movement of the present into the past then 
every present moment must be understood as already being past at the moment 
that it is present. Indeed, in highlighting this paradoxical character of the second 
synthesis of time, and yet its necessity for the passage of the present, Deleuze 
proposes that: ‘No present would ever pass were it not past ‘at the same time’ as 
it is present; no past would ever be constituted unless it was first constituted ‘at 
the same time’ as it was present’.218 Therefore, in order for the second synthesis 
of time to ensure that the present moment always has a past aspect to it, then the 
past must not be understood - as it is for the ordinary understanding of time - as 
a former present that is constituted after the arrival of a new present moment. 
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Rather, the second synthesis of time is to be understood in terms of an a priori 
past that always coexists with every present moment and that is the condition for 
the passage of every present, an a priori and contemporaneous past which 
ensures that each present moment has a past aspect to it and is therefore able to 
pass. In highlighting the a priori nature of the past constituted by the second 
synthesis of time, Deleuze writes that ‘we necessarily speak of a past which 
never was present, since it was not formed ‘after’. Its manner of being 
contemporaneous with itself as present is that of being posed as already there, 
presupposed by the passing present and causing it to pass’.219   
For each individual’s living present to be characterised by the passage of 
time, then it must also be understood as being an expression of a second 
synthesis of time or Memory, a profoundly paradoxical synthesis of time that, in 
establishing an a priori and contemporaneous past, ensures that each present 
moment is already past at the moment that it is present. As Turetzky notes: ‘For 
a present to pass it must be constituted as past, and it cannot be constituted as 
past unless it were so constituted when it was present’.220 In so far as the second 
synthesis of time constitutes ‘a past which never was present’, a past which was 
already there prior to every present moment, then this a priori past must not be 
understood in terms of, and as being constituted by, a series of former presents 
or ‘nows’. Rather, this a priori past is to be understood as ‘the past itself’ or a 
‘general region’ into which each present moment passes, a coexistent ‘past in 
general’ in which particular former presents preserve themselves and from 
which it is possible to focus upon and actively represent those former presents to 
ourselves in the living present. As Deleuze suggests: ‘The past is not the former 
present itself but the element in which we focus upon the latter. Particularity, 
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therefore, now belongs to that on which we focus - in other words, to that which 
‘has been’; whereas the past itself, the ‘was’, is by nature general. The past in 
general is the element in which each former present is focused upon in particular 
and as a particular’.221 Therefore, as that which is already there prior to every 
present, the second synthesis time is not only to be understood as a coexistent a 
priori past that ensures that our living present is characterised by the passage of 
time, but it is also to be understood as the past in general into which particular 
presents pass and that, by virtue of its contemporaneity, serves as a necessary 
condition for the possibility of actively recollecting and representing those 
former presents to ourselves in the living present.
222
   
As the past in general into which particular presents pass, the coexistent 
a priori past that is established by the second synthesis of time, ought not to be 
understood as a general region into which some of our particular presents pass. 
Rather, the past in general is to be understood as that general region into which 
all of our former presents pass so that the whole of our past is contemporaneous 
with our living present, so that ‘all of the past coexists with the new present in 
relation to which it is now past’.223 As Williams suggests, the proposal that all of 
our former presents coexist with our living present, including those that have 
‘sunk without a trace’, is ‘deeply counter-intuitive’ in so far as it is often 
supposed that without some physical record or some enduring memorial ‘trace’, 
without some enduring remembrance of a former present that we can call to 
mind, then those former presents are gone for good and forever lost to memory: 
‘The enduring intuition is: no trace - no past; no remembering - no memory’.224 
However, the ongoing coexistence of all of our former presents with our living 
present can be understood as the necessary condition for the phenomena of 
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involuntarily memory. It is because the whole of our past is contemporaneous 
with our living present that any one of the former presents that comprise that 
past - even those former presents that have sunk without a trace, those former 
presents for which there is no longer a physical record or enduring memorial 
trace - can be involuntarily summoned into the living present by, for example, 
the smell of perfume, the notes of a melody or, as famously depicted in Marcel 
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time the taste of a piece of madeleine dipped in lime-
blossom tea. Indeed, in highlighting the extent to which such involuntarily 
memory can resurrect whole periods of lost time, rather than merely a limited 
number of recent former presents, Proust’s narrator proposes that the taste of 
madeleine dipped in lime-blossom tea involuntarily summons whole sections of 
his forgotten past into the present so that ‘the good people of the village and 
their little dwellings and the church and all of Combray and its surroundings, all 
of this which is assuming form and substance, emerged, town and gardens alike, 
from my cup of tea’.225 
In beginning with the living present, it has been suggested that the 
dynamic form or temporal character of our living present is to be understood as 
being an expression of, and thereby constituted by, two distinct syntheses of 
time. The first synthesis of time or Habit ensures that our lived present is 
characterised by an ongoing continuity in so far as this synthesis contracts and 
retains every present moment that has passed and synthesises all those past 
moments into the present, thereby creating an anticipation or certain expectation 
of the future. However, in order to ensure that the living present is characterised 
by the passage of time then the second synthesis of time or Memory constitutes 
an a priori past in general that not only ensures that every present moment 
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possess a past aspect to it, and is therefore able to pass, but is also the coexistent 
region into which every former present passes, ensuring that those former 
presents can be recollected, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in the present 
moment. If we consider the first and second synthesis of time within the context 
of the example of hearing a melody in the living present, then the first synthesis 
of time ensures that all the notes that have passed are contracted, retained and 
synthesised into the present, creating the expectation of future notes and the 
ongoing continuity of the melody. In contrast, the second synthesis of time is 
that synthesis which ensures that each note of the melody is able to pass and is 
also the condition for both the voluntary and involuntary recollection of the past 
notes and phrases of that melody. Therefore, in so far as the first synthesis of 
time is a contraction of all the present moments that have passed, while the 
second synthesis ensures that each present moment is able to pass, the former 
synthesis refers to, and must be understood as being grounded upon, the latter 
synthesis. Without the activity of the second synthesis of time no present would 
be able to pass and therefore the first synthesis of time would be unable to 
conduct its contraction of the presents that have passed. Highlighting the 
dependency of the first synthesis of time upon the passing present, and therefore 
upon the second syntheses of time, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘The claim of 
the present is precisely that it passes. However, it is what causes the present to 
pass, that to which the present and habit belong, which must be considered the 
ground of time. It is memory that grounds time’.226      
But how is it that the living present is continually characterised by a new 
and distinguishable present moment upon which the first and second syntheses 
of time conduct their respective syntheses? While Habit contracts every present 
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moment that passes, and Memory ensures that every present moment is able to 
pass, how are we to account for the manner in which our living present is 
continually characterised by a new present moment, necessarily distinguishable 
from the past and the future, that Memory ensures passes and Habit continually 
contracts into the new present moment? The answer to this, I shall argue, is that 
the living present is not only constituted by, and therefore an expression of, the 
first and second synthesis of time, but it is also an expression of a third 
syntheses of time, a third synthesis of time that ensures that the living present is 
continually characterised by a distinguishable and new present moment without 
which the first and second syntheses would be unable to conduct their respective 
syntheses. Before discussing this further, however, it should be noted that any 
attempt to provide an exposition of the third synthesis of time demands a 
particularly close and critical reading of Deleuze’s work, not only because that 
synthesis possesses a particularly complex determination or character, but also 
because it is introduced in Difference and Repetition in a significantly 
contracted and abstruse manner. Indeed, in his assessment of the difficulty in 
coming to terms with the exposition of the third synthesis of time in Difference 
and Repetition, and the need for a critical reading in order to do so, Hughes has 
suggested that: ‘Deleuze’s comments on the third synthesis are among the most 
opaque of the entire book. His descriptions are extremely difficult to follow, and 
at times they seem incoherent and contradictory…one reason this particular 
moment is so difficult to follow is that Deleuze himself does not make enough 
distinctions and pushes too much information and too many elaborate allusions 
into too few lines’.227 Indeed, Deleuze’s explicit exposition of the third synthesis 
of time in Difference and Repetition can be seen as being conducted over a mere 
 92 
three or four pages,
228
 and does so by employing a number of oblique references 
to a variety of literary, fictional characters such as Oedipus and Hamlet. For 
example, Deleuze writes: ‘What does this mean: the empty form of time or third 
synthesis? The Northern Prince says ‘time is out of joint’. Can it be that the 
Northern philosopher says the same thing: that he should be Hamletian because 
he is Oedipal?’229 
Despite these difficulties, however, I shall suggest that the exposition of 
the third synthesis of time is best approached through a careful and critical 
reading of Deleuze’s brief allusion to the nineteenth century German poet 
Friedrich Hölderlin and, within the context of Hölderlin, Deleuze’s discussion of 
‘the caesura’ in particular.230 Therefore, in order to provide an exposition of the 
third synthesis of time, and continue the formulation of the manner in which the 
temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an 
expression of all three syntheses of time, and ultimately the manner in which the 
living present is an ongoing and immanent expression of Life itself, it is to 
Deleuze’s employment of Hölderlin and his discussion of the caesura that I shall 
now turn. Deleuze can be understood as seeking to elucidate the complex 
character of the third synthesis of time with the suggestion that: ‘Hölderlin said 
that it no longer ‘rhymed’, because it was distributed unequally on both sides of 
a ‘caesura’, as a result of which beginning and end no longer coincided. We may 
define the order of time as this purely formal distribution of the unequal in the 
function of a caesura.’231 Despite the complex and contracted manner of this 
passage, I want to argue that Deleuze can be understood as proposing that a 
productive way to begin to think about the third synthesis of time is in 
accordance with, and analogous to, the poetic device known as a caesura, where 
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a caesura is a cut or a break that occurs midway in a poetic line - more often 
than not, of iambic pentameter. For example, following his encounter with the 
ghost of his father, Hamlet famously declares that: ‘The time is out of joint: O 
cursed spite // That ever I was born to set it right!’232 Here, a particularly sharp 
caesura occurs in the first line (indicated by the colon) which effectively cuts or 
breaks the line in two, enabling a clear distinction to made between what comes 
before the caesura and what comes after it. This is to say that the caesura 
functions as a break or a pause that enables an audience to clearly distinguish 
Hamlet’s assessment of the current state of ‘the time’ (i.e. ‘the time is out of 
joint’), and his assessment of the role he has in relation to that time (i.e. ‘O 
cursed spite // That ever I was born to set it right’).   
In an analogous fashion to the caesura in a poetic line, therefore, we can 
provisionally propose that the third synthesis of time can be understood in terms 
of a ‘temporal caesura’, a temporal caesura that functions as, or serves to 
introduce, a cut or a break. However, if we understand the caesura in temporal 
terms, then how are we to consider the nature of the cut or the break that it 
serves to introduce, and what is the ‘purely formal distribution of the unequal’ 
that Deleuze suggests is established by the function of the caesural cut or break? 
In a fashion analogous to the function of the poetic caesura, the temporal 
caesura that is to be identified with the third synthesis of time can be understood 
as enabling a temporal distinction to be made between what comes before the 
caesura and what comes after it. This is to say that in so far as the third synthesis 
of time is understood in terms of a temporal caesura then I am suggesting that it 
establishes a temporal cut or break that enables a distinction to be made between 
the past - or that which comes before the temporal caesura - and the future - or 
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that which comes after the temporal caesura. It is in this sense that we can 
understand the third synthesis of time as establishing ‘a distribution of the 
unequal’ on both sides of the caesura, a distribution of the past on one side or 
before the caesura, and a distribution of the future on the other side or after the 
caesura, such that the past and the future are unequal and therefore 
distinguishable distributions either side of the temporal cut that, to use the 
terminology that Deleuze attributes to Hölderlin, no longer ‘rhyme’. If the third 
synthesis of time is understood in terms of a temporal caesura that serves to 
introduce a cut that enables a distinction to be made between the past and the 
future, then the caesural cut itself can be further determined in temporal terms. 
This is to say that as a caesural cut that enables a temporal distinction to be 
made between what comes before the caesura and what comes after it, the third 
synthesis of time can be determined as the present moment such that the present 
moment, understood as a temporal caesural cut, is that which enables a 
distinction to be made between the past or that which comes before the present 
moment and the future or that which comes after the present moment.     
Although the third synthesis of time is to be understood as a temporal 
caesura that is identified with the present moment and that enables a distinction 
to be made between the past and the future, that temporal caesura must not be 
understood exclusively as a cut or a break. This is to say that while the third 
synthesis of time functions as a temporal caesura, a cut that enables a temporal 
distinction to be made between the past and the future, it must not be understood 
as a caesural cut that definitively and irremediably breaks the past from the 
future. If we again consider the function of a poetic caesura, then the caesural 
cut does not simply break the line in two, irrevocably divorcing that which 
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comes before the caesura from that which comes after the caesura. Rather, the 
caesural cut must also be understood as gathering together that which comes 
before and after it precisely so that a distinction can be made between them. For 
example, the caesural cut highlighted in Shakespeare’s line from Hamlet does 
not irrevocably separate Hamlet’s assessment of the current state of the time 
from his assessment of the role that he has in relation to that time. Rather, the 
caesural cut gathers those two assessments together precisely so that the 
audience can make the distinction between them. In an analogous fashion, the 
temporal caesura that is the third synthesis of time and that is identified with the 
present moment is not a caesural cut that irrevocably divorces the past from the 
future, but is to be understood as a cut that simultaneously gathers together the 
past and the future either side of the present moment precisely so that a 
distinction can be made between that which comes before and that which comes 
after that temporal caesura. The third synthesis of time, therefore, possesses a 
double aspect such that, as a temporal cut that is to be identified with the present 
moment, it divides time into a distinguishable past and future, but in doing so it 
is also that which simultaneously creates and connects that past and future either 
side of the present moment so that they can be distinguished. Indeed, it is in this 
sense that we can understand Deleuze’s suggestion that the caesura ‘must be 
determined in the image of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is 
adequate to time as a whole’,233 in so far as the caesural cut that is the third 
synthesis of time is that dynamic action that simultaneously cuts, creates and 
connects the past and the future either side of the present moment. A ‘unique 
and tremendous event’ that thereby establishes the whole of time, the 
dimensions of past, present and future, and therefore that which Deleuze refers 
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to as the formal or ‘pure order of time’,234  the very manner in which each 
individual’s living present is always characterised by a present moment with a 
distinguishable past and future either side of that present.  
As a unique and tremendous event that establishes the pure order of time, 
the action of the caesural cut that is to be identified with the third synthesis of 
time ought not to be understood in terms of that which establishes a particular 
distinguishable past and future either side of the present moment. Indeed, in 
discussing the ‘purely formal distribution’ of the unequal that is established by 
the caesural cut, Deleuze suggests that: ‘We can then distinguish a more or less 
extensive past and a future in inverse proportion, but the future and the past here 
are not empirical and dynamic determinations of time: they are formal and fixed 
characteristics which follow a priori from the order of time’.235 This is to say 
that as a temporal cut that simultaneously cuts, creates and connects a 
distinguishable past and future either side of the present moment, the past and 
future that is thereby established is not to be understood in terms of our 
empirical pasts or futures, our particular and individual histories or our 
individual future expectations or aspirations. Similarly, the past constituted by 
the third synthesis of time ought not to be identified with the past in general, that 
past constituted by the second synthesis of time, into which, for example, the 
particular notes of a melody pass, and neither is it to be identified with the 
expectations of the future established by the first synthesis of time such as the 
expectation of the ongoing progression of a musical melody. Rather, while the 
third synthesis of time is analogous to the temporal caesura that is to be 
identified with a present moment - a present moment that, through the activity of 
the first and second synthesis of time, passes and is then contracted into the 
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present to create certain expectations of the future - the past and the future that is 
established by the third synthesis is not particular and dynamic. The past and 
future that is constituted by the third synthesis of time is to be understood in 
terms of the formal order of time or the pure order of time, the manner in which 
each individual’s living present possesses the formal characteristics of a 
distinguishable past and future either side of a present moment and is always 
structured in accordance with this fixed order.  
In discussing the manner in which it establishes the pure order of the 
living present, the formal, fixed or, as it were, static characteristics of every 
living present, Deleuze sometimes refers to the third synthesis of time as a static 
synthesis, as ‘statique forcement’ or necessarily static.236 Despite this, however, 
the third synthesis of time must not be thought of as a synthesis that is not 
dynamic, as a temporal caesural cut that only occurs once and thereby 
establishes, one and for all, the distinguishable but non-particular past and future 
either side of the present moment. Indeed, in discussing the manner in which the 
third synthesis constitutes the fixed and formal characteristics of time, the 
manner in which time always has the order of a past and future either side of a 
present moment, Deleuze suggests that the third synthesis of time constitutes the 
past and present ‘as though it comprised a static synthesis of time’ (comme une 
synthese statique du temps).
237
 How then are we to understand the description of 
the third synthesis of time as a static synthesis of time, or as though it acted like 
a static synthesis of time? The answer to this can be discerned in Deleuze’s 
description of the third synthesis of time as ‘the most radical form of change, but 
the form of change does not change.’238 This is to say that the third synthesis of 
time is the most radical synthesis of time because, in being understood as a 
 98 
caesural cut that is identified with the present moment, it constitutes the fixed 
and formal characteristics of the whole of time, the manner in which our living 
present is always characterised by a past and future either side of a present 
moment, as opposed to the second and first syntheses of time which deal with 
the passage of particular presents and their contraction respectively. In doing so, 
however, the very form of change, the manner in which change occurs within 
the formal order of time established by the third synthesis does not change. 
Change occurs within a living present that is always characterised by a past and 
a future either side of a present moment, a necessarily static order of time that is 
established by the third synthesis such that this synthesis appears to be a static 
synthesis of time, a caesural cut that only occurs once and thereby establishes 
the order of time.  
The third synthesis of time, however, is the most radical form of change, 
and it is the most radical form of change not merely because it establishes the 
fixed, formal or static characteristics of the whole of time, but because it 
continually establishes or reconstitutes these static characteristics. This is to say 
that as a caesural cut that is to be identified with the present moment, the third 
synthesis of time is not to be understood as a temporal cut that only occurs once, 
but is to be understood as an ongoing or recurring present moment that 
continually cuts, creates and connects the distinguishable but non-particular past 
and future either side of the present moment. Although the form of time is fixed 
or static, although each individual’s living present is always characterised by a 
past and a future either side of a present moment, this static form of time is 
continually reconstituted by the ongoing recurrence of the present moment, a 
present moment that continually cuts, creates and connects a past and a future 
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either side of that present moment such that the third synthesis of time, far from 
being a static synthesis, is to be understood as a thoroughly dynamic synthesis 
of time. In order to assist in the conceptualisation of this thoroughly dynamic 
character of the third synthesis of time, Deleuze therefore identifies it with an 
important concept from the philosophical tradition: Nietzsche’s notion of the 
eternal return or the eternal recurrence.
239
 Arguably more than any other figure 
from the philosophical tradition, Nietzsche’s work as a whole has lent itself to a 
variety of both creative readings and dangerous distortions, with the notion of 
the eternal return in particular being given a number of formulations
240
 - a state 
of affairs that can be illustrated by Grosz’s recent suggestion that: ‘In many 
ways, the eternal return can be seen as a curious amalgam and a bizarre, twisted 
reformulation of Darwinism, thermodynamics and Kantian ethics’.241 However, 
Deleuze is insistent that the eternal return ought to be understood in temporal 
terms and, in particular, in terms of the third synthesis of time; indeed, in a 
somewhat enigmatic fashion he suggests that: ‘Eternal return, in its esoteric 
truth, concerns - and can concern - only the third time of the series. Only there is 
it determined’.242 
The esoteric truth of the eternal return that Deleuze speaks of, however, 
involves a particular understanding or formulation of the eternal return, a 
formulation that, in turn, serves to further illustrate the thoroughgoing 
dynamism of the third synthesis of time and the manner in which it establishes 
the past and the future either side of a present moment. The esoteric truth of the 
eternal return is not, as one might be tempted to conclude, to be understood in 
terms of the continual return of the same thing or the eternal recurrence of the 
same state of affairs.
243
 Indeed, while acknowledging that Nietzsche himself 
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made statements that lent themselves to an understanding of the eternal return as 
the return of the same or the similar,
244
 Deleuze makes it clear in the preface to 
the English translation of Nietzsche and Philosophy that no one was more 
vigorous in their critique of identity than Nietzsche, no one was more systematic 
in the overturning of the prioritisation of the same and the similar. Indeed, he 
suggests that: ‘Every time we understand the eternal return as the return of a 
particular arrangement of things after all the other arrangements have been 
realised, every time we interpret the eternal return as the return of the identical 
or the same, we replace Nietzsche’s thought with childish hypotheses’. 245 
However, if the eternal return is not to be understood in terms of the continual 
return of a particular arrangement of things, if it is not to be understood as the 
eternal recurrence of the same or similar state of affairs, then the question arises 
as to how we are to understood the character or the esoteric truth of the eternal 
return, and what precisely is it that is continually returning in the eternal return? 
In his response to this, Deleuze is emphatic in his insistence that the eternal 
return, rather than being conceptualised in terms of the continual return of the 
identical, rather than being understood as the eternal recurrence of the same 
thing or the same state of affairs, is to be understood in terms of the ongoing and 
dynamic recurrence of that which is new or different. For example, he proposes 
that: ‘Eternal return affects only the new…However, it causes neither the 
condition nor the agent to return: on the contrary, it repudiates these and expels 
them with all its centrifugal force…It is itself the new, complete novelty’.246         
In order to assist in the conceptualisation of the thoroughly dynamic 
nature of the third synthesis of time, and to further illustrate the manner in which 
it establishes the past and the future either side of the present moment, Deleuze 
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therefore identifies the third synthesis with Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal 
return. In doing so, however, the eternal return is not to be understood in terms 
of the continual return of the same thing or the eternal recurrence of the same 
state of affairs, but is instead to be understood in terms of the dynamic 
recurrence of that which is new or different, and it is precisely in this 
understanding of the eternal return that we uncover its esoteric truth. Indeed, in 
highlighting this challenging and even radical understanding of the eternal 
return, Ansell-Pearson proposes that: ‘Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche goes 
further than any other reading in insisting that the eternal return does not speak 
of a return of the same but only of difference’.247 However, in so far as I have 
suggested that the function of the eternal return is to further illuminate the third 
synthesis of time then there would appear to be a conflict between an 
understanding of the eternal return as the eternal recurrence of the new or the 
different and the manner in which I have suggested that the third synthesis is to 
be understood as that which establishes the fixed, formal or static characteristics 
of the living present. If the eternal return is to be understood in terms of the 
continual return of the new or the different, then the question arises as to how it 
can be productively employed to further illustrate the character of the third 
synthesis of time when it has been suggested that the third synthesis is that 
synthesis which ensures that our living present possess a fixed identity, the 
manner in which our living present is always characterised by the same order of 
time: a distinguishable past and future either side of a present moment. In order 
to address this apparent conflict then it is necessary to be cautious when 
considering Deleuze’s more dramatic declarations concerning the manner in 
which the eternal return ‘expels’ the return of the same ‘with all its centrifugal 
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force’.248 This is to say that it is necessary to understand the eternal return in a 
more refined manner and to thereby suggest that the eternal return is not simply 
that which expels the return of a particular arrangement of things, or the 
recurrence of the same state of affairs, but is to be understood as that which is 
able to ensure the return of the same or the recurrence of a given identity but 
only as a consequence of the eternal return of the new or the different.  
In accordance with this more refined understanding of the eternal return, 
Deleuze proposes: ‘That identity not be first, that it exists as a principle but as a 
second principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the 
Different…Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return’.249 But 
how are we then to understand the third synthesis of time in light of this more 
refined understanding of the eternal return, an understanding of the eternal 
return that incorporates the return of the same or the recurrence of a given 
identity but only as a consequence of the more profound recurrence of the 
different or the new? To address this question I want to suggest that within the 
context of the third synthesis of time, the eternal return entails that although the 
same form of time continually returns, although the living present is always 
structured into a distinguishable past and future either side of a present moment, 
this ongoing identity depends upon, or is a product of, the eternal recurrence of a 
new or different present moment that continually cuts, creates and connects the 
past and the future either side of that present moment. This is to say that while 
the third synthesis of time is to be understood as a temporal caesura that is 
identified with the present moment and that enables a distinction to be made 
between the past and the future, that caesural cut is not to be understood as only 
occurring once. Rather, the third synthesis of time is to be understood as a 
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thoroughly dynamic synthesis of time in so far as it is an ongoing caesural 
cutting that continually engenders a new or different present moment which, in 
its eternal recurrence, continually establishes the formal, fixed or static 
characteristics of the living present, the manner in which each individual’s 
living present is always characterized by a distinguishable past and future either 
side of a present moment. It is therefore in terms of the continual recurrence of a 
new or different present moment that the eternal return can serve to further 
illustrate the manner in which the third synthesis of time is a dynamic synthesis 
of time, a synthesis in which the very identity or order of time is continually 
established, but is established only as a consequence of the continual and more 
profound recurrence of the different or the new.   
In introducing the third synthesis of time I proposed that, beyond the first 
and second syntheses, a further synthesis was necessary in order for the first and 
second syntheses of time to conduct their respective syntheses. While Habit 
contracts every present moment that passes, creating expectations of the future, 
and Memory ensures that every present moment is able to pass, retaining those 
particular former present moments so that they can be recollected, I suggested 
that the question arose as to how we are to account for the manner in which our 
living present is continually characterized by a new present moment, necessarily 
distinguishable from the past and the future, that Memory ensures passes and 
Habit continually contracts into the forever renewed present moment. We can 
now respond to this by suggesting that our living present is not only an 
expression of, and therefore constituted by, the first and second syntheses of 
time, but that it is also an expression of a thoroughly dynamic third synthesis of 
time, a third synthesis of time that is to be understood as an ongoing caesural 
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cutting that is to be identified with the present moment and, in particular, with 
the continual or eternal return of a new or different present moment. The first 
and second syntheses of time, therefore, must be understood as referring to, and 
as being grounded upon, the third synthesis of time in so far as it is this latter 
synthesis which ensures that our living present is continually characterised by a 
new present moment, distinguishable from the past and the future. Without the 
activity of the third synthesis of time there would be no present moment, no 
continually renewed present moment that the second synthesis of time could 
ensure passes and the first synthesis of time could continually contract into a 
forever renewed present moment. Therefore, while we shall see that the 
character of the ground or foundation that the third synthesis of time constitutes 
challenges the traditional, Platonic conceptualisation of what it means to be a 
ground, the third synthesis of time can be understood as the ground of time in so 
far as it is the temporal synthesis that the first and second syntheses of time must 
be understood as referring to, a temporal synthesis that engenders a continually 
renewed present moment without which Habit and Memory would be unable to 
conduct their respective syntheses.
250
  
In illustrating the manner in which the temporal character or dynamic 
form of an individual’s living present is an expression of the passive syntheses 
of time, the foregoing should not simply be understood as providing an account 
of the lived experience of hearing, for example, the ongoing continuity of 
musical melodies or the ticking or chiming of clocks. Rather, the foregoing 
exposition of the passive syntheses of time, and of the third synthesis of time in 
particular, ought to be understood as that which enables us to begin to address a 
number of the concerns of this study. At the beginning of this study, I suggested 
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that my aim would be to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s individual 
and collaborative work could be productively understood as being concerned 
with the question of living well, where it was suggested that living well 
necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the 
forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment 
brings, therefore moving beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life 
that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to 
occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. Following the exposition of 
the passive syntheses of time, it is now possible to see that it is the 
thoroughgoing dynamism of the third synthesis of time that ensures that we are 
continually given a new present moment, necessarily distinguishable from the 
past and the future, which provides us with the forever renewed opportunity to 
explore new possibilities for living otherwise. As Williams has noted: ‘The third 
synthesis of time is the condition for actions that drive towards the new’.251 This 
is to say that the manner in which each moment of our lives provides us with the 
possibility of new or novel actions, with a forever renewed present possibility 
for living otherwise, is to be understood as being established by the temporal 
caesura that is to be identified with the third synthesis of time, as being 
addressed by that temporal synthesis which constitutes the very ground of time 
in so far as it engenders a forever renewed present moment upon which the first 
two syntheses depend. It is therefore precisely the ongoing dynamism of the 
third synthesis of time which, in continually ensuring that our living present is 
characterised by a forever renewed present moment, ensures that we are given a 
continually open field of present possibilities for living otherwise, that we are 
given a continually or eternally recurring opportunity for exploring and moving 
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beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that we have inherited 
and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. 
To strive to become aware of and to explore the open field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise should therefore not simply be understood as 
acting in accordance with the temporal character of our own individual living 
present. Rather, in so far as the living present of each human being is to be 
understood as being an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive 
syntheses of time, then to explore the possibilities for living otherwise that each 
moment brings is to live in accordance with a temporality that, as it were, 
exceeds the living present of any individual human being. Indeed, we can begin 
to see the manner in which the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as 
that which exceeds the living present of any individual human being by 
considering Deleuze’s determination of the three syntheses of time as passive 
rather than active syntheses. For example, in discussing the character of the first 
synthesis of time or Habit, Deleuze writes that: ‘In any case, this synthesis must 
be given a name: passive synthesis. Although it is constitutive it is not, for all 
that, active’.252 Although the first synthesis of time contracts and synthesises the 
past into the present, thereby constituting certain expectations of the future, it is 
not a synthesis of time that is actively carried out by the individual, but is a 
synthesis in relation to which the individual remains passive, a synthesis of time 
that occurs prior to any active reflection, deliberation or prediction by the 
individual. We do not, for example, hear a melody in our living present by 
consciously or actively remembering, retaining and somehow synthesising all of 
the notes of the melody that have passed into the present, while simultaneously 
considering in a conscious or active manner which notes are yet to come. Of 
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course, ‘we are always able, in the present moment, to actively remember the 
past notes and phrases [of a melody] and consciously ‘predict’ or ‘expect’ the 
appearance of future ones, but this is not the primary mode in which we hear a 
melody’.253 Rather, the experience of hearing a melody in the living present as 
an ongoing and progressive continuity occurs prior to active reflection, 
deliberation and prediction, a pre-reflective experience of the ongoing continuity 
of the living present that is established by the passive constituting dynamism 
that is characteristic of the first synthesis of time.  
The passivity characteristic of the first synthesis of time, a passivity that 
enables us to begin to see the manner in which that synthesis is an expression of 
a temporality that exceeds the living present of the human being, is also to be 
understood as being characteristic of the second and third syntheses of time. 
Neither the passage of the present that is established by the second synthesis of 
time, nor the ongoing recurrence of a forever renewed present moment that is 
established by the third synthesis of time, are to be understood as syntheses that 
the individual actively carries out. Instead, the manner in which the living 
present is always characterised by a forever renewed present moment, and the 
manner in which that present moment always passes, is to be understood as 
being established by the passive constituting dynamism that is characteristic of 
the second and third synthesis of time, syntheses of time that occur prior to any 
activity conducted by the individual in the living present. Indeed, the passivity 
of the three syntheses of time, and the manner in which they are to be 
understood in terms of a temporality that exceeds the living present of any 
individual, can be seen in Deleuze’s determination of those syntheses as a 
universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is characteristic of the pre-
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individual processes that occur at the most fundamental level of the human 
organism. For example, in illustrating this in relation to the first synthesis of 
time, he proposes that: ‘We are made of contracted water, earth, light and the air 
- not merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their 
being sensed. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also 
in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and of expectations.’254 
Indeed, in stressing the manner in which the passive syntheses of time are to be 
understood as occurring at the most fundamental level of the human organism, a 
universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is constitutive of the organism 
and that ensures its ongoing survival, Deleuze proposes that the contraction, 
retention and synthesis of the past into the present is manifest in the form of 
cellular hereditary, while the orientation towards the future that this synthesis 
establishes is manifest in the form of need.
 255
  
The passive syntheses of time, therefore, are not to be understood in 
terms of a temporality that is confined to the temporal character of the 
individual’s living present. For example, in discussing Deleuze’s development 
of a philosophical account of time, Ansell-Pearson makes it clear that: ‘The 
presentation of time he is developing is by no means restricted to human 
time’.256 Rather, the temporal character of each individual’s living present is an 
expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time where 
the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as a universal and impersonal 
temporality that exceeds all individual human beings. Indeed, Deleuze’s 
displacement of an account of temporality that is confined to, and an exclusive 
property of, the temporal character of the individual’s lived experience - or what 
can be referred to as ‘psychological duration’ - and his development of an 
 109 
account of time that exceeds, and yet is intimately connected to the temporal 
character of each individual’s living present - or what can be referred to as 
‘ontological duration’ - can be traced back to his work on Bergson. For example, 
Deleuze writes that: ‘It is only to the extent that movement is grasped as 
belonging to things as much to consciousness that it ceases to be confused with 
psychological duration, whose point of application it will displace, thereby 
necessitating that things participate directly in duration itself…Psychological 
duration should be only a clearly determined case, an opening onto ontological 
duration’.257 As I have discussed earlier, in presenting his account of duration, at 
least in his earlier works, Bergson can be understood as proposing that the 
ongoing endurance of the past with the present, an ongoing endurance that 
presupposes the contraction and the melding of the past into the present, is an 
exclusive characteristic of the ongoing succession of our conscious states. For 
example, in Time and Free Will he suggests that ‘in consciousness we find states 
which succeed, without being distinguished from each other; and in space 
simultaneities which, without succeeding, are distinguished from one another, in 
the sense that one has cased to exist when the other appears. Outside us, mutual 
externality without succession; within us, succession without mutual 
externality’.258   
Bergson’s later work suggests, however, that duration is not to be 
understood as being confined to, and an exclusive property of, the temporal 
character of the individual’s lived experience, but that the durational nature of 
the individual’s conscious states ought to be understood as an opening onto a 
broader, more universal duration. As Deleuze makes clear, ‘Bergson evolved, in 
a certain sense, from the beginning to the end of his work…[in 
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particular]…Duration seemed to him to be less and less reducible to a 
psychological experience and became instead the variable essence of things, 
providing the theme of a complex ontology.’259 This move from duration being 
reducible to a psychological experience and instead becoming ‘the variable 
essence of things’ can be discerned in Bergson’s Creative Evolution in which he 
proposes that: ‘The universe endures…The systems marked off by science 
endure only because they are bound up inseparably with the rest of the 
universe’.260 This is to say that duration is no longer to be understood as an 
exclusive characteristic of the ongoing succession of our conscious states, but is 
also a feature of the systems that science studies, such that both the duration of 
the individual’s conscious states and the systems that science commonly isolates 
and abstracts from the movement of the whole of reality, are in fact bound up 
with the duration of the universe itself. Thus, Bergson goes on to suggests that: 
‘There is no reason, therefore, why a duration, and so a form of existence like 
our own, should not be attributed to the systems that science isolates, provided 
such systems are reintegrated into the Whole’.261 Deleuze’s displacement of an 
account of temporality that is confined to, and an exclusive property of, the 
temporal character of the individual’s lived experience can therefore be traced 
back to his work on Bergson, a displacement of temporality that, I am 
suggesting, entails that the temporal character of each individual’s living present 
is constituted by the passive syntheses of time where the passive syntheses of 
time are to be understood in terms of a temporality that exceeds all individual 
human beings, a universal, impersonal and pre-individual temporal dynamic or 
what I want to suggest is the time of Life itself. This is to say that the 
thoroughgoing temporalisation of Life that I proposed at the beginning of this 
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chapter necessitates a reconsideration of Life in terms of the passive syntheses 
of time such that Life is to be understood as a universal, impersonal and pre-
individual temporality that, by virtue of its ongoing expression, constitutes the 
dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present.  
To the extent that the temporal character or dynamic form of each 
individual’s living present is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the 
passive syntheses of time, where the passive syntheses of time are to be 
understood as a universal, pre-individual and impersonal temporal dynamic that 
exceeds the living present of every individual, then it is possible to highlight a 
difference between Deleuze’s work and that of Immanuel Kant’s, a difference 
that Deleuze himself highlights, and that can help to further clarify the 
distinctive character of his approach. It is important to note, however, that the 
relationship between Deleuze’s work and Kant’s is both complex and 
multifaceted, with it variously being suggested that Deleuze’s work stands in 
opposition to Kant’s,262 that Deleuze’s work aims to complete Kant’s work,263 or 
that Deleuze’s work is concerned with developing problems set by Kant.264 As 
such, my intention here is not to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between Kant’s work and Deleuze’s, but rather to suggest that in so far as the 
passive synthesis of time is to be understood as the pre-individual conditions 
that dynamically or genetically constitute the temporal character of each 
individual’s living present, then it is possible to highlight an important 
distinction between the work of Deleuze and Kant that serves to further illustrate 
the character of the former. Therefore, in the Critique of Pure Reason, and in 
particular as that which he identifies with the revolution of the movement of 
celestial bodies instigated by Copernicus, Kant proposes that the mind, in 
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experiencing the world, necessarily apprehends it in terms of a certain structure; 
this is to say that we come to the world already armed with a priori concepts of 
the understanding, concepts that are prior to and independent of experience.
265
 
In particular, Kant calls these a priori or ‘pure’ concepts of the understanding 
‘categories’,266 categories such as causality or substance, that are presupposed 
by experience and are fundamental preconditions for our being able to 
experience the world at all.
267
 As such our ability to experience the world 
involves an interaction, fusion or union of the dispersed sensory presentations or 
intuitions that are received by our sensibility, and the concepts of the 
understanding or categories that order those intuitions and enable cognition; as 
Kant famously suggests: ‘Without sensibility no object would be given to us; 
and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without 
content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind…Only from their union 
can cognition arise’.268  
However, in order for the dispersed sensory presentations that are 
received by the sensibility to be brought under a priori concepts and thereby 
become an object of thought, in order to move ‘from an indeterminate object 
dispersed in diversity to the determinate object of cognition’,269 it is necessary 
that the dispersed sensory presentations that are received by the sensibility are 
subject to a process of combination, subject to what Kant refers to as 
‘synthesis’.270 In particular, in the 1781 edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant proposes that there are three synthesis: the synthesis of ‘apprehension’, the 
synthesis of ‘reproduction’ and, finally, the synthesis of ‘recognition’; while the 
first two syntheses are said to be carried out by the ‘imagination’, it is the third 
synthesis, carried out by the ‘understanding’, that brings the dispersed sensory 
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presentations under a priori concepts or categories, such that those presentations 
become a unified and determinate object of cognition.
271
 As Burnham and 
Young suggest, it is the third synthesis, the synthesis of recognition as a function 
of the understanding, which ensures that ‘A and B have a conceptual 
relationship, such as being the same thing at different times, species of the same 
type, or being cause and effect. Without that recognition, B would always [be] 
new with respect to A, always be different and without unity’.272 Importantly, 
however, this unification of disparate sensory presentations under a priori 
concepts, a unification carried out by the synthesis of recognition as a function 
of the understanding, also necessitates the unity of consciousness as its 
necessary condition. As Deleuze suggests: ‘My representations [disparate 
sensory presentations brought under a priori concepts or categories] are mine in 
so far as they are linked in the unity of a consciousness, in such a way that the ‘I 
think’ accompanies them’.273 This is to say that the recognition that A and B 
have a conceptual relationship, that A and B are, for example, the same thing at 
different times, not only requires the employment of a priori concepts or 
categories, but it also requires an enduring and unified consciousness within 
which A and B can enter into a conceptual relationship, an original unity of 
consciousness or what Kant refers to as ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental apperception’, 
which ensures that the variety of sensory presentations that are received by the 
sensibility can be recognised as belonging to one unified and enduring 
consciousness.
274
 Therefore, Kant proposes that if we want to pursue the basis of 
the combination or synthesis of the dispersed sensory presentations or intuitions 
that are received by the sensibility, ‘and pursue it to the point at which the 
presentations must all converge in order that there they may first of all acquire 
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the unity of cognition needed for a possible experience, then we must start from 
pure apperception. All intuitions are nothing for us and are of no concern to us 
whatsoever if they cannot be taken up into consciousness…and solely through 
consciousness is cognition possible’.275 
Despite this brief overview, it is now possible to draw a distinction 
between Kant and Deleuze, a distinction that Deleuze himself draws attention to, 
and that serves to further illustrate the character of his approach. In particular, he 
suggests that although ‘the question of knowing how the transcendental field is 
to be determined is very complex. It seems impossible to endow it, in the 
Kantian manner, with the personal form of an I, or the synthetic unity of 
apperception’.276 This is to say that what Deleuze objects to in Kant’s work is 
the determination of the necessary or a priori conditions of experience, what 
Deleuze refers to as the ‘transcendental field’ or simply the ‘transcendental’, in 
the image of consciousness, and he objects to this precisely because it is said to 
involve a projection or, more appropriately, a retrojection of ‘the given’ back 
into the conditions that are supposed to account for the given. For example, 
despite proposing that Kant is ‘the analogue of a great explorer - not of another 
world, but of the upper or lower reaches of this one’, Deleuze suggests that in 
his formulation of the three syntheses in the 1781 edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason ‘Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical 
acts of a psychological consciousness…In order to hide this all too obvious 
procedure, Kant suppressed this text in the second edition. Although it is better 
hidden, the tracing method, with all its ‘psychologism’, nevertheless subsists’.277 
More generally, Deleuze stresses that: ‘The error of all attempts to determine the 
transcendental as consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the 
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image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground’.278 For 
Deleuze, the central issue at stake in the retrojection of the empirical or the 
given back into the transcendental or the conditions that are supposed to account 
for the given - a manoeuvre that is exemplified by the determination of the 
transcendental field in the image of consciousness - is that it entails a paucity of 
dynamism, or genetic constitution, an inability, for example, to account for the 
manner in which the unity of consciousness itself may be dynamically or 
genetically constituted. Thus, Deleuze makes it clear that when we determine 
the conditions in the image of that which the conditions are supposed to ground, 
when we determine the transcendental field, after Kant, in terms of the unity of 
consciousness, then ‘in agreement we Kant, we give up genesis and constitution 
and we limit ourselves to a simple transcendental conditioning’.279  
 We can therefore bring into sharper focus the character of Deleuze’s 
approach if we draw a distinction between his work and Kant’s, a distinction 
that Deleuze himself draws attention to, and which is concerned with the 
determination of the necessary or transcendental conditions of the given in terms 
of the unity of consciousness, and the manner in which this retrojection of the 
image of the given into its necessary conditions obscures genetic constitution for 
a simple conditioning of the given. In contrast to determining the necessary 
conditions of the given in terms of a unified consciousness and the simple 
conditioning that this is said to entail, Deleuze proposes to think of the 
conditions of the given in terms of impersonal or pre-individual processes that 
dynamically or genetically constitute the given. For example, he proposes to 
think in terms of ‘an impersonal transcendental field, not having the form of a 
synthetic personal consciousness or a subjective identity - with the subject, on 
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the contrary, being always constituted’. 280  Therefore, to the extent that the 
conditions of the given are to be understood in terms of pre-individual or 
impersonal processes that dynamically or genetically constitute the given then 
Deleuze will seek to resist the retrojection of the given into its necessary 
conditions that he sees at work in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and that is 
exemplified by the determination of the transcendental field in the image of 
empirical consciousness. As Hughes has suggested: ‘In Difference and 
Repetition, the sole reason that ‘tracing the transcendental from the empirical’ 
was problematic…was that it obscured the point of view of genesis, or 
constitution’, whereas for Deleuze: ‘The constituted does not resemble its 
process of production, its constitution, in the same way a car does not resemble 
the production line which built it’. 281  Therefore, the thoroughgoing 
temporalisation of Life, and its relation to the temporal character of each 
individual’s living present, that I have been developing throughout this chapter 
can begin to be understood as reflecting these Deleuzian characteristics of 
impersonal or pre-individual processes and dynamic or genetic constitution. 
This is to say that the manner in which the temporal character of each 
individual’s living present is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the 
passive syntheses of time, where the passive syntheses of time, as the 
temporality of Life itself, are to be understood as a universal and impersonal 
temporality that exceeds all individual human beings, can be understood as 
seeking to account for the manner in which the temporal character of each 
individual’s living present is genetically constituted by impersonal, pre-
individual and thoroughly dynamic processes.  
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While I shall continue to develop this shortly in relation to Deleuze’s 
important distinction between the virtual and the actual, I want to here further 
clarify the manner in which the living present is to be understood as an 
expression of an impersonal and dynamic temporality that exceeds and yet 
constitutes the living present. In particular, I want to do so with reference to 
Deleuze’s consideration of the commonplace suggestion that human beings 
‘exist in time’, and his suggestion that this phrase is sometimes understood as 
implying that time is ‘interior’ to the human being, that time is confined to, and 
an exclusive property of, the temporal character of the individual’s lived 
experience.
282
 However, he notes that the suggestion that human beings exist 
within time must be understood as containing an important, albeit paradoxical, 
truth in so far as it ought to be taken to mean that: ‘Time is not the interior in us, 
but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live and 
change’.283 This is to say that time ought not to be understood as belonging to 
the human being in the sense that time is an exclusive property of the 
individual’s lived experience. Rather, while the lived experience or interiority of 
the individual is characterized by time, while each individual’s living present 
possesses a dynamic form or temporal character, this is an interiority that is 
constituted by a universal, impersonal and pre-individual temporal dynamic, an 
interiority established by a temporality that exceeds all individual human beings 
and yet to which all individual’s belong. The displacement of an account of 
temporality that is confined to the temporal character of the individual’s lived 
experience has therefore led May to conclude that:  
 
Deleuze’s philosophy is not humanistic. It does not seek to create an 
ontology centred on human perceptions or the human orientation 
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toward the world. This does not mean that humans do not figure in 
his ontology. Nor does it mean that we, as humans, do not figure in 
his approach to temporality. What it means is that we cannot occupy 
pride of place in that approach. We must conceive temporality in a 
way that both captures the human living of time and does not 
subordinate all of temporality to it.
284
  
 
To understand each individual’s living present as being an ongoing expression 
of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time, where the passive 
syntheses of time are understood in terms of a universal and impersonal 
temporality that exceeds all individual human beings, what I am suggesting is 
the very time of Life itself, can therefore enable us to begin to conceptualise the 
human living of time without subordinating all of temporality to it.  
We can therefore begin to see that an important aspect of what I referred 
to in the introduction to this study as the stoical orientation of Deleuze’s work 
can be discerned in the manner in which all human beings are to be understood 
as deriving their dynamic, temporal being from Life. The temporal character or 
dynamic form of each individual’s living present, the manner in which every 
individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present 
moment, a present moment that passes, and by expectations of the future, is an 
expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time where 
the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as a universal, impersonal and 
pre-individual temporal dynamic that exceeds the living present of every 
individual. However, if Life is to be understood in terms of a temporality that 
exceeds the living present of every individual human being does this not once 
again raise the spectre of transcendence, along with threatening to resurrect the 
remaining Platonic presuppositions associated with the historical responses to 
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the problem of participation? If the temporal character of each individual’s 
living present is an expression of the passive syntheses of time, where the 
passive syntheses of time are to be understood in terms of the universal and 
impersonal temporality of Life itself, then is not the living present of each 
individual constituted by that which ‘lies beyond’, and remains transcendent, to 
each individual? In order to begin to address this concern, in order to understand 
the manner in which Life can be conceptualised as a universal and impersonal 
temporality that exceeds the living present of each individual, but is nevertheless 
not transcendent to the living present of those individuals, it is necessary to 
reconsider Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the actual. 
This is to say that in order to understand the manner in which the temporal 
character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present is to be 
conceptualised as an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life and, in 
particular, as an immediate or immanent expression of this universal temporal 
dynamic, then it is necessary to provide a reconsideration of Deleuze’s 
distinction between the virtual and the actual that I introduced in the previous 
chapter, and to provide a reconsideration of this doublet within the context of 
the three passive syntheses of time.   
In discussions of the virtual and the actual within the context of the 
passive syntheses of time, however, the virtual in particular is sometimes 
exclusively discussed in terms of the second syntheses of time, the a priori 
contemporaneous past that not only ensures that every present moment 
possesses a past aspect to it, and is therefore able to pass, but is also the 
coexistent region, past in general or pure past into which every former present 
passes and is retained. Turetzky, for example, writes that: ‘The living present 
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presupposes the past as already real, preserving itself as something without 
actual existence. Accordingly, the mode of being of the pure past is virtual’.285 
Indeed, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze himself refers to the ‘virtual 
coexistence’ of the pure past within the context of his exposition of the second 
synthesis of time,
286
 and also speaks of a ‘mnemonic virtual’ in relation to the 
notion of the virtual coexistence of the past put forward by Bergson.
287
 An 
understanding of the notion of the virtual in terms of the second synthesis of 
time, the synthesis of time that establishes the coexistence of the past in general, 
would therefore appear to be justified in light of Deleuze’s references in 
Difference and Repetition to the virtuality of the coexistent past put forward by 
Bergson - along with the former’s work on the latter’s notion of the virtual 
elsewhere.
288
 However, while Deleuze makes reference to the virtual within the 
context of his discussion of the second synthesis of time, and discusses it in 
greater detail when discussing that which unites Bergson’s Matter and Memory 
with his Creative Evolution,
289
 we must be cautions in concluding that the a 
priori coexistent past in general that is established by the second synthesis of 
time exhaustively determines the notion of the virtual for Deleuze. In warning 
against a simple identification of Deleuze’s notion of the virtual with Bergson’s 
notion of the virtual, Hughes has proposed that: ‘Where the virtual is clearly the 
pure past for Bergson, it may not be for Deleuze…He may well adopt aspects of 
Bergosn’s thought for his description of the second synthesis in Difference and 
Repetition, including the word itself [i.e. ‘virtual’], but it in no way follows from 
this that we have reached the properly Deleuzian notion of the virtual’.290 
Indeed, in the preface to the English edition of Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze can be understood as providing his own warning against a 
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simple identification of his work, and the terms that he employs within it, with 
the work of those that he makes reference to and employs. In particular, this 
warning can be discerned in the distinction that he draws between ‘writing 
history of philosophy’ and ‘writing philosophy’ where: ‘In the one case, we 
study the arrows or the tools of a great thinker, the trophies and the prey, the 
continents discovered. In the other case, we trim our own arrows, or gather those 
which seem to us the finest in order to try to send them in other directions, even 
if the distance in not astronomical but relatively small’. 291  In so far as he 
proposes that Difference and Repetition was the first book in which tried to do 
the latter, to ‘do philosophy’, 292  then we should not assume that the term 
‘virtual’ for Deleuze is adopted from Bergson in order to establish a simple 
identification with the latter’s use of the term. In appropriating the term ‘virtual’ 
from Bergson, Deleuze can be understood to have gathered a tool or an arrow 
from another, and yet we should not suppose that his intention is to do the same 
work or cover the same ground with it, but that he is attempting to try and send 
that arrow in another direction. Therefore, rather than proposing that the notion 
of the virtual for Deleuze is to be identified with Bergson’s notion of the virtual, 
and thereby exhaustively understood in terms of the coexistence of the past in 
general that is established by the second synthesis of time, I want to argue that 
the first, second and third synthesis of time ought to determined as virtual, that 
all three syntheses comprise a dynamic and temporal virtual structure. In 
contrast, the temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living 
present - the manner in which it is characterised by a forever renewed present 
moment, a present moment that passes, and by particular expectations of the 
future - ought to be understood in terms of the actual such that the actual 
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character of the living present is an ongoing expression of, and therefore 
constituted by, the temporality of Life itself, a universal, impersonal and virtual 
temporal structure that is to be understood in terms of the three passive 
syntheses of time.   
I have suggested that in so far as the temporal character of each 
individual’s living present is constituted by the passive syntheses of time then 
the living present is to be understood as an expression of a temporality that 
exceeds it. However, in proposing that the three passive syntheses of time 
comprise a virtual structure, this must not be understood as entailing that this 
virtual, universal and impersonal temporal dynamic is somehow artificial or not 
real or that it possesses an ideal and therefore transcendent character. As we 
have seen, Deleuze makes it clear that the notion of the virtual is to be 
understood as ‘fully real’ and is therefore not to be understood as being opposed 
to the real, as unreal or as ideal, but only as being opposed to the actual.
293
 We 
can illustrate the virtual character of the passive syntheses of time, and the 
manner in which it is to be understood as being fully real and yet being 
‘opposed’ to the actual, if we once again consider the temporal character of each 
individual’s living present. The living present of each individual is to be 
understood as being characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a 
present moment that passes and by expectations of the future, and it is precisely 
these characteristics that I have suggested ought to be determined as actual. In 
contrast, that which establishes these actual characteristics of the individual’s 
living present, the dynamic activity of the three passive syntheses of time, are 
not actual in so far as they are the conditions for the actual temporal 
characteristics of the individual’s living present. If we consider, for example, the 
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dynamic activity of the first synthesis of time, the manner in which it contracts 
and retains all the particular presents that have passed and then synthesises those 
past particular presents into the new present, then we can see that this ongoing 
dynamic activity of the first synthesis of time is not encountered within our 
living present. Rather, what we encounter or experience in the living present is a 
series of actual expectations about the future that are established as a 
consequence of the dynamic activity of the first synthesis of time, as a 
consequence of the ongoing contraction and retention of the past into the 
present, a synthesis that therefore exceeds the actual character of the living 
present but, rather than being understood as unreal and ideal, is to be determined 
as virtual.   
In determining the three passive syntheses of time as a virtual structure, 
therefore, it is not to be understood as a universal temporal dynamic that is 
artificial or transcendent, but is to be understood as the fully real condition for 
the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present. Indeed, in 
highlighting the manner in which the virtual is a structure that ought not to be 
understood as actual, and yet nevertheless possesses a full reality, Deleuze 
makes it clear that: ‘The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving 
the elements and relations which form a structure an actuality which they do not 
have, and withdrawing from them a reality which they have.’294 In so far as the 
actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood 
as being constituted by a universal and virtual temporal structure - the three 
passive syntheses of time - then the living present is constituted by, and an 
expression of, that which exceeds the living present. However, while exceeding 
the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, the virtual 
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structure that is the condition for it is to be understood as the universal and 
impersonal temporal dynamic that remains immanent, involved or implicated 
within those living presents. Each individual’s living present is an expression of 
a universal and virtual temporal structure, but precisely because that structure 
possesses a virtual character then it is not to be understood as unreal or ideal but 
ought to be determined as the fully real and immanent condition for the actual 
temporal character of each individual's living present. Indeed, it is the 
reconsideration of the distinction between the virtual and the actual within the 
context of the three passive syntheses of time that enables us to begin to 
understand Life within the context of the specific conception of univocity that 
Deleuze sought to maintain. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Deleuze’s 
complex, subtle and challenging conception of univocity requires us to posit an 
expressive ontological ground that is the distinguishable ground of the 
variegated beings that are its expression; however, in so far as that expressive 
ground is to be understood as remaining involved, implicated or immanent 
within the multitude of beings that are its expression, then it must not be 
understood as being distinct or separate from those beings. 
As I also discussed previously, it is precisely this attempt to maintain a 
position of univocity while holding that there is an expressive ontological 
ground that is distinguishable from the beings that are its expression that Badiou 
proposes Deleuze is unable to sustain. For Badiou, the attempt to determine an 
expressive ontological ground as the distinguishable and virtual ground of the 
plurality of actual beings that it expresses, without that ground thereby being 
distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression, collapses 
into the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many, 
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reintroducing the Platonic ontological presupposition of transcendence along 
with the remaining ontological presuppositions associated with the historical 
responses to the problem of participation. However, if the virtual/actual doublet 
is reconceptualised within the context of the three passive syntheses of time and 
the temporal character of each individual’s living present, then we can begin to 
understand the manner in which the passive syntheses of time, as a universal and 
virtual temporal structure, can be understood as an expressive ground that, while 
distinguishable from the actual character of each individual’s living present, is 
nevertheless not distinct or separate from the plurality of living presents that are 
its ongoing expression. This to say that the virtual structure that is to be 
identified with the three passive syntheses of time, the universal and impersonal 
temporal dynamism of Life itself, can be distinguished from the actual temporal 
character of each individual’s living present in so far as the three passive 
syntheses of time are the conditions for the character of the living present. As I 
have suggested, the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each 
individual’s living present, the manner in which it is characterised by a forever 
renewed present moment, a present moment that passes and by expectations of 
the future, is established as a consequence of the dynamic and distinguishable 
activity of the three syntheses of time. However, while distinguishable from the 
actual character of each individual’s living present, the dynamic activity of the 
three passive syntheses of time are not distinct or separate from those living 
presents. Precisely because the syntheses of time are determined as the virtual 
conditions for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, 
then that universal and impersonal temporal dynamism does not possess an ideal 
and therefore transcendent character, but is the fully real condition that exceeds, 
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and yet remains immanent within, the actual temporal character of each 
individual’s living present.  
The actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is an 
expression of, and therefore constituted by, the distinguishable and dynamic 
activity of the first, second and third synthesis of time. However, precisely 
because it is a virtual structure, the passive syntheses of time are not to be 
understood as being distinct or separate from the plurality of living presents that 
are its expression. An understanding of the passive syntheses of time as the 
virtual, distinguishable and yet not distinct ground of the actual temporal 
character of each individual’s living present can therefore be understood as 
radically problematising the traditional, opposing relation between the One and 
the many that Badiou proposes continues to be present in Deleuze’s work. As a 
virtual ground, the passive syntheses of time are not to be understood in terms of 
a One that is above or transcendent to the many living presents that the virtual 
ground is the dynamic condition for. Rather, while the virtual can be understood 
as the distinguishable ground of the actual temporal character of the plurality of 
living presents that it constitutes, this distinction is made within the context of a 
thoroughgoing univocity. As Sherman notes, ‘Deleuze connects the virtual and 
the actual at the level of ontology so that the one never appears apart from its 
liaison with the other’.295 This is to say that there is no ontological division, no 
equivocity and no ontological hierarchy, between the virtual structure comprised 
of the passive syntheses of time and the actual temporal character of each 
individual’s living present that is an expression of that virtual structure, but 
solely one reality, a single and consistent plane of nature or plane of immanence, 
that is to be understood as possessing two sides or a double aspect to it. As 
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Deleuze suggests, that univocal reality, that ‘plane of immanence includes both 
the virtual and its actualization simultaneously, without there being any 
assignable limit between the two’.296 Therefore, while it is not actual, the virtual 
is to be understood as fully real and so to determine the passive syntheses of 
time as the distinguishable, virtual ground of the actual temporal character of 
each individual’s living present is not to understand that ground as possessing a 
distinct or separate reality, it is not to revert to the traditional, opposing relation 
between the One and many where the former is the transcendent precondition 
for the former. Rather, to distinguish the passive syntheses of time as the virtual 
ground of each individual’s living present is to determine both the virtual 
ground and the actual temporal character of the living present as ‘belonging’ to 
the same thoroughly temporal, univocal reality, but it is to distinguish the former 
as the virtual side or aspect of that univocal reality and the latter as the actual 
side or aspect of that univocal reality. Accordingly, Smith warns that: ‘One must 
not be led astray (as Alain Badiou seems to have been) by the prefix ‘uni’ in the 
term ‘univocity’: a univocal ontology is by definition irreconcilable with a 
philosophy of the One, which necessarily entails an equivocal concept of 
being’.297    
Despite determining the passive syntheses of time as the virtual, 
distinguishable, and yet not distinct ground of the actual temporal character of 
the living present, are we still not retaining something akin to the Platonic 
ontological presupposition of an immutable foundation or fixed ground? Even if 
the distinction between the virtual passive syntheses of time and the actual 
character of the living present is made within the context of thoroughgoing 
univocity, is not the former still the invariant precondition or fixed ground for 
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the latter? In order to respond to this concern, it is necessary to reconsider the 
character of the virtual structure that is comprised of the passive syntheses of 
time and, in particular, to recall the relation that holds between the first, second 
and third synthesis of time. In so far as the third synthesis of time is to be 
understood in terms of a temporal caesura, an ongoing temporal cutting that 
ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever 
renewed present moment, then the third synthesis is to be understood as the 
ground of time because it is that synthesis upon which the first and second 
synthesis of time depend. Without the activity of the third synthesis of time 
there would be no present moment, no continually renewed present moment that 
the second synthesis of time could ensure passes and the first synthesis of time 
could continually contract into a forever renewed present moment. However, in 
so far as the third synthesis of time is an ongoing caesural cutting that is to be 
identified with the eternal return - whose esoteric truth consists in being 
conceptualised as the dynamic recurrence of that which is new or different - then 
the ground that it constitutes challenges the traditional, Platonic conception of a 
ground as an immutable or fixed foundation. This is to say that in so far as the 
third synthesis of time is to be understood as the ground of time, and in so far as 
the third synthesis of time is to be identified with the continual or eternal return 
of the new or the different, then it must be understood as a thoroughly dynamic 
ground, a ground that never achieves a fixed form that could serve as an 
immutable foundation.   
As the virtual ground of the actual temporal character or dynamic form 
of each individual’s living present, the passive syntheses of time therefore 
posses, at their foundation, a dynamic synthesis that never achieves a fixed form. 
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The actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is constituted 
by, or an expression of, the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of 
Life itself whose first two syntheses depend upon a third synthesis of time that is 
characterised by the continual return of the new or the different. Indeed, to 
determine the third synthesis of time as the ground of time, and to identify that 
ground with the eternal return of the new or the different entails, as Deleuze 
makes clear, that any Platonic notion of a fixed ground or immutable foundation 
‘has been superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding 
[effondement] which turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come to 
return’.298 The three syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure that possesses 
a complex formality: each synthesis is to be understood as a distinctive 
constituting dynamism that establishes a particular temporal characteristic of the 
living present, and the particular relation that holds between the three syntheses 
entails that while the first syntheses is grounded upon the second both the first 
and the second are grounded upon the third. However, it is precisely this 
particular relation between the three syntheses that engenders ‘the revelation of 
the formless in the eternal return’, such that ‘the extreme formality is there only 
for an excessive formlessness’.299 This is to say that while the three syntheses of 
time comprise a complex and formal virtual structure, at the foundation of that 
structural formality is the third synthesis of time, a synthesis that is characterised 
by the continual return of the new or the different such that the ‘extreme 
formality’ of that virtual structure reveals an ‘excessive formlessness’, a 
formless foundation or groundlessness that is to be identified with the eternal 
return of the new or the different. It is this conceptualisation of Life in terms of 
the three passive synthesis of time, a conceptualisation of Life in terms of a 
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universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that, at its foundation, is 
characterised by an excessive formlessness, by the eternal return of the new or 
different, that enables Life to be understood as that which is continually 
becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal 
power that continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its 
interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities for being.  
As a virtual structure that is comprised of the three passive syntheses of 
time and that, at its foundation, is characterised by the eternal return of the new 
or the different, the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself 
has therefore overturned the Platonic primacy of identity over difference and, 
ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. As the virtual condition 
for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, the passive 
syntheses of time do not possess a superior, fixed determination or identity such 
that the actual temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living 
present bears an internal resemblance or imitative similitude to that identity. At 
their foundation, the passive syntheses of time are characterised by an excessive 
formlessness or universal ungrounding that resists the establishment of a 
superior, fixed determination or identity that the individual’s living present 
could bear an internal resemblance or imitative similitude to. As we have seen, 
this does entail that we do not admit of identity or resemblance, of the same or 
the similar, but is instead to determine these as being established as a 
consequence of the continual and more profound recurrence of the different or 
the new. As Deleuze asserts: ‘In the reversal of Platonism, resemblance is said 
of internalised difference, and identity of the Different as primary power’.300 As 
an expression of the virtual, distinguishable, and yet not distinct dynamism of 
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Life, the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is 
characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that 
passes, and by expectations of the future, such that each individual’s living 
present can be conceptualised in terms of a similitude or the same temporal 
character or dynamic form. However, the temporal character or dynamic form 
that characterises each individual’s living present is an expression of, and 
therefore constituted by, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that, at 
its foundation, is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different as 
its primary power. It is this primary power, the ongoing caesural cutting that 
characterises the third synthesis of time and upon which the first two syntheses 
of time depend, that not only ensues that the actual temporal character of each 
individual’s living present is established as a consequence of the profound 
recurrence of the different or the new, but it is also that which ensures that we 
are continually given a new present moment, distinguishable from the past and 
the future, that provides us with forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise.  
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Chapter Three: Nihilism 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the temporal character of each individual’s 
living present is an immediate an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life 
itself, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is to be understood in 
terms of the three passive syntheses of time. Distinguishable and yet not distinct 
from the living present, the three syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure 
that is the fully real, universal and immanent condition for the actual dynamic 
form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, the manner in 
which each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed 
present moment, a present moment that passes, and by expectations of the future. 
However, as the formless foundation of the passive syntheses of time, it is the 
third synthesis which ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever 
renewed present moment, distinguishable from both the past and the future, and 
which thereby provides each individual with continually renewed present 
possibilities for living otherwise. To strive to become aware of and to explore 
the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment 
engenders is therefore not simply to live in accordance with the actual temporal 
character of our own individual living present. Rather, in so far as the forever 
renewed present moment that characterises the living present is constituted by 
the third synthesis of time, then to strive to exploit the present possibilities for 
living otherwise is to strive to live in accordance with the formless foundation of 
the passive syntheses of time, to live in accordance with the universal 
ungrounding or excessive formlessness that characterises the temporality of Life 
itself. To live in accordance with Life, therefore, does not entail a fixed, 
overarching plan of how our present possibilities ought to be realised. 
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Understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time - understood as a 
universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that, at its foundation, is 
characterised by the eternal return of the new or different - Life does not possess 
some definite, fixed determination that would oblige us to realise our 
possibilities in accordance with that determination. Rather, Life is to be 
understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any 
given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that, at its formless foundation, 
continually resists the establishment of any fixed determination, continually 
overcoming the establishment of any fixed identity, in its interminable drive to 
produce new present possibilities.  
In order to begin to address the aim of this study, therefore, the foregoing 
has formulated an account of the manner in which each individual’s living 
present is characterised by forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise, along with formulating an account of the manner in which a life that 
strives to explore that open field of present possibilities is a life that strives to 
live in accordance with the dynamic nature of Life itself, and therefore a life that 
address the question of living well that I suggested Deleuze’s individual and 
collaborative work could be productively understood as being concerned with. 
However, in addition to suggesting that I would formulate an account of the 
manner in which Deleuze’s work could be understood as being concerned with 
how it is that each moment of our lives provides us with a plurality of new 
possibilities, I also proposed that I would formulate an account of the manner in 
which Deleuze’s work can be understood as being profoundly concerned with 
how the present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders 
are continually hindered, thwarted and negated. In particular, I suggested that 
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Deleuze’s work could be productively understood as being concerned with 
sensitising us to the manner in which our present possibilities for living 
otherwise are continually hindered, thwarted and negated such that, with this 
awareness, we are then better prepared to begin to actively explore the 
possibilities for our lives, better prepared to move beyond the often restrictive, 
self-limiting modes of life that are part of the historical legacy that we have 
inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. 
This is to say that Deleuze’s work is not simply concerned with the manner in 
which each moment of our lives provides us with a forever renewed present 
moment, a present moment that I have argued is constituted by the ongoing 
caesural cutting that characterises the third synthesis of time, where this is 
understood as the eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the 
dynamic, temporal and universal ungrounding of Life itself. Rather, Deleuze’s 
individual and collaborative work must also be understood as being profoundly 
concerned with sensitising us to the manner in which our life’s possibilities are 
continually constrained such that, with this awareness, we are then better 
prepared to resist such constriction and to begin to actively explore the 
possibilities for our lives, better prepared to begin to exploit the open field of 
present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. 
My objective in this chapter, therefore, is to formulate an account of the 
manner in which the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that 
each moment engenders is often occluded, delimited and even negated. In 
particular, I shall argue that the circumscription of our present possibilities 
ought to be understood within the context of ‘nihilism’, where the term nihilism 
must be understood as possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense in 
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so far as it is to be determined as a reaction against the third synthesis of time, 
against the very foundation of the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism 
of Life itself. This is to say that against the thoroughly dynamic, temporal and 
ongoing return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis 
of time and which ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming 
any fixed identity, nihilism is to be provisionally understood in terms of the 
establishment and perpetuation of an immutable foundation, and therefore fixed 
identity, in place of the temporal, formless foundation that characterises Life. 
However, while it shall be suggested that nihilism can be understood as having a 
substantial history that can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy, I shall 
examine the manner in which nihilism, for Deleuze, can be understood as 
finding its exemplary expression with the advent of Christianity. In particular, I 
shall propose that the ‘perfection of nihilism’ that is said to characterise 
Christianity
301
 is to be discerned in the enlargement or intensification of its 
reaction against Life, a nihilism that is not merely limited to a reaction against 
the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its 
foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, but is also a reaction 
against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each 
individual’s living present is characterised by an open field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise. However, I will also argue that the persistence 
of the nihilistic reaction against Life within the lives of modern men and women 
is not to be understood merely in terms of the manner in which contemporary 
Western peoples may continue to explicitly adopt, for a variety of reasons, the 
Judeo-Christian world-view and may continue to adhere to its particular form of 
life. Rather, I shall suggest that the nihilistic reaction against Life of which 
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Christianity is said to be the exemplary expression can be understood as 
continuing to implicitly persist and exert an influence upon the lives of modern 
men and women such that a number of Christianity’s nihilistic presuppositions, 
concepts and themes manifest themselves in new guises and, as it were, 
transubstantiated forms beyond the ‘grand event’ that Nietzsche encapsulated in 
his now infamous proclamation that: ‘God is dead’.302 
To begin to formulate an account of the manner in which the forever 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are continually hindered, 
thwarted and negated, it is therefore necessary to begin by developing Deleuze’s 
notion of nihilism. In order to develop this Deleuzian notion of nihilism, 
however, then it is necessary to refer to Deleuze’s study of Nietzsche in 
Nietzsche and Philosophy in so far as it is in that work, as Williams has 
suggested, that we find Deleuze’s most sustained and comprehensive study of 
the concept of nihilism.
303
 Indeed, in the preface to the English translation of 
Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze proposes that no one had analysed the 
concept of nihilism better than Nietzsche,
304
 and it is within the context of his 
analysis of Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism that we can develop a Deleuzian 
understanding of that concept. This is not, of course, to suggest that Deleuze’s 
notion of nihilism can simply be identified with, and is therefore a reproduction 
of, Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism. As we have seen with respect to his 
discernment of a concept of expression in Spinoza’s work, his employment of 
Bergson’s notion of the virtual or Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return, 
Deleuze’s employment of the work of others and the concepts within that work 
is not to be understood in terms of identification or reproduction, but in terms of 
a process of critical and creative transformation. I am therefore suggesting that it 
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is within the context of his sustained study of the concept of nihilism in 
Nietzsche and Philosophy that we can discern a Deleuzian notion of nihilism, 
but it is an understanding of nihilism that ought to be understood as emerging as 
a result of the creative interaction with, and transformative analysis of, 
Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism. Therefore, to begin to formulate an account of 
the manner in which our forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise are continually hindered, thwarted and negated, then it is necessary to 
formulate a Deleuzian notion of nihilism which, in turn, necessitates that we 
begin with Nietzsche’s understanding of that concept. However, as both 
Kaufmann
305
 and Schacht
306
 have indicated, in order to orientate oneself in 
relation to Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism then it is productive to understand that 
notion within the context of his infamous declaration that: ‘God is dead’. 
As with many of Nietzsche’s ideas, his proclamation that God is dead 
has been subject to a variety of interpretations, a situation that is illustrated by 
Deleuze’s seemingly conflicting proposals that there are four senses of the death 
of God,
307
 that ‘there are at least fifteen versions of the death of God’,308 and 
that the death of God ‘has as many meanings as there are forces capable of 
seizing Christ and making him die’.309 While I shall discuss the meaning and 
develop the implications of the death of God at a later point in this chapter, in 
order to determine an account of Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism within 
the context of the death of God then I want to provisionally suggest that by 
proclaiming that God is dead Nietzsche was proposing that Western culture in 
general, and the Judeo-Christian tradition in particular, had entered a profound 
ideological crisis, a crisis that would have profound existential implications for 
the lives of modern men and women, to the extent that there was a growing 
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sense that the belief in the existence of God was becoming untenable. Thus, in 
1887, Nietzsche announced that: ‘The greatest recent event - that “God is dead,” 
that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable - is already 
beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe. For the few at least, whose eyes 
- the suspicion in whose eyes is strong and subtle enough for this spectacle, 
some sun seems to have set and some ancient and profound trust has been turned 
into doubt’.310 Although the recognition of the death of God, and certainly the 
full implications of this event, would initially remain ‘beyond the multitudes 
capacity for comprehension’, Nietzsche notes that its repercussions would begin 
to be felt by an increasing number of people.
311
 In particular, we would begin to 
experience a profound ‘instability’ and ‘disorientation’ and we would begin to 
do so because the belief in God, and the Judeo-Christian world view generally, 
had so greatly influenced the conception of ourselves and others, the values that 
we hold, the morality that we espouse, the meaning that we believe our lives to 
possess and the direction that we believe our lives ought to take.
312
 It was this 
Judeo-Christian world view that mitigated against uncertainty, distress and 
suffering ‘because it provided ready answers to the problem of how life ought to 
be lived and what its overall meaning and purpose was, and faith in the 
existence of God gave the reassurance that the validity of that form of life had, 
as it were, a ‘divine guarantee’’.313 
With the growing sense that the belief in the existence of God was 
becoming untenable, the two thousand year long form of life that was 
established upon that belief therefore comes to be seen as increasingly untenable. 
For Nietzsche: ‘The time has come when we have to pay for having been 
Christians for two thousand years: we are losing the center of gravity by virtue 
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of which we have lived; we are lost for a while’.314 In particular, the increasing 
incredulity towards the existence of God, the growing incredulity towards the 
Judeo-Christian interpretation of the world, and the loss of meaning and 
guidance that it gave to people’s lives, entails that the peoples of the West are 
confronted by that most profound of questions: ‘Has existence any meaning at 
all?’315 According to Nietzsche, it will take time and courage for people to 
confront and ‘honestly’ attempt to tackle this question; indeed, he proposes that: 
‘It will require a few centuries before this question can even be heard 
completely and in its full depth’.316 The initial response to it, however, would be 
one of despair, whereby people would rebound from the belief that ‘God is 
truth’ to the fanatical faith that: ‘All is false’.317 This is to say that the Judeo-
Christian world view has so deeply influenced Western people’s lives that the 
loss of belief in God, the loss of belief in that which provided the Judeo-
Christian world view and its form of life with a transcendent, immutable 
foundation, will engender the belief, the nihilistic belief, that everything is lost. 
Set to become the defining characteristic of our age, Nietzsche writes that 
nihilism is that condition wherein what were previously ‘the highest values 
devalue themselves’, a condition in which life lacks any aim, purpose or 
meaning, a condition in which ‘“why?” finds no answer’.318 Understood within 
the context of the death of God, the notion of nihilism for Nietzsche can 
therefore be understood in terms of a reaction that is instigated by the growing 
sense that a belief in the existence of God has become increasingly untenable. 
With the loss of belief in the existence of God, we lose the transcendent 
validation of the Judeo-Christian form of life that gave purpose, value and 
meaning to our existence, and we react against this loss by drawing the 
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conclusion, the specifically nihilistic conclusion, that existence has therefore 
become meaningless.                      
In determining Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism in terms of a reaction 
against the loss of belief in the existence of God, however, I am not suggesting 
that this determination exhausts the understanding of nihilism for Nietzsche.
319
 
Indeed, in contrast to a reaction against the death of God, Nietzsche can be 
understood as proposing that the belief in the existence of God is itself a form of 
nihilism in so far as it depreciates ‘this world’ and the life of human beings 
within it to nothingness, to nil.
320
  As Kaufmann notes, Nietzsche was perhaps 
more concerned than any other with ‘the manner in which belief in God and a 
divine teleology may diminish the value and significance of man: how this 
world and life may be completely devaluated ad maiorem dei gloriam’. 321 
Rather than exhausting the understanding of nihilism for Nietzsche, the 
determination of that concept as a reaction to the loss of belief in the existence 
of God ought to be understood as that which enables us to more easily 
understand the manner in which Deleuze’s notion of nihilism is developed 
within the context, and yet is a creative transformation, of Nietzsche’s 
understanding of that term. In particular, I want to argue that the notion of 
nihilism for Deleuze must also be understood in terms of a reaction but, unlike 
Nietzsche, it is no longer to be determined as a reaction to the loss of belief in 
God, and neither is it to be identified with the atheism that this loss of belief 
engenders. Indeed, Deleuze proposes that: ‘Atheism is not a problem for 
philosophers or the death of God…It is amazing that so many philosophers still 
take the death of God as tragic. Atheism is not a drama but the philosopher’s 
serenity and philosophy’s achievement’.322 Rather than a reaction to the loss of 
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belief in the existence of God, therefore, I want to provisionally propose that 
nihilism for Deleuze ought to be understood in terms of a deep-seated and 
profound reaction against Life. While I shall develop a Deleuzian notion of 
nihilism throughout this chapter, and while we shall see that nihilism for 
Deleuze can also be understood as incorporating the more general, broader 
understanding of nihilism as a devaluation of ‘this world’, a denigration of ‘this 
life’, I am suggesting that nihilism for Deleuze ought to primarily be understood 
in terms of a reaction against Life, where Life is to be understood as possessing 
the technical and specifically expressive, temporal sense that was developed 
over the course of the preceding two chapters.  
The notion of nihilism for Deleuze is to be provisionally determined as a 
reaction against Life, where Life is to be understood in dynamic terms as that 
which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an 
irrepressible temporal power that, at its formless foundation, continually resists 
and overcomes the establishment of any fixed determination or identity. As a 
reaction against the manner in which Life is continually overcoming any fixed 
determination, therefore, nihilism is to be understood as a profound reaction 
against that which establishes this continual overcoming. As was discussed in 
the previous chapter, Life is to be understood as a universal and impersonal 
temporal dynamic and, in particular, as a virtual structure that is comprised of 
three passive syntheses of time with the third synthesis of time being the 
foundation of time upon which the first two syntheses conduct their respective 
constituting activity. However, in so far as the third synthesis of time is 
understood as an ongoing temporal caesural cutting that is characterised by the 
continual return of the new or the different, then the third synthesis is that 
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formless foundation or universal ungrounding that ensures that Life, at its 
foundation, continually resists and overcomes the establishment of any fixed 
determination or identity. To suggest that nihilism is to be determined as a deep-
seated and profound reaction against Life is to suggest that nihilism is a reaction 
against the formless foundation of the passive synthesis of time, a reaction 
against the third synthesis of time and the manner in which it is characterised by 
the eternal return of the new or the different. Therefore, rather than a reaction 
against the loss of belief in the existence of God, and more than a devaluation of 
‘this world’ and denigration of ‘this life’, the Deleuzian notion of nihilism that I 
am formulating here ought to be understood as possessing a technical and 
specifically temporal sense in so far as it is to be determined as a reaction 
against the third synthesis of time, against the very foundation of the universal 
and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself. Indeed, as Williams has noted, 
the notion of nihilism for Deleuze must be understood in terms of its ongoing 
antagonism towards the third synthesis of time, and the manner in which it is 
characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different, so that even 
though ‘Deleuze does not discuss nihilism at length in Difference and Repetition, 
it lurks in the background every time he develops the concept of the third 
synthesis of time and eternal return’.323  
But how are we to understand this nihilistic reaction against the third 
synthesis of time? By what means does nihilism establish and seek to perpetuate 
its antagonism towards the universal ungrounding that characterises the formless 
foundation of Life itself? We shall see that the nihilistic reaction against Life 
manifests itself in multifarious ways, and can even be understood in terms of an 
evolution or transformation from one manifestation to another, but I want to 
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provisionally propose that nihilism is to be understood as manifesting itself in 
the form of a fixed ground or immutable foundation. Against the thoroughly 
dynamic, temporal and ongoing return of the new or the different that 
characterises the third synthesis of time and which ensures that Life, at its 
foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, nihilism is to be 
understood in terms of the establishment and perpetuation of an immutable 
foundation, and therefore fixed identity, in place of the temporal, formless 
foundation that characterises Life. As was discussed previously, as a universal, 
impersonal and specifically virtual structure that is comprised of the three 
passive syntheses of time, Life is to be understood as the fully real and 
immanent condition for the actual temporal character or dynamic form of each 
individual’s living present. This is to say that while Life is to be understood in 
terms of a temporality that exceeds the actual, and is therefore to be determined 
as distinguishable from it, as a virtual, fully real and immanent condition it is 
not to be determined as distinct or separate from the actual. Rather, the 
distinction between the virtual and actual is made with the context of a 
thoroughgoing univocity so that there is exclusively one reality, a single and 
consistent plane of nature or plane of immanence, which is to be understood as 
possessing two sides or a double aspect to it. In contrast, the nihilistic reaction 
against Life that I am suggesting is manifest in the positing of an immutable 
foundation also entails that this foundation exceeds the temporal character of the 
actual, but that it does so in an ideal and therefore transcendent manner. This is 
to say that the nihilistic positing of an immutable, fixed foundation is the 
positing of a transcendent foundation so that there is no longer a distinction 
within a univocal reality or single plane of immanence between the virtual and 
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the actual, with the former being the distinguishable and yet not distinct 
condition for the existence of the latter. Rather, we now have the distinction 
between the ideal and the real that inaugurates an equivocal account of reality, 
with the former being the distinguishable, distinct and transcendent precondition 
for the existence of the latter.   
In so far as nihilism is to be provisionally understood in terms of the 
positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation that inaugurates an equivocal 
account of reality, then the responses to the Platonic problem of participation 
discussed in chapter one must be determined, for Deleuze, as manifestations of 
nihilism, as a nihilistic reaction against Life. As we saw, as a response to the 
problem of participation, Plato’s theory of Forms proposes that for every group 
of particular beings that exist there also exists a single, transcendent Form and it 
is by virtue of participating in that Form that every particular member of a given 
group obtains its characteristic being. Against the thoroughly temporal and 
formless foundation of Life, against the eternal return of the new or the different 
that characterises the third synthesis of time, the theory of Forms posits an 
immutable, transcendent foundation that possesses a fixed identity. Against the 
distinction between the virtual and the actual that is made within a univocal 
reality, with the former understood as the fully real and immanent condition of 
the latter, the theory of Forms establishes an equivocal distinction between the 
ideal and the real, with the former the transcendent and ontologically superior 
precondition for the being of the latter. Similarly, although Neo-Platonism and 
Christianity introduce a significant degree of movement, dynamism and 
productive genesis into their accounts they also continue to posit an immutable, 
transcendent foundation that possesses a fixed identity, and must therefore also 
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be determined for Deleuze as manifestations of nihilism. This is to say that 
while Neo-Platonism and Christianity invert the problem of participation - 
beginning from the side of the participated rather than the participants, and 
proposing that the latter have their existence conferred on them as a 
consequence of the emanative or creative dynamism of the former - both Neo-
Platonism and Christianity maintain that the participated, the One and God 
respectively, is to be understood as an immutable, transcendent foundation that 
possesses a fixed identity. Therefore, while I shall propose that Deleuze’s 
concern is primarily with Christianity as a manifestation of nihilism, it is 
important to note that his antipathy towards religion more generally is not 
simply confined to Christianity or any other ‘established religions’. Rather, the 
term ‘religion’ for Deleuze is to be understood as designating that nihilistic 
reaction against Life that involves the positing of an immutable, transcendent 
foundation such that both Plato’s theory of Forms and the Neo-Platonic response 
to the problem of participation are to be understood as ‘religious’ responses. 
Indeed, rather than being confined to any particular established religion, 
Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Wherever there is transcendence, vertical Being, 
imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion.’324  
Understood in terms of the positing of an immutable, transcendent 
foundation that opposes the thoroughly temporal and formless foundation of 
Life, the manifestation of nihilism is therefore to be understood as possessing a 
substantial history. Prior to Christianity, both Plato’s theory of Forms and the 
Neo-Platonic emanative response to the problem of participation are to be 
understood as nihilistic reactions against the dynamic, thoroughly temporal 
eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of 
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time and which ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming 
any fixed determination or identity. Indeed, for Deleuze, nihilism can be 
understood as being manifest in the very beginnings of Western philosophy in 
so far as it can be discerned in the work of Anaximander and the manner in 
which he not only posits one original, immutable Being or Aperion that is the 
precondition for the mutability of the observable world, but also in the manner 
in which he seemingly denigrates the temporal state of the beings that Aperion 
produces. For example, considering Anaximander’s proposal that things ‘pay 
penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice in accordance with the 
ordering of time’,325 Deleuze suggests that Anaximander ought to be understood 
as putting forward the thesis that, as the product of Aperion, all beings fall into 
the inferior condition of temporality or becoming ‘the injustice of which it 
[Aperion] redeems eternally by destroying them’ and thereby releasing beings 
from their inferior, temporal condition.
326
 However, although nihilism is to be 
understood as being manifest prior to the advent of Christianity, of having a 
substantial history that can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy and is 
variously manifest as the transcendent God of Christianity, the Neo-Platonic 
One, Platonic Forms, Anaximander’s Aperion and to which we could add, for 
example, Parmenides’ account of the unchanging and eternal nature of reality,327 
it is Christianity that is to be understood as the exemplary manifestation of 
nihilism for Deleuze. For example, he declares that: ‘In comparison with 
Christianity the Greeks are children. Their way of depreciating existence, their 
“nihilism”, does not have the perfection of the Christian way.’328 But how are 
we to understand this designation of Christianity as the exemplary or perfect 
expression of nihilism? If Anaximander, Plato, Neo-Platonism and Christianity 
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all posit an immutable, transcendent foundation, and are therefore to be 
understood as expressing a nihilistic reaction against the formless foundation of 
Life, why is it that Christianity is any more complete an expression of nihilism 
than the Aperion of Anaximander, the Forms of Plato or the One of Neo-
Platonism?  
The answer to this, I shall argue, is that for Deleuze the advent of 
Christianity is characterised by the development of a new orientation, or at least 
an increased concern with an orientation that simultaneously enlarges and 
intensifies the nihilistic reaction against Life. This is to say that Christianity is 
not only concerned with the establishment of an ‘objective’, immutable and 
transcendent foundation that is the ideal precondition for the manifest beings of 
the world, but is also increasingly concerned with ‘subjectivity’ and with the 
‘subjective’ aspects of human existence in particular. Indeed, in stressing the 
orientation to the subjective that characterises Christianity, a ‘turning’ that 
distinguishes Christianity from ‘ancient metaphysics’, and Plato’s theory of 
Forms in particular, Vattimo has proposed that: ‘Christianity announces the end 
of the Platonic ideal of objectivity. It cannot be the eternal word of forms 
outside ourselves that saves us, but only the eye directed toward the interior and 
the searching of the deep truth inside us all’.329 While I shall shortly discuss the 
manner in which Deleuze understands Christianity’s turning or increased 
concern with the subjective, I want to suggest here that it ought not to be 
understood as an orientation that diminishes a concern with its objective, 
immutable and transcendent foundation. We shall see that for Deleuze, 
Christianity is characterised by the interplay between the objective and the 
subjective such that the establishment of an immutable, transcendent foundation 
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has profound implications, specifically constraining and limiting implications, 
for the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that are 
available to human beings. Deleuze can therefore be understood as designating 
Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism because it does not merely 
manifest itself in the form of the establishment of an immutable, transcendent 
foundation that reacts against the formless foundation of Life, a foundation that 
is constituted by the third synthesis of time and is characterised by the eternal 
return of the new or the different. Rather, with its turning or increased concern 
with the subjective, Christianity develops an orientation that hinders, thwarts 
and even negates the open field of present possibilities that are available to 
human beings and, in doing so, is to be understood as a nihilistic reaction 
against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each 
individual’s living present is characterised by forever renewed present 
possibilities for living otherwise. 
To clarify, in designating Christianity as the exemplary manifestation of 
nihilism, I am proposing that rather than a reaction against the loss of belief in 
the existence of God, and more than a general devaluation of this ‘this world’ 
and denigration of ‘this life’, nihilism continues to possess a technical and 
temporal sense for Deleuze. This is to say that nihilism continues to be 
understood as a reaction against the third synthesis of time, against the very 
foundation of the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself, 
but it is no longer simply manifest in the positing of an immutable, transcendent 
foundation that establishes an equivocal account of reality. As I discussed at 
length in the previous chapter, the actual dynamic form or temporal character of 
each individual’s living present - the manner in which each individual’s living 
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present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment 
that passes, and by certain expectations of the future - is an immediate an 
ongoing expression of the temporality of Life itself, where Life is to be 
understood as a universal, impersonal and virtual temporal dynamic that is 
comprised of the three passive syntheses of time. However, as the formless 
foundation of the passive syntheses of time, it is the third synthesis which 
ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever renewed present 
moment, and which thereby provides each individual with the continually 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. In its turning towards the 
subjective, a turning to the supposedly ‘deep truth inside us all’, Christianity 
begins to delimit, occlude and even negate the open field of present possibilities 
that are available to each individual and, in doing so, must also be determined as 
that which reacts against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures 
that each individual is provided with forever renewed present possibilities for 
living otherwise. The so-called perfection of nihilism that is said to characterise 
Christianity is therefore to be discerned in the enlargement or intensification of 
its reaction against Life, a nihilism that is not merely limited to a reaction 
against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its 
foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, but is also a reaction 
against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each 
individual’s living present is characterised by an open field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise. 
But how are we to respond to this designation of Christianity as the 
exemplary expression of nihilism? Is not the determination of Christianity as 
that which enlarges, intensifies and perfects the nihilistic reaction against Life 
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an unbalanced assessment and characterisation of Christianity, a characterisation 
that perhaps even risks becoming a caricature of Christianity? Consider, for 
example, the vociferous declaration that: ‘The will to destroy, the will to 
infiltrate every corner, the will to forever have the last word - a triple will that is 
unified and obstinate: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’. 330  Although I have 
proposed that Deleuze’s designation of Christianity as the perfect expression of 
nihilism ought to be understood as possessing a technical and temporal sense, 
are such pronouncements symptomatic of a failure to give due consideration to 
what might be of value in the teachings of Christ, such as compassion, charity 
and forgiveness? It is possible, however, to discern a distinction in Deleuze’s 
work between, on the one hand, the gospel and the historical figure of Jesus and, 
on the other hand, Christianity as an institutionalised set of beliefs - a distinction 
that is reminiscent of that which Nietzsche makes between Christ and Saint 
Paul.
331
 For example, while Deleuze writes that Christ invented ‘a religion of 
love (a practice, a way of living and not a belief)’, Christianity is to be 
understood as ‘a religion of Power - a belief, a terrible manner of judging’.332 In 
the main, however, when Deleuze’s work treats of Christianity it does so almost 
exclusively by focusing on what he perceives as its nihilistic character, rather 
than providing a consideration of what may be of value in the teachings’ of 
Christ. Indeed, it is in this context that we can understand Caputo’s suggestion 
that Deleuze’s antipathy towards Christianity meant that ‘for the most part, the 
New Testament remained for him a missed opportunity, and he allowed himself 
to be waylaid by the received institutional reading of the text and discouraged by 
the high wall of ecclesiastical power by which it is surrounded’.333 Despite this, 
however, I want to suggest that we can perhaps better understand the stridency 
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of Deleuze’s antipathy towards Christianity, and perhaps moderate its excesses, 
if we understand his pronouncements on Christianity as being deliberately 
provocative, as an intentional provocation whose aim is to elicit a practical 
response from contemporary men and women.  
As I suggested in the introduction to this study, Deleuze’s individual and 
collaborative work can be understood in terms of a practical challenge to the 
manner in which we live our lives, a provocative accusation that all too often we 
do not live well, that all too often we are guilty, at one time or another, of the 
great crime of not living life to the full. As May has suggested, ‘we may take 
Deleuze as constructing, for his sake and ours, works which should be read as 
spiritual exercises, and wrestlings with and attempts to free us all from the grip 
of certain philosophical notions that prevent us from discovering and creating 
who we might be’.334 In particular, Deleuze’s work can be understood as a direct 
challenge to each that all too often we fail to see, let alone explore and exploit, 
the possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings because of the 
often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life - along with the philosophical 
notions inherent in those modes of life - that are part of the historical legacy that 
we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present 
possibilities. In presenting Christianity as the perfect expression of nihilism, 
therefore, Deleuze can be understood as making a provocative accusation 
against that which has so profoundly shaped the culture of the West, an 
accusation that is designed to provoke us into developing a critical stance 
towards that which has so greatly influenced how we understand ourselves, the 
values that we hold, the morality that we maintain and the manner in which we 
believe our lives ought to be lived. Moreover, by conducting a provocative 
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accusation against that which is the cultural heritage of the West, Deleuze can 
be understood as not merely seeking to stimulate the development of a critical 
stance towards Christianity, but to develop a critical stance towards the past 
more generally, to provoke us to consider how our forever renewed present 
possibilities for living otherwise may be hindered, thwarted and negated by the 
habitual, unreflective perpetuation of that which we have inherited. I shall 
develop an understanding of this critical stance towards the past in the following 
chapter, and I shall do so within the context of the first, second and third 
synthesis of time in particular, but what I want to suggest here is that instead of 
an outright resistance to the influence of the past upon the present, Deleuze’s 
work can be understood in terms of a creative transformation of the past that is 
designed to facilitate the exploration of the open field of present possibilities for 
living otherwise, and therefore as that which opens up the possibility for a more 
nuanced consideration of the value of Christianity for the present.  
I want to now turn, however, to the manner in which the advent of 
Christianity for Deleuze can be understood in terms of the development of a new 
or more intensive orientation to the subjective that enlarges and intensifies the 
nihilistic reaction against Life and that leads to its designation as the exemplary 
expression of nihilism. In particular, I want to develop an account of the manner 
in which Christianity’s increased concern with the subjective aspects of human 
existence, in concert with the positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation, 
involves the development of technologies or systematic techniques that begin to 
occlude, constrain and constrict the open field of present possibilities that are 
available to human beings. To do so, however, it is necessary to recall that in 
positing an immutable, transcendent foundation as the precondition for the 
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manifest beings of the world, in responding to the problem of participation by 
maintaining that the manifest beings of the world are created by God, 
Christianity not only retains the Platonic ontological presupposition of 
equivocity, but also retains the presupposition of ontological hierarchy with God 
being understood as the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the 
beings of the world. As Armstrong suggests, this is the view of the cosmos ‘as 
quintessentially frail and utterly dependent upon God for being and life…God 
had summoned every single being from an abysmal nothingness and at any 
moment he could withdraw his sustaining hand’.335 The increased concern with 
the subjective that is said to characterise Christianity, however, entails that this 
ontological hierarchy is not merely attributable to the manner in which the 
multitude of manifest beings are at once removed from the Creator, possessing a 
lesser degree of perfection than the ontological ideality of God. Rather, 
Christianity’s increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence 
becomes manifest in the designation of existence as inferior, unjust and 
blameworthy because of the existence of pain, distress and suffering and, in 
particular, because of the existence of human pain, distress and suffering. This is 
to say that for Christianity, ‘the real’ is not inferior simply because it is at once 
removed from the ontological ideality of God, but must also be understood as 
being unjust and blameworthy because of the existence of human suffering. As 
Deleuze makes clear: ‘For Christianity the fact of suffering in life means 
primarily that life is not just, that it is even essentially unjust, that it pays for an 
essential injustice by suffering, it is blameworthy because it suffers’.336  
More than the designation of existence as unjust and blameworthy 
because of the existence of human suffering, the turning to the subjective that is 
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said to be characteristic of Christianity is concerned with who is responsible for 
this state of pain and distress. In order to begin to understand the manner in 
which Christianity’s turning to the subjective entails the enlargement or 
intensification of its nihilistic reaction against Life and, in particular, the manner 
in which that turning begins to circumscribe the open field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise that are available to human beings, it is 
necessary to note that it is human beings who are designated as being 
responsible for the existence of human suffering, that this suffering ought to be 
understood as a ‘condition of punishment’.337 In contrast with the manner in 
which the afflictions and tribulations of human existence and, in particular, the 
responsibility for those tribulations were, for the ancient Greeks, attributable to 
the various activities of gods, Deleuze writes that: ‘When existence is posited as 
blameworthy only one step is needed in order to make it responsible. All that is 
needed is a change of sex, Eve instead of the Titans’.338 This is to say that 
Christianity’s increased concern or turning to the subjective entails that it is 
human beings that are to be determined as being responsible for the existence of 
human suffering, that all human beings, as a consequence of Man’s original 
offence against God, are condemned to universal suffering, condemned to toil a 
soil strewn with thistles and thorns and thereafter condemned to exist in a state 
of profound privation.
339
 Encapsulated in Augustine’s notion of ‘original sin’,340 
the original offence against God and the condition of punishment, privation and 
dispossession that it engenders does not merely designate the particular 
temptation succumbed to by the inhabitant’s of Eden and the condition to which 
they are condemned. Rather, it possesses a universal application that is to be 
understood as characterising the fundamental identity of all human beings such 
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that ‘the deep truth within us all’, the universal truth of the essence of human 
being, is to be understood in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, 
privation or lack so that the original, particular sin against God is to be 
understood, as Borg has suggested, as ‘a sinfulness that is transmitted to every 
individual in every generation’.341 
However, while characterising the condition of human beings as one of 
universal privation, as being fallen and essential sinners who are responsible for 
the existence of human suffering, Christianity also offers the hope of salvation, a 
return to God’s heavenly kingdom in which human suffering will cease and we 
will be redeemed from our state of privation by a state of eternal bliss. Indeed, 
for Deleuze, there is an intimate relationship between the designation of 
existence as inferior, unjust and blameworthy because of the existence of human 
suffering, and the possibility of redemption from that condition of privation. For 
example, he writes that: ‘Existence seems to be given so much by being made a 
crime, an excess. It gains a double nature - an immense injustice and a justifying 
atonement’. 342  This is to say that rather than engendering a condition of 
profound despair, Christianity can be understood as enabling the possibility of a 
meaning, purpose and direction for human existence that arises out of its 
designation of existence as inferior, unjust and blameworthy. Importantly, 
however, it is through the promise of the possibility of redemption from the 
essential human state of privation that we find the manner in which 
Christianity’s turning to the subjective can be seen to enlarge and intensify its 
nihilistic reaction against Life, the manner in which each individual’s forever 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are hindered, thwarted and 
negated. This is to say that as an essential sinner, and therefore as the cause of 
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our own suffering, we can only obtain future salvation from our state of 
privation, and we can only be redeemed from our debt to God and avoid his 
future wrath, in so far as we continually strive to actualise our present 
possibilities in accordance with the dictates, prescriptions and strictures of 
Christianity. As McGrath suggests: ‘The believer’s present justified Christian 
existence is thus an anticipation of and advance participation in deliverance 
from the wrath to come, and an assurance in the present of the final 
eschatological verdict of acquittal’. 343  Rather than becoming aware of the 
manner in which every moment engenders an open field of present possibilities, 
rather than striving to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise that each moment brings, each individual is concerned with the 
salvation of their soul and with actualising their possibilities in accordance with 
that form of life that will ensure it.    
To understand the designation of Christianity as the perfect expression of 
nihilism is therefore to understand Christianity as the exemplary example of 
what Deleuze refers to as ‘a plan of organisation’. 344  This is to say that 
Christianity’s nihilistic reaction against Life is not merely manifest in the 
manner in which it reacts against the formless foundation of Life by positing a 
fixed, immutable foundation, by positing a transcendent God who, through the 
process of creation, organises reality into an equivocal distribution that is 
characterised by ontological hierarchy and the primacy of identity over 
difference. Rather, in addition to this concern with the objective character of 
reality, Christianity’s turning to the subjective manifests itself in the manner in 
which it seeks to organise how human beings live their lives, the manner in 
which it seeks to occlude the awareness and circumscribe the exploration of the 
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open field of present possibilities for living otherwise by promoting the 
actualisation of those possibilities in accordance with Christian dictates, 
prescriptions and strictures. As I indicated above, however, Christianity’s 
increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence ought not to 
be understood as an orientation that diminishes a concern with the objective 
character of reality in so far as the imperative to actualise one’s present 
possibilities in accordance with Christianity’s strictures appeals to the objective 
character of reality in order to acquire its legitimacy and its power of adherence. 
This is to say that the dictates, prescriptions and strictures of Christianity are not 
to be understood as that which are open to question or subject to revision, they 
do not lay down what is contingently good and bad such that each individual is 
at liberty to decide which to follow, which to modify and which to dispose of. 
As Deleuze asserts, ‘moral law is an imperative, it has no other effect, no other 
finality than obedience’. 345  Christianity’s strictures are therefore to be 
understood as expressing eternal, transcendent values, as being the commands 
laid down by God Himself, as being the inerrant and infallible Word of God, 
such that they are that which constitutes what will be eternally good and bad for 
all human beings, as that which, to employ the moral terminology of 
Christianity, ought to be considered ‘Good’ and that which ought to considered 
‘Evil’.346   
In order to determine God’s plan of organisation, in order to determine 
how we are to actualise our present possibilities in accordance with 
Christianity’s strictures and therefore obtain salvation, then the individual 
requires - particularly for Roman Catholicism - the mediation of the Church and 
its secular authorities. For example, in characterising this position, McGrath 
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writes that: ‘Salvation was only to be had through membership of the church. 
Christ may have made the hope of heaven possible; only the church could make 
it available. There was an ecclesiastical monopoly on the dispensation of 
redemption’. 347  The secular authorities of the Church are therefore to be 
understood, for Deleuze, as those who profess to possess the knowledge and the 
authority to instruct human beings how to correctly actualise their present 
possibilities in accordance with the dictates of Christianity and, importantly, are 
those who profess to possess the knowledge and the authority to dispense 
judgement accordingly. For example, in characterising the psychology of the 
supposed authoritative intermediaries of the Church and, as it were, the passion 
to engage in the judgment of how others live their lives, Deleuze proposes that 
‘the logic of judgement merges with the psychology of the priest, as the inventor 
of the most somber organisation: I want to judge, I have to judge…’ 348 
Moreover, while the mediation of the Church takes on less significance for the 
Christian tradition of Protestantism, the judgement and organisation of the 
individual’s life in accordance with the dictates, prescriptions and strictures of 
Christianity continues, but here it is the individual who takes the function of 
judgment upon themselves. This is to say that in so far as the individual comes 
to embrace and internalise Christianity’s plan of organisation - in so far as the 
individual comes to accept that plan’s account of the objective organisation of 
reality, the manner in which ‘the deep truth’ of their being ought to be 
conceptualised, and how they ought to actualise and organise their own present 
possibilities in accordance with the strictures of Christianity - then they accept 
and adopt the role of self-judge, a judgement of one’s own life that is in thrall to 
the all-pervasive judgement of God. Indeed, in characterising this adoption of 
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the role of self-judge that comes to characterise Christianity, Bogue makes it 
clear that: ‘The Christian’s only role is that of perpetual self-judge, and the sole 
form against which that role is measured is the infinite form of the deity, that 
form being one with an all-pervasive judgement’.349    
Deleuze’s determination of Christianity as the exemplary manifestation 
of nihilism ought to be understood, therefore, in terms of the manner in which it 
develops an increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, 
an orientation that makes reference to, and is supported by, the positing of an 
immutable, transcendent foundation and that, in its characterisation of reality, 
maintains the ontological presuppositions of Platonism. In particular, through 
the designation of human beings as responsible for the existence of pain, distress 
and suffering, Christianity is to be understood as promulgating an account of the 
essential identity of each human being, of uncovering the supposedly deep truth 
within us all, and of conceptualising that identity in terms of a condition of 
punishment, dispossession and profound privation. While existing upon earth in 
a current condition of privation, however, Christianity also offers the hope of 
salvation in the form of ascension to Heaven after death, a return to God’s 
transcendent kingdom in which human suffering will cease and each individual 
will be redeemed from their present condition of dispossession. Far from being 
assured, however, redemption is to be understood as being conditional upon the 
manner in which each individual conducts themselves in this life, conditional 
upon the manner in which each actualises their present possibilities and 
regulates their own conduct in accordance with the dictates, prescriptions and 
strictures of Christianity. The development of, and the increased concern with, 
the subjective aspects of human existence that is said to accompany the advent 
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of Christianity, and that leads Deleuze to designate Christianity as the 
exemplary expression of nihilism, can therefore be understood in terms of the 
manner in which it characterises the human condition as one of dispossession 
and privation, as providing hope of redemption from that condition after death 
and in making that redemption conditional upon the manner in which each 
actualises their present possibilities throughout life. This is to say that 
Christianity’s nihilistic reaction against Life is manifest in the manner in which 
it is to be understood as an exemplary instantiation of a plan of organisation that 
not only provides an account of the universal organisation of reality with 
reference to the notion of an immutable, transcendent foundation, but also in the 
manner in which it seeks to organise how each individual lives their life, thereby 
occluding, constricting and even negating an awareness of the forever renewed 
present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings.  
Following the death of God, however, why is this concern with 
Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism relevant for contemporary 
human beings? If the growing disbelief in the existence of God entailed that the 
form of life that was established upon it also came to be seen as increasingly 
fragile, does not the incredulity towards a belief in a transcendent God entail an 
incredulity towards the status of Christianity’s dictates, prescriptions and 
strictures - understood as divine imperatives - as well a growing incredulity 
towards its notions of sin, privation and redemption more generally? Indeed, in 
highlighting the consequences of the growing disbelief in the existence of God 
and the authority of the dictates and prescriptions that were founded upon that 
belief, Deleuze proposes that: ‘The supersensible world and higher values are 
reacted against, their existence is denied, they are refused all validity…The 
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sensational news spreads: there is nothing to be seen behind the curtain’.350 With 
the growing sense that the belief in the existence of God is becoming untenable, 
as well as the Judeo-Christian form of life that was established upon it, what 
contemporary significance can Christianity have with respect to the manner in 
which each individual’s forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise are hindered, thwarted and negated? In response to this we must 
remember Nietzsche’s suggestion that although it may be the greatest recent 
event, the full implications of the death of God would remain beyond the 
comprehension of many such that both the Judeo-Christian world view and its 
form of life would continue to exert considerable influence over the lives of 
modern men and women.
351
 Indeed, both Armstrong
352
 and Borg
353
 have 
suggested that, despite the secular tenor of much of contemporary Western 
society, Christianity and ‘the idea of God’ more generally continues to influence 
and affect the lives of millions of people throughout the world. Similarly, noting 
the enduring influence of Christianity within the lives of Western peoples, 
Vattimo has suggested that it may be understood variously as a response to a 
number of challenging socio-political issues confronting late-modern humanity, 
issues ranging from ‘genetic manipulation to ecology’, 354  along with 
contemporary society’s perceived inability to address the more profound need 
for meaning, purpose and hope in the face of human finitude. For example, he 
writes that: ‘Death hovers over us as an ineluctable event, we escape from 
despair by turning to God and his promise to welcome us into his eternal 
kingdom.’355   
I want to argue, however, that Deleuze’s concern with Christianity as the 
exemplary expression of nihilism is not to be understood merely in terms of 
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Christianity’s explicit manifestation in, and enduring influence upon, the lives of 
modern men and women, the manner in which contemporary Western peoples 
may continue to explicitly adopt, for a variety of reasons, the Judeo-Christian 
world-view and adhere to its form of life. Rather, his concern with Christianity 
is also to be understood in terms of the manner in which its nihilistic reaction 
against Life continues to implicitly persist and exert an influence upon the lives 
of modern men and women, the manner in which Christianity’s nihilistic 
technologies manifest themselves in ‘new guises’ and, as it were, 
‘transubstantiated forms’ beyond the death of God. This is to say that despite the 
increasing incredulity towards Christianity as a plan of organisation, a growing 
disbelief that each individual ought to actualise their present possibilities in 
accordance with the strictures of Christianity, and a growing incredulity towards 
Christianity’s particular formulation of the notions of sin, privation and 
redemption, there is an attempt to preserve the transcendent, authoritative realm 
that has been vacated by God and to posit similarly authoritative prescriptions 
and compelling notions. For example, in noting this transition away from the 
explicit and specific content of Christianity as a plan of organisation, and yet a 
retention of a number of its ‘underlying formal characteristics’, Heidegger 
writes that ‘if God in the sense of the Christian god has disappeared from his 
authoritative position in the suprasensory world, then this authoritative place 
itself is still always preserved, even though as that which has become 
empty….What is more, the empty place demands to be occupied anew and to 
have the god now vanished from it replaced by something else. New ideals are 
set up.’356 The death of God, therefore, entails a growing disbelief in the explicit 
content of Christianity as a plan of organisation, a growing incredulity towards 
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the existence of an immutable, transcendent God, a growing suspicion of 
Christianity’s formulation of the notions of original sin, privation and 
redemption and an increasing incredulity towards the promise of individual 
salvation through adherence to the strictures of Christianity. However, while the 
explicit content of Christianity as a plan of organisation comes to be seen as 
increasingly incredulous, its formal characteristics, its presuppositions, concepts 
and themes, implicitly persist in new and transmuted forms beyond the death of 
God, such that the nihilistic reaction against Life of which Christianity was, for 
Deleuze, an exemplary expression also persists beyond the death of God.  
The persistence of the nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises 
Christianity’s plan of organisation becomes manifest in new plans of 
organisation that retain an account of the objective organisation of reality, as 
well as retaining a concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, such 
that they can be understood, to employ Nietzsche’s phrase, as forms of ‘latent 
Christianity.’ 357 Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which the death of God 
would be followed by an attempt to create new accounts of reality and forms of 
life that retained many elements of Christianity, and with what can be 
understood as an allusion to the enduring Platonic presuppositions that would 
continue to characterise these accounts, Nietzsche proposed that: ‘After Buddha 
was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave - a tremendous, 
gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be 
caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.’358 As latent 
forms of Christianity, as tremendous, gruesome shadows of God, the new plans 
of organisation that emergence in the wake of the death of God can therefore be 
understood as continuing to maintain Christianity’s nihilistic reaction against the 
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manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, 
is continually overcoming any fixed determination or identity, as well as 
maintaining Christianity’s reaction against the manner in which the third 
synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by 
forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. As such, Deleuze’s 
concern with Christianity can be understood as retaining its contemporary 
relevance not merely because of Christianity’s explicit manifestation in, and 
enduring influence upon, the lives of modern men and women, but also because 
the nihilistic reaction against Life that is characteristic of Christianity’s plan of 
organisation continues to implicitly persist in new plans of organisation, in 
latent forms of Christianity or shadows of God. In designating Christianity as 
the exemplary expression of nihilism, Deleuze can therefore be understood as 
illustrating the perfect example or paradigmatic instance of the nihilistic reaction 
against Life so that contemporary men and women are better able to locate the 
presence of these latent forms of Christianity in their lives, better able to trace 
and locate the transmutation of the nihilistic reaction against Life, and thereby 
better able to resist the manner in which the nihilism that these shadows of God 
perpetuate may occlude, delimit and even negate the individual’s forever 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.    
In order to illustrate the continuance of nihilism in the new plans of 
organisation that emerged in the wake of the death of God, I want to turn to the 
related philosophies of Hegel and Marx for the remainder of this chapter and to 
treat them as the exemplary instantiations of such new plans of organisation, as 
the exemplary expressions of latent Christianity. In particular, in order to 
illustrate the manner in which new plans of organisation emerged in the wake of 
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the death of God, I want to turn to Hegel’s ‘dialectics of Spirit’ and the 
‘dialectical materialism’ of Marxism in order to discuss how they can be 
understood as shadows of God, as new plans of organisation that, while 
dispensing with the explicit and specific content of Christianity as a plan of 
organisation, retain a number of its underlying formal characteristics and, in 
significantly transmuted forms, perpetuate its nihilistic reaction against Life. But 
why turn to Hegel and Marx in order to illustrate the continuance of nihilism 
beyond the death of God when it is widely acknowledged that both Hegelian and 
Marxist historicism have themselves become the object of a sense of growing 
incredulity, with the latter in particular - following the collapse of communism - 
losing the influence that it once exerted over the lives of modern men and 
women? Indeed, in so far as the late twentieth and early twenty first century is 
commonly characterised as a new period of cultural history, as that which ought 
to be understood in terms of ‘the end of modernity’ and the emergence of a new 
‘postmodern condition’, then it has been suggested that what has accompanied 
or even defined this period is an ‘incredulity’ towards those modern 
philosophies - those grand or ‘metanarratives’ of which Hegelianism and 
Marxism are characteristic examples - that emerged in the wake of the death of 
God.
359
 For example, Vattimo has suggested that: ‘The ‘end of modernity’, or in 
any case its crisis, has also been accompanied by the dissolution of the main 
philosophical theories that claimed to have done away with religion…Hegelian 
and then Marxist historicism’,360 while Young has proposed that: ‘Marxism, like 
Hegelianism…is, then, a myth. It does not merit serious belief; it deserves to 
‘die’. And it has died, visibly and finally, with the fall of the Berlin Wall’.361 
 166 
As I shall discuss in the following chapter, even if we accept that there is 
a generalised cultural climate of incredulity towards those philosophies, 
specifically Hegelianism and Marxism, that emerged in the wake of the death of 
God, Deleuze can be understood as proposing that there are plans of 
organisation that persist within this climate. Even for those who seemingly no 
longer maintain an adherence to, or belief in, any overarching plan of 
organisation, the nihilistic reaction against Life can be understood as persisting 
in plans of organisation that adapt to this climate of disbelief, plans that, 
somewhat paradoxically, enable those ‘who no longer believe in anything to 
continue believing’.362 I shall return to this in the following chapter in relation to 
psychoanalysis, but for now I want to suggest that perhaps a greater degree of 
circumspection is required when considering the significance of the plans of 
organisation that emerged following the death of God. This is to say that while 
there may be a greater degree of incredulity towards both Hegelian and Marxist 
historicism, while the explicit content of those philosophies may no longer exert 
the influence that they once did over the lives of modern men and women, the 
potential for individual’s to be attracted to plans of organisation and, in 
particular, attracted to the manner in which they proffer meaning, purpose and 
hope in the face of a condition of seeming privation may continue to be 
powerful and enduring force. For example, in discussing the enduring attraction 
of ‘theodicy’, where this is not merely understood in terms of the vindication of 
God’s divine providence in the face of the existence of evil, but is understood 
more generally as an overarching and providential course of history, Levinas has 
suggested that: ‘It is impossible, in any case, to underestimate the temptation of 
theodicy, and to fail to recognise the profundity of the empire it exerts over 
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mankind’. 363  The value in examining Hegelian and Marxist historicism can 
therefore be understood in terms of an attempt to gain a broader awareness of 
that empire, to understand the manner in which it is able to adopt new forms that 
continue to perpetuate the nihilistic reaction against Life beyond the death of 
God. In particular, Hegelian and Marxist historicism reveal how the ongoing 
concern with the objective organisation of reality continues to react against the 
manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life is continually 
overcoming any fixed determination, as well as disclosing how the notions of 
sin, privation and redemption take on new forms that continue to react against 
the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual is 
provided with an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise.  
If we turn to the work of Hegel first in order to illustrate the manner in 
which new plans of organisation emerge in the wake of the death of God, and 
yet continue to perpetuate a nihilistic reaction against Life then, in contrast to 
the positing of a static, fixed foundation, Hegel is to be understood as 
characterising the nature of reality in terms of a historical, dynamic and 
developmental process. In particular, in the Phenomenology of Spirit he presents 
‘ultimate reality’ or ‘the absolute’ as a person-like entity, subject or ‘I’,364 which 
can be understood as being indicated by the designation of the absolute as Geist, 
as Mind or Spirit. Rather than being a fixed, transcendent foundation, however, 
the absolute is to be understood as a process of developmental change, a process 
whose structure or pattern of change is dialectical - ‘the doubling which sets up 
opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity’365 - and that 
can be discerned as manifesting itself in the everyday phenomena of the world 
such that ‘everything around us can be regarded an example of the dialectic’.366 
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Importantly, each individual human being, existing in a state of estrangement or 
‘alienation’ from every other individual,367 is to be understood as merely a part 
of that process, as merely that through which the absolute makes itself manifest, 
such that, as a person-like entity or subject, the absolute is to be understood as 
the only genuine subject.
368
 Moreover, the absolute does not undergo an infinite 
number of dialectical developments but has a telos or goal that Hegel refers to as 
‘absolute knowing’,369 and which consists of the absolute coming to ‘know’ that 
it is the ultimate and only genuine subject, that it is all reality, and that 
everything is a part of itself.
370
 As Young has suggested, absolute knowing is 
said to have been achieved when all individual human beings recognise 
themselves and one another as a part of the absolute and, thereby, overcome 
their previous state of estrangement and alienation from each other.
371
 In order 
to begin to see the manner in which Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit can be 
understood as that which perpetuates a nihilistic reaction against Life and, in 
particular, comes to occlude and constrain the open field of present possibilities 
for living otherwise that each moment brings, it is important to note that 
although Hegel resists positing a higher transcendent realm within which the 
current state of human suffering, privation or alienation is expiated, he proposes 
that there will come a time when the dynamic, dialectical process will cease, a 
time of absolute knowing when historical development, becoming and thus time 
itself will be ‘annulled’.372  
That this is so can perhaps been seen more clearly within the dialectical 
materialism of Marxism that, drawing on the work of Hegel, conceptualises 
reality in terms of a historical, developmental and dialectical change, a process 
that is to be understood as teleological in so far as it unfolds towards a goal 
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which will complete that dialectical process and therefore bring about its end.
373
 
However, whereas for Hegel that dialectical process is to be understood in terms 
of Geist or Spirit, for Marx it is to be understood in terms of economic activity 
and class antagonisms, activity concerned with the means of production and the 
ownership of material wealth.
374
 In particular, this material or economic 
dialectic that characterises the dynamism of history suggests that history has 
progressed through a series of dialectical class struggles between ‘oppressor and 
oppressed’, a particular and ongoing societal organisation of power that has 
included the antagonisms between freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, 
lord and serf and, in our epoch, bourgeoisie and proletariat.
375
 As a consequence 
of the various manifestations of this ongoing class antagonism, the historical 
condition of human beings is to be understood in terms of a universal 
estrangement or alienation from their essential or ‘species being’, an alienation 
from themselves, from the products of their labour and from fellow human 
beings.
376
 In so far as the origin of this alienation is private property then it will 
only be with the advent of communism and the abolition of private property that 
alienation will also disappear and the supposedly natural tendency to sociability 
and co-operation that is characteristic of human being will reassert itself.
377
 In a 
similar fashion to Hegel, therefore, Marx resists positing a fixed, transcendent 
realm within which the current state of alienation and human suffering is 
expiated, but he proposes that with the arrival of communism the dynamic, 
dialectical process of history will end along with the universal alienation and 
suffering of human beings. For example, in presenting this cessation of human 
estrangement and alienation that arrives with the advent of communism, Marx 
proposes that communism is to be understood ‘as the positive transcendence of 
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private property, or human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real 
appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as 
the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) 
being…Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this 
solution’.378 
But how are we to understand this exposition of the historicism of Hegel 
and Marx as latent forms of Christianity, as tremendous and gruesome shadows 
of God that persist beyond the death of God? This is to say that to the extent that 
it has been suggested that Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical 
materialism of Marxism are to be understood as being characterised by dynamic, 
historical change, how are we to understand those philosophies in terms of the 
continuation, albeit in transmuted forms, of Christianity’s nihilistic reaction 
against the ongoing dynamism of the third synthesis of time? To understand the 
manner in which the philosophies of Hegel and Marx can be taken as 
perpetuating, in transmuted forms, the nihilistic reaction against the eternal 
return of the new or the different that characterises the formless foundation of 
Life then we must acknowledge that this reaction is not to be understood in 
terms of the positing of a what might be referred to as a ‘vertical transcendence’, 
such as the immutable, fixed transcendence that characterises the Platonic Forms, 
the neo-Platonic One or the God of Christianity. Indeed, Camus proposed that: 
‘Hegel’s undeniable originality lies in his definitive destruction of all vertical 
transcendence’.379 Rather, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and Marxism’s dialectical 
materialism can both be understood as reacting against the formless foundation 
of Life by directing what we might refer to as the ‘open’ dynamism of the third 
synthesis of time into a closed or fixed pattern of development towards a 
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specific goal, a fixed and teleological development such that - with the advent of 
absolute knowing or the arrival of communism - dynamism and historical 
change are annulled. This is to say that while the third synthesis of time is to be 
understood in terms of the ongoing or eternal return of the new or the different 
which ensures that Life, at its foundation, is characterised by a ongoing and 
excessive formlessness, an ongoing and universal ungrounding, it does not 
return the new or the different according to some transcendent, overarching 
pattern of development or predetermined, purposeful plan. In contrast, the 
Hegelian dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism can both 
be understood in terms of a reaction against the open dynamism of the eternal 
return of the new or the different that characterises the formless foundation of 
Life in so far as they provide an account of the objective organisation of reality 
in terms of a closed historical dynamic, a dynamic that is guided by a universal 
or overarching pattern of development that possesses a predetermined purpose.       
In this respect, both Hegelian and Marxist historicism can be seen to 
display similarities with the eschatological concerns of Christianity, with that 
tradition of Christian thought that is concerned with the ‘last things’. This is to 
say that while Christianity has been primarily presented here in terms of the 
creationist response to the problem of participation, as the positing of an 
immutable and transcendent foundation that is the ideal and ontologically 
superior precondition for the beings of the world, there is also an eschatological 
current of thought within Christianity that is concerned with the final destiny of 
mankind and of the world. In particular, the New Testament foundations for 
eschatology can be discerned variously in Jesus’ preaching of the coming of the 
kingdom of God, the proclamation that ‘the kingdom of God is at hand’,380 and 
 172 
in the writings of Saint Paul where there is a concern with the final coming of 
Christ, the execution of final judgement and, for those true believing Christians, 
redemption from sin and the fulfilment of the promise of eternal life.
381
 
However, perhaps the clearest and most controversial foundations for the 
eschatological concerns of Christianity can be found in the book of Revelation, 
where John of Patmos recounts his visionary, apocalyptic experience of ‘the 
rapture’, ‘the final tribulation’, the battle of Armageddon, the second coming of 
the warrior Christ and ‘the last judgement’. As Borg has suggested, the ‘futurist’ 
reading of the book of Revelation stresses that the book tells us what will 
happen some time in the future, treating the book as that which unveils God’s 
transcendent and overarching plan for the destiny of the world and, in particular, 
does so in the form of ‘a cryptogram, a message encoded in symbols about the 
signs of the end that will precede the second coming of Christ’.382 With the 
futurist interpretation of the book of Revelation, therefore, Christianity can be 
understood as that which posits a closed historical dynamic, a dynamic that is 
guided by a universal or overarching pattern of development towards a 
predetermined end. Against the formless foundation of Life, against the eternal 
return of the new or the different that is characteristic of the open dynamism of 
the third synthesis of time, the eschatology of the New Testament posits a divine, 
fixed pattern of historical development towards a specific goal such that - with 
the second coming of Christ - dynamism, historical change and therefore time 
itself are annulled.  
Previously I suggested that Deleuze’s employment of the term ‘religion’ 
is not to be understood as being confined to any particular established religion, 
but is to be understood as that which designates any nihilistic reaction against 
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Life that posits an immutable, transcendent foundation such as Plato’s theory of 
Forms, the Neo-Platonic emanative response, or Christianity’s creative response, 
to the problem of participation. However, in addition to these instances of 
vertical transcendence, Deleuze also suggests that the term religion, or what he 
refers to as a ‘theological plan’, is also to be understood as that which designates 
not only the eschatological concerns of Christianity but also those philosophies, 
such as Hegelianism and Marxism, whose dynamism and evolutionary change is 
guided by some universal, overarching or transcendent plan of development 
towards a predetermined end. For example, he writes that: ‘Any organisation 
that comes from above and refers to a transcendence, be it a hidden one, can be 
called a theological plan: a design in the mind of god, but also an evolution in 
the supposed depths of nature, or a society’s organisation of power’. 383 
Therefore, in contrast to the vertical transcendence that is manifest in the 
positing of an immutable, fixed foundation, with Hegelian and Marxist 
historicism we have what we might refer to as a ‘horizontal transcendence’ that 
is manifest in the positing of an overarching and fixed pattern of development, 
an evolutionary design within the depths of reality that guides history trough a 
series of dialectical and purposeful progressions towards a predetermined goal 
or telos. In highlighting the manner in which Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit can be 
understood in terms of a horizontal, purposeful transcendence, and therefore as 
that which perpetuates the nihilistic reaction against Life but in a significantly 
transmuted form, Holland has noted that Hegel’s philosophy is characterised by 
‘transcendental subjectivism’, in so far as ‘this historical agent, Absolute Spirit, 
is a subject that transcends any and all concrete subjects and indeed history 
itself’, and also by ‘teleologism’ to the extent that ‘the end of history is 
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guaranteed by the dialectical process of negation of the negation’.384 As we have 
seen, as a person-like entity or subject, as Mind or Spirit, the absolute is to be 
understood as the dynamic principle of reality that transcends all individual 
human beings and history itself, as that universal and overarching plan of 
development that moves the whole of reality through a series of dialectical and 
purposeful developments towards the predetermined goal of absolute knowing 
wherein that dialectical process will cease and historical change, becoming and 
thus time itself will be annulled.  
Similarly, the dialectical materialism of Marxism is also to be 
understood as being characterised by a horizontal transcendence in so far as it 
posits a fixed and purposeful pattern of development towards a predetermined 
end. However, in place of the dialectical and teleological development of Spirit 
towards absolute knowing we have a series of dialectical class struggles between 
oppressor and oppressed wherein society is moved through a series of dialectical 
transitions towards the predetermined goal of communism, whose advent will 
signal the end of historical and therefore societal development. As Holland has 
suggested: 
 
[M]uch of what passes as “Marxist” philosophy of history - 
including some (though not all) of Marx’s own - merely translates or 
inverts Hegelian idealism into a “materialism” that nonetheless 
retains the transcendental subjectivism and the teleologism: classes 
act as transcendental subjects in the historical dialectic of class 
struggle, which will according to the necessary laws produce a 
classless society with the collapse of capitalism at the end of 
history.
385
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With the philosophies of Hegelianism and Marxism, therefore, we have the 
perpetuation of the nihilistic reaction against Life of which Christianity is said to 
be the exemplary expression but, following the death of God, this nihilism 
manifests itself in a significantly transmuted form. With Hegel and Marx we 
continue to have an account of the objective, transcendent organisation of reality 
that can be understood as a reaction against the manner in which Life, at its 
formless foundation, is characterised by the open dynamism of the eternal return 
of the new or the different but, in contrast to the vertical transcendence that 
characterises Christianity’s creationist response to the problem of participation, 
we now have a horizontal, purposeful transcendence. This is to say that the third 
synthesis of time is no longer reacted against by positing an immutable, fixed 
foundation that is understood as being the ideal and ontologically superior 
precondition for the beings of the world. Rather, the nihilistic reaction against 
Life which characterises Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical 
materialism of Marxism is manifest in the form of an overarching and fixed 
pattern of development, a purposeful, dialectical and closed dynamic that is the 
ideal and ontologically superior precondition and guiding principle that directs 
the whole of reality, including all historical and societal developments, towards 
a predetermined end.  
As with Christianity, however, the philosophies of Hegel and Marx are 
not simply concerned with formulating an account of the overall and objective 
organisation of reality, but also display a concern with the subjective aspects of 
human existence that enlarges and intensifies the manner in which they 
perpetuate the nihilistic reaction against Life. In particular, both Hegel and Marx 
can be understood as presenting an account of the fundamental identity of all 
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human beings, of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and of doing so in 
terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack in so far as 
each individual is conceptualised as existing in a current and profound condition 
of alienation. This is to say that while Christianity conceptualises the essential 
condition of human beings in terms of a condition of privation because of the 
existence and perpetuation of Man’s original offence against God, both Hegel 
and Marx suggest that the current condition of each individual is to be 
understood in terms of a loss of integration with every other individual, a 
profound condition of dispossession and privation in which mankind’s tendency 
to interpersonal cooperation has been replaced by a fracturing of society, a 
society of self-serving and ‘atomistic’ individuals engaged in interpersonal 
competition. However, while denying the possibility of ascension to Heaven 
after death, a return to God’s transcendent kingdom in which each individual 
will be redeemed from their present condition of privation, Hegel can be 
understood as providing hope of future ‘redemption’ from the current condition 
of alienation with the inevitable arrival of absolute knowing. As Young has 
made clear, ‘what Hegel offers is the promise - indeed, guarantee - that, as the 
inexorable laws of history unfold, alienation will one day be overcome and 
everyone will live in peace and harmony’.386 Similarly, while rejecting religion 
and the notion of heaven as that human creation designed to soporifically 
appease the reality of human suffering,
387
 Marx can be understood as providing 
each individual with the hope of a future ‘salvation’ from their current condition 
of alienation with the inevitable abolition of private property that is achieved 
with the advent of communism. Indeed, in highlighting the pseudo-religious, 
and specifically Christian, redemptive tenor of Marx and Engel’s work, Camus 
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noted that: ‘The final disappearance of political economy - the favourite theme 
of Marx and Engels - indicates the end of all suffering. Economics, in fact, 
coincide with pain and suffering in history, which disappear with the 
disappearance of history. We arrive at last in the Garden of Eden’.388 
Along with a concern to formulate an account of the objective 
organisation of reality, the new plans of organisation that emerge following the 
death of God, such as Hegelianism and Marxism, can therefore be understood as 
latent forms of Christianity to the extent that they also retain a concern with the 
subjective organisation of each individual’s reality, with the fundamental 
identity of all human beings and the ongoing organisation of the development 
and direction of their lives. This is to say that the new plans of organisation that 
emerge in the wake of the death of God are not to be understood as shadows of 
God simply because they posit a horizontal, purposeful transcendence, to the 
extent that they characterise the organisation of reality in terms of a fixed and 
purposeful pattern of development towards a predetermined end. Rather, these 
new plans of organisation are to be understood as latent forms of Christianity to 
the extent that they perpetuate Christianity’s concern with the subjective 
formation and organisation of the human being. Indeed, in stressing their 
concern with both the objective, developmental organisation of reality and the 
subjective formation of each individual’s identity, Deleuze makes it clear that a 
plan of this type ‘always involves forms and their developments, subjects and 
their formations. Development of forms and formation of subjects’.389 Along 
with Christianity, therefore, both Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical 
materialism of Marxism can be understood as perpetuating, in a significantly 
transmuted form, the notions of dispossession and privation, along with the 
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notion of a redemption from that condition of privation, to the extent that they 
provide each individual with the hope of the future cessation of, and therefore 
redemption from, their current condition of alienation. The future redemption 
that characterises both Hegelian and Marxist historicism is no longer to be 
understood as being achieved after death in a super-sensible world, in God’s 
transcendent heavenly kingdom, but is instead to be found in the future of this 
world as reality follows its ineluctable course of dialectical developments 
towards its predetermined end. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which new 
philosophies would arise in the wake of the death of God that would continue to 
perpetuate, in transmuted form, the redemptive ideal of Christianity, Nietzsche 
made it clear that the notion of the kingdom of God would be transferred to 
earth and, in particular, to the future condition of humanity so that while the 
redemptive ideal of Christianity would be ‘redressed’, as it were, in a new 
secular ‘garb’, those new philosophies would continue to hold fast ‘to the belief 
in the old ideal’.390    
Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism 
can therefore both be understood as new plans of organisation that emerge in the 
wake of the death of God and, while dispensing with the explicit and specific 
content of Christianity as a plan of organisation, retain a number of its 
underlying formal characteristics and continue, in significantly transmuted 
forms, to perpetuate the nihilistic reaction against Life. In particular, both 
Hegelian and Marxist historicism can be understood as providing an account of 
the overall and objective organisation of reality that, in contrast to the vertical 
transcendence that characterises Christianity’s creationist response to the 
problem of participation, posit a horizontal, purposeful transcendence. This is to 
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say that both the philosophies of Hegel and Marx can be understood as reacting 
against the formless foundation of Life by directing the open dynamism of the 
third synthesis of time, the manner in which it is characterised by the eternal 
return of the new or the different, into a closed or fixed pattern of development 
towards a specific goal, a fixed and teleological development such that, with the 
advent of absolute knowing or the arrival of communism, dynamic and 
historical change are annulled. As with Christianity, however, the nihilism that 
characterises the philosophies of Hegel and Marx can also be discerned in the 
enlargement or intensification of their nihilistic reaction against Life, a nihilism 
that is not merely limited to a reaction against the manner in which the third 
synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming 
any fixed identity, but is also a reaction against the manner in which the third 
synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by 
an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise. This is to say that 
rather than becoming aware of the manner in which every moment engenders an 
open field of present possibilities, rather than striving to explore the forever 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, 
Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism shift the 
individual’s concern to the future of this world, expectant of the arrival of 
absolute knowing or the advent of communism as those future states that will 
ensure a redemption from the profound privation that is said to characterise the 
essential condition of humanity.  
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Chapter Four: Resistance 
 
In addition to being concerned with how each moment of our lives provides us 
with forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise, the previous 
chapter suggested that Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work is concerned 
with the manner in which those possibilities are hindered, thwarted and even 
negated, a circumscription of present possibilities that I argued ought to be 
understood within the context of nihilism. However, rather than a reaction to the 
loss of belief in the existence of God, and the Judeo-Christian form of life that 
was established upon that belief, nihilism is to be understood as possessing a 
technical and specifically temporal sense in so far as it is to be determined as a 
reaction against the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself. 
This is to say that nihilism is to be understood in terms of a reaction against the 
universal ungrounding or excessive formlessness that characterises the 
temporality of Life itself, a reaction against the third synthesis of time and the 
manner in which it ensures that Life, at its formless foundation, is continually 
becoming different to what it is at any given moment, continually resisting and 
overcoming the establishment of any fixed determination or identity. In 
particular, as a reaction against the formless foundation of Life, nihilism 
becomes manifest in the positing of an overarching account of the objective 
organisation of reality, accounts of reality that can be understood in terms of 
what Deleuze refers to as plans of organisation and that variously appeal to 
vertical transcendence - such as the Platonic Forms, the neo-Platonic One or the 
God of Christianity - or horizontal transcendence - as is evidenced in the 
eschatological concerns of Christianity, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit or the 
dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that the nihilism characteristic 
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of a plan of organisation manifests itself in accounts of the objective 
organisation of reality that react against the open dynamism that characterises 
the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence, by 
positing an immutable, fixed foundation that is to be understood as the ideal and 
ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world, or by appealing 
to a horizontal transcendence, by positing an overarching and fixed pattern of 
development that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition and 
guiding principle that directs the whole of reality, including all historical and 
societal developments, towards a predetermined end. 
The nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises a plan of 
organisation, however, is not merely manifest in the positing of an overarching 
account of the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a vertical and/or 
horizontal transcendence and, in doing so, reacts against the manner in which 
the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is characterised by 
the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with the advent of 
Christianity, and for the new plans of organisation that follow in the wake of the 
death of God, there is also an increased concern with subjectivity, an increased 
concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, that enlarges and 
intensifies the nihilistic reaction against Life. As I discussed previously in 
relation to Christianity, and also in relation to both Hegelian and Marxist 
historicism, plans of organisation present an account of the fundamental identity 
of all human beings, an account of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and 
do so in terms of a universal and essential condition of dispossession, privation 
or lack. In concert with their specific account of the objective organisation of 
reality, plans of organisation occlude, constrain and constrict both the awareness 
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and exploration of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise 
that each moment brings by means of the promise of salvation from a condition 
of privation, a redemption from an ostensible state of dispossession to the extent 
that the individual actualises their present possibilities in accordance with that 
form of life promulgated by the plan of organisation. Therefore, the nihilistic 
reaction against Life that is characteristic of Christianity as a plan of 
organisation, as well as those new plans of organisation that emerge in the wake 
of the death of God, is not merely manifest in the form of an account of the 
objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation of 
Life, a foundation that is constituted by the third synthesis of time and is 
characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with its 
turning or increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, 
those plans of organisation also circumscribe the open field of present 
possibilities that are available to human beings and, in doing so, are also to be 
understood as a nihilistic reaction against the manner in which the third 
synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by 
a forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise. 
But how are we to respond to the presence and the persistence of 
nihilism? At the beginning of this study, I suggested that Deleuze’s individual 
and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with 
the question of living well, and the manner in which living well necessitates that 
we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed 
present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. Over the 
course of the preceding chapters, I have sought to formulate an account of the 
manner in which, as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, each 
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individual is continually granted a forever renewed present possibility for living 
otherwise, a present moment that is constituted by the ongoing caesural cutting 
that characterises the third synthesis of time and which is to be understood as the 
formless foundation of Life itself. However, I have also formulated an account 
of the manner in which our forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise are circumscribed by nihilism, hindered, thwarted and even negated 
by the nihilistic reaction against Life that finds its most systematic expression in 
plans of organisation. In response to the presence and the persistence of nihilism, 
therefore, my objective in this chapter is argue that living well, where this 
necessitates that we explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise that each moment brings, also necessitates that we strive to resist the 
diverse ways in which those present possibilities are often occluded and 
constrained. This is to say that in order to strive to become aware of and to 
explore our forever renewed present possibilities then the response to the 
presence and the persistence of nihilism ought to be understood in terms of 
resistance and, in particular, in terms of a resistance to the inheritance and 
perpetuation of the nihilism that is characteristic of plans of organisation. 
Although I shall formulate and develop the notion of resistance throughout this 
chapter, I want to begin by suggesting that, as with nihilism, the notion of 
resistance ought to be understood as possessing a technical and specifically 
temporal sense. This is to say that in order to explore the forever renewed 
present possibilities that each moment brings, then the resistance to nihilism that 
this necessitates must not only be understood within the context of the eternal 
return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of time, 
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but must also be understood within the context of Habit, or the first synthesis of 
time, along with Memory, or the second synthesis of time.  
In order to begin to formulate a notion of resistance within the context of 
the three syntheses of time, a resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of 
the nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, it 
is first necessary to recall the character of the virtual, temporal structure of Life 
along with its relationship to each individual’s actual living present. As I 
discussed in detail in chapter two, the temporal character of each individual’s 
living present is to be understood as an immediate an ongoing expression of the 
temporality of Life itself, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is to 
be understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time. Distinguishable 
and yet not distinct from the living present, the three syntheses of time comprise 
a virtual structure that is the fully real, universal and immanent condition for the 
actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, 
the manner in which each individual’s living present is characterised by a 
forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by certain 
expectations of the future. As the formless foundation of the passive syntheses 
of time, it is the third synthesis which ensures that the living present is 
characterised by a forever renewed present moment, distinguishable from both 
the past and the future, and which thereby provides each individual with an 
ongoing open field of present possibilities for living otherwise. In contrast, the 
first synthesis of time or Habit is that which ensures that our lived experience is 
characterised by an ongoing continuity in so far as this passive synthesis 
contracts and retains every present moment that has passed and synthesises all 
those past moments into the present, thereby creating certain expectations of the 
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future such as the expected repetition of the chimes of a clock or the expectation 
of the ongoing arrival of the notes of a musical melody. However, in order to 
ensure that the living present is characterised by the passage of time then the 
second synthesis or Memory is to be understood as an a priori past in general 
that not only ensures that every present moment possesses a past aspect to it, and 
is therefore able to pass, but is also the coexistent region into which every 
former present passes, ensuring that all of those former presents are 
contemporaneous with, and can therefore be either voluntarily or involuntarily 
recollected in, the present moment.  
What the first and second syntheses of time therefore disclose is that the 
continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present, and the 
expectations of the future that the contracted and coexistent past creates, is 
characteristic of, and inherent within, the temporality of Life itself. This is to say 
that as the virtual structure that is the fully real and immanent condition for the 
actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, Life is that 
universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is comprised of three syntheses 
of time with the first two syntheses being characterised by the ongoing 
persistence of the past with the present and the continued projection of the past 
into the future to create a series of particular expectations. Memory is the 
coexistent region into which every former present moment passes and which 
ensures that the individual’s living present is characterised by the voluntary or 
involuntary recollection of the past in the present, while Habit is the ongoing 
contraction and retention of the past into the present which ensures that each 
individual’s living present is characterised by certain expectations of the future 
that arise as a consequence of the ongoing contraction of the past. The continued 
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coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present that is characteristic of 
the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory can therefore be understood as 
being profoundly productive in so far as it engenders a multiplicity of 
assumptions, judgments and expectations that what held in the past will continue 
to hold in the future, a plurality of unconscious expectations that enable us to 
carry out the full range of our everyday activities without conscious and 
therefore continued reflection. Indeed, as William Hazlitt suggested: ‘Without 
the aid of prejudice and custom, I should not be able to find my way across the 
room’.391 This is to say that without the plurality of pre-judgements about the 
future that are constituted by Habit and Memory - the expectation that the 
objects that populate the room will continue to cause us no harm, that the floor 
that bore our weight a moment ago will continue to do so, and that the way out 
of the room remains the same as it has always done - then the task of crossing 
and finding our way out of the room would become, for all practical intents and 
purposes, impossible. 
However, the continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the 
present, and the expectations of the future that the contracted and coexistent past 
creates, can also be understood as being obstructive and inhibitory. For example, 
to the extent that Habit and Memory ensure the coexistence and perpetuation of 
a multitude of restrictive assumptions, judgements and expectations about who 
we are and what we are capable of then those expectations can occlude an 
awareness of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that 
each moment brings, thereby circumscribing and even negating the 
opportunities for growth, development and change that lie therein. As Miller 
suggested, when the past is contracted, perpetuated and coexists with the present 
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in such a manner then we are continually ‘weighted down’ with the past, 
continually dragging the past behind us as we attempt to move forward, a past 
that obstructs the present possibilities for living otherwise to such an extent that 
it becomes analogous to a ball and chain.
392
 Indeed, in his Proust, Beckett 
dramatically proposed that: ‘Memory and Habit are attributes of the Time 
cancer’.393 This is to say that Memory and Habit, understood in terms of the pre-
reflective persistence of the past with the present and its continued projection 
into the future, can come to dominate and ‘deaden’ time, seemingly squeezing, 
as it were, the very life or the very temporality out of time itself, ensuring that 
the continual recurrence of a renewed present moment is overshadowed by the 
retained past and the ongoing expectation that the future will continue to be the 
same or similar to that past. For Beckett, Habit and Memory are therefore to be 
understood as ‘ministers of dullness’ to the extent that they strive to ensure the 
continuation of a given state of affairs, an ongoing contraction of the past into 
the present that creates certain expectations of the future which entails that Habit 
and Memory are also to be understood as ‘agents of security’.394 This is to say 
that through the ongoing coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the 
present, and the expectations of the future that this contracted and coexistent 
past creates, Habit and Memory strive to maintain stability and security in the 
face of the unfamiliar and the unknown by bringing the continually renewed and 
irremediable uniqueness of the present moment under the power of past 
judgments, established concepts and historical assumptions, thereby 
appropriating and transforming the different, unfamiliar and unknown into the 
same, similar and familiar.
395
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But what is the relation of nihilism to the coexistence and perpetuation 
of the past with the present that is characteristic of Habit and Memory, of the 
first and second synthesis of time? This is to say that in so far as I am seeking to 
formulate a notion of resistance within the context of the passive syntheses of 
time, a resistance to the inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilism that 
finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, then how are we to 
understand the relation between nihilism and the perpetuation of the past that 
characterises the first and second synthesis of time? To address this question, we 
must recall that the continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the 
present, and the expectations of the future that the contracted and coexistent past 
creates, is not simply a feature of the dynamic form or temporal character of the 
individual’s living present. As I discussed in detail in chapter two, the first and 
second synthesis of time are part of that virtual, universal and impersonal 
temporal dynamic that - while being the universal and immanent condition for 
the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present - is to be 
understood as that which exceeds the actual living present of each individual. 
Importantly, as an expression of the universal and impersonal temporality of 
Life itself, characterized as it is by Habit and Memory, by the first and second 
synthesis of time, each individual’s actual living present is not merely 
characterized by the ongoing coexistence and persistence of their own individual 
past with the present, by the ongoing and exclusive persistence of that 
individual’s former presents. Rather, Deleuze’s work suggests that each 
individual’s past is to be understood as being ‘woven’ into, or ‘enfolded’ within, 
the pasts of others, and indeed woven into the whole of the past itself, such that 
all of those enfolded pasts comprise a vast historical legacy that is 
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contemporaneous with each individual’s living present.396 As May suggests: ‘It 
is not just the entirety of my past that exists within me; it is the entirety of the 
past itself. My own past, my sensations, desires, memories or joys, do not arise 
outside the historical context in which I live. They arise within a legacy that is 
planted in me by history, a legacy that I might perhaps change but cannot escape. 
To live is to navigate the world immersed in a historically given context that is 
not of one’s own making’.397  
The first and second synthesis of time, therefore, do not merely ensure 
that the individual’s specific past is contracted, retained and synthesised into 
their living present, but that the entirety of the past itself is contracted, retained 
and synthesised into the individual’s living present, such that Habit and Memory 
form what Deleuze refers to as a ‘gigantic memory’,398 a vast cultural past that 
coexists virtually with each individual’s actual living present. The moments and 
events that compose an individual’s life are therefore to be understood as 
enfolded within a gigantic memory or vast cultural past that continues to coexist 
virtually with the individual’s living present such that there can be what Deleuze 
refers to as ‘non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, 
resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals and roles which 
transcend spatial locations and temporal successions’.399  This is to say that 
elements of the gigantic cultural past, such as socio-political and cultural events 
that happened many years ago, can ‘connect with and act upon’ the individual’s 
present moment, while the actions of the individual in the present moment may 
‘resonate with and echo’ socio-political and cultural events that occurred in the 
distant past. Importantly, however, to the extent that Habit and Memory, the first 
and second synthesis of time, ensure that the entirety of the past itself is 
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contracted, retained and synthesised into the individual’s living present, then 
Habit and Memory also ensure that the nihilism that finds its most systematic 
expression in plans of organisation is also contracted, retained and synthesised 
into each individual’s living present. Habit and Memory not only ensure that all 
of the individual’s particular past moments are contracted and coexist with their 
living present, but that the entirety of the past itself is contracted and coexists 
with the individual’s living present, ensuring that the nihilism that has 
historically found its most systematic expression in a variety of plans of 
organisation is also contracted and coexists virtually with each individual’s 
actual living present. This is to say that Habit and Memory ensure that the 
various plans of organisation that have been examined in this study - such as 
Plato’s theory of Forms, Neo-Platonism, Christianity’s creationist and 
eschatological plans, along with the plans of organisation that arose in the wake 
of the death of God, such as Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical 
materialism of Marxism - are all continually contracted into, and continue to 
coexist with, every individual’s actual living present.  
In order to begin to formulate a notion of resistance within the context of 
the three syntheses of time, a resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of 
the nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, 
then the notion of resistance must be understood in terms of a selective 
resistance to the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory. This is to say that 
the notion of resistance that I am formulating here ought to be understood as 
possessing a technical, ontological and specifically temporal sense in so far as it 
entails that we resist the inheritance and perpetuation of the variety of nihilistic 
plans of organisation that have been examined here, a resistance to those plans 
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of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual 
inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, 
are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. In particular, 
this selective resistance to the plans of organisation that Habit and Memory 
ensures coexists with each individual’s living present ought to be understood as 
a resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of 
the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation 
of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence - such as an immutable, fixed 
foundation that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the 
beings of the world - or by appealing to a horizontal transcendence - such as an 
overarching and fixed pattern of development that directs the whole of reality 
towards a predetermined end. Moreover, this resistance must also be understood 
in terms of a resistance to the manner in which those plans of organisation 
promulgate an account of the fundamental identity of all human beings, an 
account of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and do so in terms of a 
universal and essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack from which 
we can be redeemed. This is to say that the selective resistance to Habit and 
Memory, to the first and second synthesis of time, ought to be understood as a 
resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, the manner in which those 
plans of organisation provide the hope of salvation from an ostensible condition 
of privation, and seek to occlude and constrain an awareness of the forever 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise by instructing the individual to 
actualise their present possibilities in accordance with that form of life 
promulgated by the plan of organisation.  
 192 
The notion of resistance that I am formulating here, a resistance to the 
inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilism that finds its most systematic 
expression in plans of organisation, ought to therefore be understood in terms of 
a resistance to the manner in which those plans of organisation may continue to 
act upon and influence the individual’s living present. This is to say that the 
resistance to those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of the vast 
cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting 
dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each 
individual’s living present, necessitates a renouncement of the continued 
adherence to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of 
organisation, along with the variety of nihilistic notions of which a given plan of 
organisation is composed. However, as we discussed in the previous chapter and, 
in particular, in relation to the enduring influence of Christianity within the lives 
of Western peoples, a given plan of organisation is able to provide ready 
answers to a number of challenging socio-political issues confronting late-
modern humanity, as well as ostensibly being able to address the more profound 
need for meaning, purpose and hope in the face of human finitude.
400
 In 
particular, by presenting an overarching account of the objective organisation of 
reality that appeals to a vertical and/or a horizontal transcendence, and an 
account of the supposedly deep truth within us all that delimits our place and 
role within that overarching account, then a plan of organisation provides ready 
answers to the problem of how life ought to be lived, and provides a 
transcendental validation for our adherence to the form of life promulgated by 
that plan of organisation. However, in so far as resistance to the inheritance and 
perpetuation of nihilism necessitates a renouncement of the continued adherence 
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to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation 
then it also entails a renouncement of the ready answers that those plans offer, 
and an overcoming of the fear of losing the supposedly transcendent certitude 
and security that those plans provide. Indeed, in noting the difficulty in 
renouncing the continued adherence to a given plan of organisation and, in 
particular, the manner in which the ready answers and security that they provide 
entails that continued adherence, Deleuze proposes that: ‘We are always afraid 
of losing. Our security, the great molar organization that sustains us, the 
arborescences that we cling to, the binary machines that give us a well-defined 
status, the resonances we enter into to, the system of overcoding that dominates 
us - we desire all that’.401  
Resistance to the inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilistic 
reaction against Life, a resistance that necessitates a renouncement of the 
continued adherence to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given 
plan of organisation, ought to therefore be understood as particularly 
challenging. Indeed, rather than an image of Deleuze as the figure who is 
concerned with the rapid and almost careless renouncement of plans of 
organisation in order to enable the individual to begin to explore the open field 
of present possibilities for living otherwise,
402
 his work can be understood as 
displaying an acute awareness of the difficulties and the dangers in renouncing 
adherence to plans of organisation, along with the potential consequences of 
losing the transcendent certitude and security that they purport to provide. In 
particular, Deleuze notes that the loss of that security, the loss of those ready 
answers to questions concerning the meaning, purpose and direction that our 
lives ought to take, can potentially be so difficult for some individuals that it 
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may be preferable for some to continue to adhere to a given plan of organisation 
and the nihilistic notions or ‘strata’ of which it is composed. For example, he 
notes that ‘if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead 
of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even 
dragged towards catastrophe. Staying stratified - organised, signified, subjected 
- is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the 
strata into demented or suicidal collapse’.403 This is to say that rather than a 
reckless renouncement of the adherence to a given plan of organisation, rather 
than a rapid rejection of the certitude and security that the plan of organisation 
may have afforded the individual, Deleuze can be understood as advocating a 
cautious consideration of the consequences of resisting and renouncing 
adherence to the plans of organisation that, by virtue of the constituting 
dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each 
individual’s living present. This is to say that the renouncement of the continued 
adherence to a plan of organisation must be undertaken with ‘great patience’ and 
with ‘great care’,404  an endeavour that requires that the individual not only 
considers what new present possibilities for living otherwise may be gained 
following the renouncement of a plan of organisation, but also what dangers and 
difficulties may be involved in such a renouncement, what ready answers, 
certitude and security might be lost, if the objective and subjective aspects of a 
given plan of organisation are renounced.
405
   
Resistance to nihilism is therefore to be understood as a resistance to, 
and cautious renouncement of, the continued adherence to both the objective 
and subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation and the variety of 
nihilistic notions of which a given plan of organisation is composed. Understood 
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within the context of the passive synthesis of time, resistance is to be understood 
as a resistance to those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of the vast 
cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting 
dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each 
individual’s living present. In particular, resistance to nihilism is a resistance to, 
and renouncement of, those nihilistic notions of which a plan of organisation is 
composed, those nihilistic notions that ‘poison life’: 406  the notion of an 
overarching account of reality that posits a transcendent, immutable foundation 
or a fixed pattern of development towards a predetermined end; a resistance to, 
and renouncement of, the associated Platonic ontological presuppositions of 
equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the primacy of identity over difference and, 
ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity; and a resistance to, and 
renouncement of, any notion of the supposedly deep truth within us all, 
particularly where this universal and essential identity is formulated in terms of 
a condition of dispossession, privation or lack from which we can be redeemed. 
This resistance to both the objective and subjective aspects of a given plan of 
organisation, and the variety of nihilistic notions of which a given plan of 
organisation is composed, is necessary in order to combat the manner in which 
nihilism reacts against the formless foundation of Life itself and, in particular, 
the manner in which it hinders, thwarts and even negates the continually 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment beings. It is 
this resistance to the manner in which a given plan of organisation may continue 
to act upon and influence the individual’s living present that enables the 
individual to become increasingly aware of, and to explore, the open field of 
present possibilities for living otherwise that is constituted by the third synthesis 
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of time, a resistance to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given 
plan of organisation that enables the individual, as Deleuze concisely expresses 
it, to begin to participate in ‘the opposite of a morality of salvation, teaching the 
soul to live its life, not to save it’.407   
But what is the contemporary relevance of this resistance to nihilism, a 
resistance that necessitates a cautious renouncement of the adherence to a given 
plan of organisation along with the nihilistic notions of which it is composed? 
As I noted in the previous chapter, in so far as the late twentieth and early 
twenty first century is commonly characterised as a new period of cultural 
history, then it has been suggested that what has accompanied or even defined 
this period is an incredulity towards, and therefore a renouncement of, not only 
Christianity as a plan of organisation, but also those forms of latent Christianity 
or shadows of God of which Hegelianism and Marxism were presented as 
characteristic examples. For example, with respect to our contemporary 
condition, Deleuze asks ‘how can belief continue after repudiation, how can we 
continue to be pious? We have repudiated and lost all our beliefs that proceeded 
by way of objective representations.’ 408  This is to say that any overarching 
account of the objective organisation of reality that variously appeals to a 
vertical and/or horizontal transcendence and, on the basis of that transcendence, 
seeks to instruct human beings how they ought to organise those lives, has 
become an object of incredulity such that the death of God has come to 
designate not only an incredulity towards Christianity as a plan of organisation 
but an incredulity towards all forms of latent Christianity. As Ansell-Pearson 
has made clear, the death of God should be understood as denoting two things: 
‘On the one hand, it names the death of the symbolic God - that is, the death of 
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the particular God of Christianity…On the other hand, it means that the God of 
theologians, philosophers and some scientists, that is, the God that serves as a 
guarantor that the universe is not devoid of structure, order and purpose, is also 
dead’. 409  Therefore, it would appear as though there is little contemporary 
relevance for the need to resist nihilism - a resistance that necessitates a 
renouncement of Christianity as a plan of organisation along with all forms of 
latent Christianity - if the idea of an objective and transcendent organisation of 
reality, what Nietzsche referred to as the idea of a ‘true world’, has become 
discredited in our age, ‘an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even 
obligating - an idea which has become useless and superfluous - consequently, a 
refuted idea.’410      
As I discussed in the previous chapter, however, perhaps a greater degree 
of circumspection is required when considering the enduring significance of 
plans of organisation within the lives of modern men and women. Although they 
may be regarded, philosophically, as an object of increasing incredulity we 
should not underestimate, as Levinas suggested, ‘the empire’ that such 
theological and pseudo-theological plans have exerted over humankind,
411
 and 
the manner in which modern men and women may continue to adhere to the 
forms of life that they propagate in order to seek the transcendent certitude, 
security and ready answers that those plans of organisation purport to provide. 
However, the contemporary relevance of the need for modern men and women 
to engage in a resistance to, and renouncement of, nihilistic plans of 
organisation should not simply be understood in terms of a resistance to those 
plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual 
inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, 
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are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. Rather, the 
contemporary relevance of the need to resist the nihilistic reaction against Life 
should also be understood in terms of a resistance to the manner in which the 
plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, and the 
nihilistic notions of which those plans are composed, are able to adopt new 
forms and enter into new configurations that continue to hinder, thwart and 
negate the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each 
moment engenders. This is to say that even if we acknowledge that the 
contemporary condition of humankind is one of increased incredulity towards 
the idea of an objective and transcendent organisation of reality, an organisation 
that provides ready answers to the problem of how life ought to be lived, along 
with a transcendental validation for our adherence to the form of life 
promulgated by that plan of organisation, Deleuze’s work suggests that new 
plans of organisation emerge that are able to persist within this climate of 
increased incredulity. The need to resist and renounce nihilistic plans of 
organisation can therefore be understood as continuing to possess its 
contemporary relevance for modern men and women precisely because new 
nihilistic plans of organisation emerge that are able to persist within a climate of 
increased incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of our 
cultural and coexistent past, new plans of organisation that continue to occlude 
and constrain the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each 
moment brings.    
In order to illustrate the manner in which Deleuze’s work can be 
understood as suggesting that new plans of organisation emerge that are able to 
persist within this climate of increased incredulity, and therefore the 
 199 
contemporary relevance of resistance, it is instructive to do so within the context 
of Deleuze’s critique of psychoanalysis, and Freudian psychoanalysis in 
particular. It is important to note, however, that the critique of psychoanalysis, 
primarily carried out in Anti-Oedipus, is detailed, complex and challenging not 
least because of the manner in which a host of unfamiliar terms - such as 
‘desiring-machines’, ‘desiring-production’ and ‘deterritorialization’ - are 
introduced and employed as though their meaning was unproblematic, while 
what we may consider to be unproblematic terms - such as ‘schizophrenia’, 
‘paranoia’ and ‘fascism’ - are employed in new and unfamiliar ways. Therefore, 
to the extent that I have done so elsewhere,
412
 I do not here intend on providing 
a detailed exposition of the critique of psychoanalysis carried out in Anti-
Oedipus, but shall instead draw upon Deleuze’s critique to illuminate this 
study’s ongoing concern with nihilism and to suggest that psychoanalysis can be 
understood as a new nihilistic plan of organisation that is able to persist within a 
climate of increased incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of 
our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity’s creationist and 
eschatological plans, and Hegelian and Marxist historicism. In order to 
understand how psychoanalysis perpetuates the nihilistic reaction against Life 
within this climate of increased incredulity, it is instructive to begin by 
considering Deleuze’s complex and enigmatic assertion that: ‘What acts in myth 
and tragedy at the level of objective elements is therefore reappropriated and 
raised to a higher level by psychoanalysis, but as an unconscious dimension of 
subjective representation’. 413  To begin to understand this assertion, and the 
manner in which it can be understood as signalling a critique of psychoanalysis 
as a new nihilistic plan of organisation, it is important to note that the objective 
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and overarching accounts of reality that are characteristic of traditional plans of 
organisation, plans of organisation that also provide an account of the 
supposedly fundamental identity of all human beings, can be understood as 
‘myths’ or ‘stories’ that possess a particular narrative structure. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the objective and subjective aspects of, for 
example, Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s dialectics 
of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism, are presented within a 
framework of redemption, a narrative or story of salvation that, with reference to 
a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence, present the current condition of 
human beings in terms of a universal condition of dispossession, but also tell of 
the journey of humankind towards redemption that is variously instigated with 
the kingdom of God, the arrival of absolute knowing or the advent of 
communism.  
As with Christianity and Hegelian and Marxist historicism, however, 
Freudian psychoanalysis also possesses, and is presented in terms of, its own 
characteristic myth. In particular, the myth that is appropriated by 
psychoanalysis is the myth of Oedipus, a myth that no longer recounts the 
creation and development of the objective organisation of reality, but is instead 
employed by psychoanalysis to formulate the central ‘complex’ that is said to 
characterise the subjective organisation of the human psyche. Indeed, in 
stressing the centrality of the Oedipus complex for the theoretical and practical 
particularities of psychoanalysis, Rand suggests that:  
  
Infantile psychosexual development and instinctual repression; fear of 
castration and the acceptance of moral precepts; the dynamic 
unconscious and the return of the repressed; the two principles of 
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mental functioning (the pleasure and reality principles); the mental 
apparatus stratified into the psychical agencies of ego, id, and superego; 
the remote origins of civilization in parricide, guilt, atonement, and the 
barrier against incest; the sublimation of sex drives in social 
interaction, art, and literature - all these theories and more coalesced 
around the distinctive and central idea of the Oedipus complex being 
the one and only formative, nuclear and universal psychosexual 
complex of humankind in health and disease.
414
             
 
In particular, the Oedipus complex, appropriated by Freud from Sophocles’ 
Oedipus Rex, is to be understood as a composite of ideas and feelings that, 
developing in the individual’s childhood, are concerned with the desire to 
possess the parent of the opposite sex and eliminate the parent of the same sex. 
As Freud makes clear, ‘in the first years of infancy, the relation known as the 
Oedipus complex becomes establised: boys concentrate their sexual wishes upon 
their mother and develop hostile impulses against their father as being a rival, 
while girls adopt an analogous attitude’.415 However, in so far as the Oedipal 
complex remains unresolved then these repressed ideas and feelings persist into 
adulthood where they manifest themselves as a varity of neuroses, including 
acute or chronic anxiety, obsessive-compulsive behaviour or depression. By 
analysing the individual’s present behaviour in terms of this Oedipal drama, the 
therapeutic aim of the psychoanalyst is therefore to assist the individual to 
recognise the ‘true meaning’ of their current condition and achieve a release, 
catharsis and resolution of the emotional tension associated with such repression. 
Indeed, in highlighting the therapeutic centrality of recognising the truth of the 
Oedipus complex, Bowlby suggests that ‘in Freud’s common ‘tragedy’, every 
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human being is in the position of a dramatic character who must recognise their 
part in a long-buried past history of which they were previously unaware’.416    
Despite seeking to present its theoretical foundations and practical 
activities in terms of a science, ‘the science of unconscious mental processes’,417 
psychoanalysis can be understood as appropriating, developing and therefore 
possessing its own characteristic myth. This is to say that although Freud sought 
to distance psychoanalysis from the myths that recount the creation and 
development of the objective organisation of reality - such as the redemptive 
narratives of Christianity, and religion more generally, and communism or 
Bolshevism in particular
418
 - psychoanalysis possesses, and is presented in terms 
of, its own characteristic myth, appropriating the myth of Oedipus to account for 
the fundamental identity of all human beings. Indeed, in highlighting the manner 
in which the Oedipus complex is to be understood in terms of the deep truth 
within us all, the universal feature of the human subject that transcends any 
particular culture or historical epoch, Freud proposed that: ‘Every new arrival on 
this planet is faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who 
fails to do so falls a victim to neurosis’.419 With the advent of psychoanalysis, 
therefore, we no longer have a myth or story that recounts the creation and 
development of the objective organisation of reality with reference to a vertical 
transcendence and/or a horizontal transcendence, but we have instead a 
universal Oedipal drama that is said to characterise the subjective organisation 
of each human being. This is to say that while psychoanalysis presents itself as a 
science in order to distance itself from myth, it continues to perpetuate a 
particular myth, the myth of Oedipus, which is appropriated and employed by 
psychoanalysis to formulate an account of the transcendent identity of all human 
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beings, an account of the trans-historical and trans-cultural organisation of every 
individual’s psyche. Indeed, it is this rejection of the redemptive myths that 
sought to characterise the objective organisation and development of reality, and 
yet a retention of myth to formulate an account of the Oedipus complex as the 
universal truth of human subjectivity that leads Deleuze to note that 
psychoanalysis gives us a ‘double impression’ such that, on the one hand, 
‘psychoanalysis is opposed to mythology no less than to mythologists, but at the 
same time extends myth and tragedy to the subjective universal’.420  
However, how can we begin to understand psychoanalysis as a new 
nihilistic plan of organisation that is able to persist within a climate of increased 
incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and 
coexistent past, such as Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, and 
Hegelian and Marxist historicism? This is to say, how can psychoanalysis be 
understood in terms of a nihilistic reaction against the third synthesis of time and, 
in particular, as a nihilistic reaction against the manner in which the third 
synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by 
an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise? In order to address 
this question, it is important to note that, as with Christianity and Hegelian and 
Marxist historicism, psychoanalysis presents an account of the fundamental 
identity of all human beings, of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and does 
so in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack. As was 
highlighted above, for psychoanalysis the individual does not come into the 
world, as it were, in a state of ‘psychological harmony’, but inherits the 
psychological difficulties associated with the Oedipus complex and the 
challenge of mastering those difficulties. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in 
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which psychoanalysis transforms the uniqueness of the tragedy that befalls 
Sophocles’ Oedipus into the universal and common condition that each 
individual inherits, Bowlby proposes that: ‘Instead of being an exceptional 
perpetrator of incest and patricide, Oedipus was now seen as a kind of everyman, 
or everybody. He was not aberrant; rather, every single human being was 
destined to live through the beginnings of a comparable story in early life, and 
had no choice in it’.421 However, in promulgating the universal truth of the 
Oedipus complex, psychoanalysis does not merely present an account of the 
deep truth within us all in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, 
privation or lack but also offers the hope of a resolution of that drama for those 
who fail to do so themselves, a resolution that is conditional upon the individual 
adhering to the ‘therapeutic prescriptions’ of psychoanalysis. This is to say that 
the nihilistic force of the Oedipus complex does not merely manifest itself in the 
theoretical realm, in the conceptualisation of the ostensible organisation of each 
individual’s psychic reality, but also becomes apparent in the practical, 
therapeutic applications that a perceived failure to resolve the Oedipus complex 
entails. Indeed, stressing both the theoretical and practical interdependence and 
pervasiveness of the employment of the Oedipus complex by psychoanalysis, 
Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Everything is made to begin with Oedipus, by 
means of explanation, with all the more certainty as one has reduced everything 
to Oedipus by means of application’.422 
We can therefore understand the manner in which psychoanalysis can be 
taken as a new nihilistic plan of organisation to the extent that it promulgates its 
own particular conception of the fundamental identity of each human being in 
terms of a condition of privation, and offers the hope of a resolution of that state 
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that is conditional on the individual adhering to the therapeutic prescriptions of 
psychoanalysis. This is to say that rather than becoming aware of the manner in 
which each moment engenders an open field of present possibilities, rather than 
striving to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise 
that each moment brings, psychoanalysis seeks to shift the individual’s concern 
to the Oedipus complex and the need for ongoing analysis to bring about its 
successful resolution. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which 
psychoanalysis reacts against the open field of present possibilities for living 
otherwise by promulgating its own account of the subjective reality of each 
individual, along with the significant period of time that a person is required to 
be ‘in analysis’, Deleuze proposes that the individual is ‘eternally 
psychoanalyzed, going from one linear proceeding to another, perhaps even 
changing analysts, growing increasingly submissive to the normalisation of a 
dominant reality’.423 Importantly, the therapeutic technique that is integral to the 
manner in which the individual becomes increasingly submissive to the 
subjective reality promulgated by psychoanalysis is interpretation, a technique 
that transforms everything that the individual does or says so that it is made to 
accord with the Oedipus complex. For example, discussing Freud’s famous 
analysis of the so-called ‘Wolf-Man’,424 and the manner in which the patient’s 
speech is continually ‘passed through the filter’, as it were, of the Oedipal drama, 
Deleuze suggests that: ‘The trap was set from the start: never will the Wolf-Man 
speak. Talk as he might about wolves, howl as he might like a wolf, Freud does 
not even listen; he glances at his dog and answers, “It’s daddy.” For as long as 
that lasts, Freud calls it neurosis; when it cracks, it’s psychosis.’425 The nihilistic 
reaction against Life carried out by psychoanalysis, the manner in which it seeks 
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to circumscribe the individual’s open field of present possibilities for living 
otherwise, is therefore not only manifest in the manner in which it professes to 
reveal the transcendent truth of each individual’s psychic reality in terms of a 
condition of privation, and does so by appropriating and developing the myth of 
Oedipus, but it is also manifest in the manner in which it makes the resolution of 
that state conditional upon the acceptance of, and adherence to, the therapeutic 
interpretations and prescriptions of psychoanalysis.  
However, as a new nihilistic plan of organisation, how is psychoanalysis 
able to persist within a climate of increased incredulity towards the plans of 
organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past? This is to say, how 
is psychoanalysis able to maintain belief in the Oedipal myth within a climate of 
increased incredulity towards the redemptive myths that characterise, for 
example, Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism? In order to understand how 
psychoanalysis is able to do so, it is important to note the manner in which 
psychoanalysis proposes that the Oedipus complex is ‘held’ by the individual. 
This is to say that while psychoanalysis can be understood as seeking to distance 
itself from the redemptive myths of Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism, 
thereby seeming to be in accordance with the contemporary climate of increased 
incredulity towards plans of organisation, it promulgates belief in its own 
particular myth by suggesting that the Oedipus complex is a feature of the 
individual’s unconscious mental processes. This is to say that in so far as the 
Oedipal drama is to be understood as a universal feature of the psychic reality of 
each human being, and which every human being must confront and seek to 
resolve, that psychic reality is not consciously acceded to and maintained by the 
individual, but is said to be unconsciously acceded to and maintained. In 
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highlighting the unconscious nature of the Oedipus complex, Goodchild makes 
it clear that ‘the child desires to be reunited sexually with its mother, but is 
prevented from realizing this unconscious phantasy (as opposed to conscious 
fantasy) by the real and forbidding presence of its father’. 426  Therefore, by 
promulgating the Oedipus complex as an unconscious belief, psychoanalysis is 
able to propagate adherence to its particular mythology within a climate of 
increasing incredulity towards the redemptive myths that are characteristic of 
previous plans of organisation, promulgating a belief in a particular myth but, as 
Deleuze suggests, ‘only in order to raise it to the condition of a denial that 
preserves belief without believing in it’.427 This is to say that in so far as the late 
twentieth and early twenty first century has been characterised as a new period 
of cultural history, a period that has supposedly been accompanied by an 
incredulity towards the mythological narratives that characterised Christianity, 
and Hegelian and Marxist historicism, psychoanalysis seeks to promulgate 
belief in its particular myth by making it an unconscious and private belief, by 
suggesting that the beliefs and feelings that make up the Oedipus complex are a 
feature of the individual’s unconscious mental processes. As Deleuze makes 
clear, in a climate of increasing incredulity towards previous nihilistic plans of 
organisation, psychoanalysis ‘fills the following function: causing beliefs to 
survive even after repudiation; causing those who no longer believe in anything 
to continue believing; reconstituting a private territory for them, a private 
Urstaat, a private capital’.428  
Even if we acknowledge, therefore, that the contemporary condition of 
Western modernity is characterised by an increased incredulity towards the 
plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, I am 
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arguing that Deleuze’s work on psychoanalysis suggests that resistance to 
nihilism continues to retain its contemporary relevance within this climate of 
increased incredulity. This is to say that the need to resist and renounce nihilism 
continues to possess its contemporary relevance for modern men and women 
precisely because psychoanalysis is a new nihilistic plan of organisation that is 
able to persist within this climate of increased incredulity towards, for example, 
Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit 
and the dialectical materialism of Marxism. While psychoanalysis no longer 
propagates an account of the objective and universal organisation of reality with 
reference to a vertical transcendence and/or a horizontal transcendence, it 
propagates an account of the universal organisation of every individual’s 
psychic reality, and does so in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, 
privation or lack. In particular, the subjective organisation of each individual’s 
psychic reality, and the universal challenge that each individual inherits, 
confronts and must seek to resolve, is to be understood in terms of the myth of 
Oedipus, a set of beliefs and feelings that are unconsciously held by the 
individual, but which the individual can gain insight into, and achieve a 
resolution of, to the extent that they accept the interpretations and prescriptions 
of psychoanalysis. Indeed, to the extent that the individual adopts, embraces and 
internalises the Oedipal interpretations and prescriptions that characterise 
psychoanalysis, in so far as the ‘analysand’ accepts that their unconscious 
psychic reality is organised in terms of the Oedipal drama, and in so far as they 
accept the psychoanalyst’s prescription of how to respond to that reality, then 
the direct guidance and judgement of the psychoanalyst can increasingly be 
dispensed with as the analysand takes such functions upon themselves. In 
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highlighting the manner in which the individual can progressively come to adopt 
the theoretical and therapeutic tenets of psychoanalysis and, by doing so, 
increasingly circumscribe their own present possibilities for living otherwise, 
Deleuze suggests that: ‘The psychoanalyst does not even have to speak anymore, 
the analysand assumes the burden of interpretation; as for the psychoanalyzed 
patient, the more he or she thinks about “his” or “her” next session, or the 
proceeding one, in segments, the better a subject he or she is.’429  
The Deleuzian notion of resistance that I am therefore formulating here, 
a notion of resistance that is formulated within the context of the three passive 
syntheses of time, is to be understood in terms of a resistance to the multiple 
manifestations of nihilism that would occlude and circumscribe each 
individual’s open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each 
moment brings. This is to say that the notion of resistance ought to be 
understood as possessing a technical, ontological and specifically temporal 
sense in so far as it entails a resistance to the enduring power of plans of 
organisation to act upon the individual’s living present, a resistance to the 
adherence and perpetuation of those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part 
of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the 
constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with 
each individual’s living present. However, to the extent that it has been 
suggested that one of the salient features of contemporary, Western modernity is 
an increasing incredulity towards those nihilistic plans of organisation that are 
part of our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity, Hegelianism and 
Marxism, then resistance ought not to be understood exclusively in terms of a 
resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of 
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the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation 
of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence and/or by appealing to a 
horizontal transcendence. Rather, I am arguing that the notion of resistance must 
also be understood in terms of both a sensitivity to, and vigilance against, the 
manner in which the nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises plans of 
organisation is able to adopt new forms and new configurations that continue to 
occlude and constrain the forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise that each moment brings. This is to say that resistance must also be 
understood in terms of a sensitivity to, and vigilance against, the emergence of 
new plans of organisation, such as psychoanalysis, that seek to perpetuate the 
nihilistic reaction against Life within a climate of increased incredulity, and do 
so by promulgating an account of the deep truth within us all, a deep truth that is 
presented in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack 
such that, by offering the hope of a resolution of this ostensible condition of 
privation, they continue to circumscribe the individual’s open field of present 
possibilities for living otherwise. 
However, it is perhaps pertinent to once again raise the question 
regarding the extent to which resistance maintains its relevance in the face of 
contemporary suggestions that the influence of the Oedipus complex, and 
psychoanalysis more generally, is increasingly becoming an object of 
incredulity.
430
 Indeed, a year after the publication of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze 
proposed that what made that work possible was the concurrent presence of ‘a 
particular mass of people (especially young people) who are fed up with 
psychoanalysis…fed up listening to themselves saying “daddy, mommy, 
Oedipus, castration, regression” and seeing themselves presented with a really 
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inane image of sexuality in general and of their own sexuality in particular.’431 
However, even if we acknowledge that there is a growing incredulity towards 
psychoanalysis, Deleuze’s work entails that the contemporary relevance of 
resistance remains in so far as the nihilistic reaction against Life adopts multiple 
manifestations, new forms and new configurations that are no longer rigidly 
associated with the universal and overarching accounts of the objective and/or 
subjective organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, 
Marxism and psychoanalysis. In particular, Deleuze’s collaborative work with 
Guattari can be understood as suggesting that nihilism also becomes manifest in 
a profusion of broad representational categories by which individual human 
beings come to be identified, a multiplicity of categories that often imply a 
condition of dispossession, privation or lack and, by doing so, continue to 
hinder, thwart and negate the forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise that each moment brings. Indeed, that contemporary, Western peoples 
increasingly come to be identified, and come to identify themselves, in relation 
to a multiplicity of representational categories can be discerned in Deleuze’s 
seemingly enigmatic suggestion that: ‘Whether we are individuals or groups, we 
are made up of lines…all kinds of clearly defined segments, in all kinds of 
directions, which cut us up in all senses, packets of segmentarized lines’.432 I 
shall discuss Deleuze’s notion of ‘segmentarized lines’ or ‘segments’ shortly, 
but what it suggests is that even if we accept that psychoanalysis is becoming an 
object of incredulity the notion of resistance retains its contemporary relevance 
in so far as the nihilistic reaction against Life increasingly manifests itself in 
more mobile, fluid configurations that are no longer associated with the 
nihilistic plans of organisation examined above, no longer bound to the 
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universal and overarching accounts of the objective and/or subjective 
organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and 
psychoanalysis. 
To illustrate the manner in which the nihilistic reaction against Life 
manifests itself in more mobile, fluid configurations that no longer appeal to a 
highly rigid and organised account of reality, the manner in which individual’s 
come to be identified, and come to identify themselves, in terms of a profusion 
of representational categories or segments, then it is necessary to introduce the 
notion of what Deleuze refers to as ‘binary machines’. In particular, it is 
important to note the relation between binary machines and segments that 
Deleuze draws when he asserts that: ‘Segments depend on binary machines 
which can be very varied if need be. Binary machines of social classes; of sexes, 
man-woman; of ages, child-adult; of races, black-white; of sectors, public-
private; of subjectivations, ours-not ours. These binary machines are all the 
more complex for cutting across each other, or colliding against each other, and 
they cut us up in all sorts of directions’. 433  This is to say that within 
contemporary, Western society, modern individual’s increasingly come to be 
identified, and come to identify themselves, in terms of a composite of broad 
binary oppositions such that an individual is, for example, either male or female, 
and then either a child or an adult, and then either black or white, heterosexual 
or homosexual, rational or irrational, healthy or sick, able-bodied or disabled, 
neurotic or psychotic. However, in order to understand the manner in which 
those binary categories hinder, thwart and even negate the present possibilities 
for living otherwise that each moment brings then it is important to note that 
such categories or segments imply a host of established values, normative 
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standards and strictures, values, standards and strictures that entail the ongoing 
actualisation of certain possibilities and the perpetuation of a specific mode of 
existence. As Deleuze makes clear with reference to the work of Foucault, the 
binary categories or segments by which individuals are identified, or come to 
identify themselves, ‘also imply devices of power, which vary greatly among 
themselves, each fixing the code and the territory of the corresponding segment. 
These are the devices which have been analysed so profoundly by Foucault’.434 
To the extent that I have discussed Foucault’s analyses of ‘devices of power’ 
elsewhere (with reference to ‘power-knowledge’, ‘panopticism’ and psychiatry 
in particular),
435
 I do not intend on providing a detailed exposition of them here. 
Rather, I want to suggest that in proposing that segments imply devices of 
power, Deleuze is suggesting that a given segment marks out a certain territory, 
such that the categories by which an individual is identified entail, variously, 
that they are expected or entitled to do or say certain things, and to refrain or be 
prohibited from doing or saying other things.
436
  
However, in order to understand the manner in which the segments by 
which an individual is identified seek to validate the circumscription of that 
individual’s open field of present possibilities, it is important to note that the 
categories that constitute the variety of binary oppositions by which an 
individual is segmented do not possess an equivalent value. This is to say - in 
accordance with critiques of such binary oppositions presented by, for example, 
Jacques Derrida or Donna Haraway
437
 - one term of any given binary opposition 
has precedence over the other, and this precedence constitutes a dominant, 
evaluative standard or ‘molar’, ‘majoritarian model’ which Deleuze simply 
refers to as ‘man’; for example, he suggests that ‘man constitutes the majority, 
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or rather the standard upon which the majority is based: white, male, adult, 
“rational,” etc., in short, the average European’.438 In referring to ‘man’ as the 
majority it is important to stress that majority should not be understood in 
quantitative terms, but rather in qualitative terms as that which is considered as 
qualitatively superior, as the standard against which all else is judged. As 
Deleuze makes clear: ‘It is obvious that “man” holds the majority, even if he is 
less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, 
etc.’439 Therefore, as the dominant, evaluative standard, ‘man’ (understand as a 
composite of segments such as white, male, adult and rational) is to be 
understood as the ‘central point’ which ‘at every turn nourishes a certain 
distinctive opposition…male-(female), adult-(child), white-(black, yellow, or 
red); rational-(animal)’.440 Importantly, however, the latter term in such binary 
oppositions is not only defined as inferior, as an ‘outsystem’ or, regardless of 
number, as ‘minor’, as ‘minoritarian’, but is also characterised in terms of 
dispossession, privation or lack to the extent that it is defined as that which lacks 
what the major term possesses; as Deleuze proposes, ‘he [man] appears twice, 
once in the constant and again in the variable from which the constant is 
extracted’.441 For example, it has been suggested the segment ‘female’ or ‘the 
feminine’ has been defined in relation to the segment ‘male’ or ‘the masculine’ 
and, in particular, it has been formulated in negative terms as that which is not 
male, as that which lacks or is deprived of the characteristics of the male sex; 
indeed, in highlighting the manner in which the feminine is defined in terms of 
lack in relation to its ostensibly superior binary opposite, Luce Irigaray has 
asserted that: ‘The ‘feminine’ is always described in terms of a deficiency or 
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atrophy, as the other side of the sex that alone holds the monopoly on value: the 
male sex’.442    
The segments by which individuals come to be identified, and come to 
identify themselves, however, should not be understood in terms of static binary 
oppositions. Rather, Deleuze’s work suggests that contemporary, Western 
society is increasingly characterised by dynamic processes of segmentation 
which are increasingly adaptive, such that new categories can rapidly be 
constructed in order to identify an individual, and by which they can come to 
identify themselves, categories that rapidly develop their own normative 
standards, strictures and devices of power that circumscribe the individual’s 
present possibilities for living otherwise. As Deleuze proposes, ‘it is a 
particularity of modern societies, or rather State societies, to bring into their own 
duality machines that no longer function as such, and proceed simultaneously by 
biunivocal relationships and successively by binarized choices’.443 This is to say 
that even if an individual appears to elude a given binary opposition, even if that 
individual cannot, at present, be made to fit into either category of a 
dichotomous choice then, beginning with that binary opposition, successive 
categories can be constructed that imply devices of power, normative standards 
and strictures. So, for example, Deleuze suggests that:  
 
[I]f you are neither a nor b, then you are c: dualism has shifted, and no 
longer relates to simultaneous elements to choose between, but 
successive choices; if you are neither black nor white, you are a half-
breed; if you are neither man nor woman, you are a transvestite: each 
time the machine with binary elements will produce binary choices 
between elements that are not present at the first cutting-up.
444
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I am therefore arguing that resistance to nihilism continues to retain its 
contemporary relevance in so far as the nihilistic reaction against Life manifests 
itself in increasingly mobile, fluid configurations, in a profusion of broad 
representational categories or segments that are no longer bound to the universal 
accounts of the objective and/or subjective organisation of reality that 
characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis. However, 
as with those nihilistic plans of organisation, the identity of the individual is 
commonly characterised in terms of dispossession, privation or lack, such that 
the segments by which the individual is identified imply an ostensible condition 
of inferiority, a condition of inferiority that is defined in relation to ‘man’ where 
‘man’ is characterised as a standard of fulfilment and superiority. 445  It is 
precisely on the basis of the ostensible inferiority of the increasingly mobile, 
fluid segments by which an individual is identified that the devices of power, 
normative standards and strictures obtain their validation, devices of power, 
normative standards and strictures that continue to hinder, thwart and negate the 
individual’s exploration of the forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise.
446
 
In so far as I have suggested that the notion of resistance is to be 
understood within the context of the three syntheses of time, however, I want to 
conclude this chapter by clarifying the relation of resistance to the continued 
contraction and coexistence of the past with the present that is constituted by the 
dynamic, constituting activity of the first and second synthesis of time. As I 
have suggested, the notion of resistance is to be understood as a resistance to 
those plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each 
individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and 
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Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present, along 
with a resistance to new nihilistic plans of organisation and increasingly mobile 
representational categories or segments by which people come to be identified, 
and come to identify themselves. However, Deleuze’s work entails that this 
resistance to these various manifestations of nihilism which, by virtue of the 
constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contemporaneous with each 
individual’s living present, ought not to be understood as being synonymous 
with a broad, indiscriminate rejection of the contracted and coexistent past, a 
broad and indiscriminate negation of Habit and Memory. As I suggested 
previously, the continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the 
present that is constituted by Habit and Memory can be understood as being 
profoundly productive in so far as it engenders a multiplicity of assumptions, 
judgments and expectations that what held in the past will continue to hold in 
the future, a plurality of unconscious expectations that enable us to carry out the 
full range of our everyday activities without conscious and therefore continued 
reflection. More than this, however, I want to suggest that the contracted and 
coexistent past that is constituted by the first and second synthesis of time can 
also be understood in terms of a vast cultural and coexistent resource that can be 
actively employed by the individual to challenge that which circumscribes their 
present possibilities for living otherwise, a vast cultural and coexistent past that, 
more than just containing nihilistic plans of organisation, also contains resources 
that can be employed by the individual to facilitate the exploration of the forever 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. 
In order to illustrate the manner in which the contracted and coexistent 
past that is constituted by Habit and Memory, more than just ‘containing’ 
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nihilistic plans of organisation, is also to be understood as containing resources 
that can be employed by the individual to facilitate the exploration of the present 
possibilities for living otherwise, then it is productive to consider Deleuze’s 
brief comments on the resemblance between the French revolutionaries of 1789 
and the Roman Republic, comments which echo those made by Marx in The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
447
 In particular, Deleuze suggests that 
it ought not to be considered the case that it is exclusively the reflections of 
historians which determine a resemblance between the revolutionaries of 1789 
and the Roman Republic, it ought not to be thought that the resemblance 
between the two was established from a historical perspective many years after 
the French revolution; rather, ‘it is in the first place for themselves that the 
revolutionaries are determined to lead their lives as ‘resuscitated Romans’, 
before becoming capable of the act which they have begun by repeating in the 
mode of a proper past, therefore under conditions such that they necessarily 
identify with a figure from the historical past’.448 This is to say that in order to 
inspire their own present activities, in order to resist the ongoing circumscription 
of their present possibilities for living otherwise, the French revolutionaries 
adopted the names, slogans and language of the past, and of the Roman 
Republic in particular. However, this identification with the past was not some 
form of ritual masquerade, an attempt to somehow repeat or faithfully reproduce 
past events in the present, and neither was it to be understood as an attempt to 
take flight from the reality of the struggles, difficulties and concerns that the 
present posed for the revolutionaries. Rather, their identification with the past, 
and with the names, slogans and language of the Roman Republic in particular, 
was an attempt to productively and creatively employ the vast cultural past for 
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their present purposes, an exploration and subsequent employment of the 
contracted and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory in order 
to assess what new perspectives the past could bring to bear on the 
revolutionaries’ present concerns, and how the past could assist in the 
exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. Indeed, it is in this 
sense that we can understand Marx’s suggestion that the particular employment 
of the past that was conducted by the French revolutionaries ‘served the purpose 
of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the 
given tasks in imagination, not of taking flight from their solution in reality, of 
finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk 
again’.449  
Deleuze’s comments on the manner in which the French revolutionaries 
employed the past to inspire their own present struggles can therefore be 
understood as indicating how modern men and women, albeit in more modest 
terms, may productively employ the vast cultural and coexist past as a resource 
that facilitates the exploration of their forever renewed present possibilities for 
living otherwise. This is to say that resistance to the manner in which the 
individual’s present possibilities are occluded and constrained is not simply to 
be understood in terms of a resistance to those plans of organisation that are part 
of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the 
constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with 
each individual’s living present. Of course, to respond to the adherence to, and 
the perpetuation of, Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and the 
increasingly mobile representational categories by which people come to be 
identified with a decisive ‘no’ is an important feature of the notion of resistance 
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that has been formulated here, but to simply say no is, as Foucault made clear, 
‘the minimum form of resistance’. 450  This is to say that in order for the 
individual to become aware of and to explore the forever renewed present 
possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings then it will be 
necessary for the individual to say no, to renounce the adherence to, and the 
perpetuation of, the objective and subjective aspects of ‘traditional’ plans of 
organisation, as well as saying no to the manner in which both psychoanalysis 
and the profusion of segments that circulate throughout contemporary society 
seek to account for the individual’s identity and circumscribe their present 
possibilities on the basis of that identity. Beyond this minimum form, however, I 
am suggesting that resistance to the nihilistic reaction against Life also entails 
that the individual employs the vast cultural and coexistent past as a resource, 
and does so in order to animate and inspire their present concerns, an 
exploration, discovery and creative employment of the strategies, techniques and 
practices that individuals and groups have employed in the past as they 
attempted to explore their present possibilities for living otherwise. As Grosz 
has suggested: ‘The resources of the previously oppressed - of women under 
patriarchy, of slaves under slavery, of minorities under racism, colonialism, or 
nationalism, of workers under capitalism, and so on - are not lost or wiped 
out…they are preserved somewhere, in the past itself, with effects and traces 
that can be animated in a number of different contexts and terms in the 
present’.451         
To illustrate how the notion of resistance that is being formulated here 
necessitates more that saying no, indeed to illustrate the limited nature of a form 
of resistance that is exclusively characterised by refusal, then it is productive to 
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do so in relation to the form of resistance that Deleuze discerns in Herman 
Melville’s short story Bartleby. At the beginning of Melville’s story, the 
narrator, an elderly lawyer who ‘in the tranquillity of a snug retreat’ is said to do 
‘a snug business among rich men’s bonds, and mortgages, and title deeds,’ is 
given the title of a Master of Chancery.
452
 As a result of the increased work that 
this entails, and in addition to his two existing clerks, ‘Turkey’ and ‘Nipper’, the 
lawyer advertises for a scrivener or copyist and appointments Bartleby, a 
‘motionless young man’, to the position.453 Although Bartleby initially carries 
out an extraordinary quantity of copying, ‘as if famishing for something to 
copy…copying by sunlight and candlelight,’454 three days after being appointed 
to the position of scrivener, and in response to a request to assist in checking the 
accuracy of one of his own copies, Bartleby replies, in a singularly mild and yet 
firm voice, that: “I would prefer not to”.455 Throughout the course of the story, 
Bartleby continues to assert his preference not to do various tasks assigned to 
him, to continue to engage in what the lawyer refers to as ‘a passive resistance’, 
so that even if asked to go on the most trivial errand of any sort ‘it was generally 
understood that he would “prefer not to” - in other words, that he would refuse 
point blank’.456 For Deleuze, a central aspect of the significance of Bartleby’s 
repeated response, the significance of the particular linguistic formula by which 
he asserts his resistance towards that which is asked of him (i.e. “I would prefer 
not to”), is that it challenges a variety of linguistic conventions and 
presuppositions, such as the presupposition that when asked by an employer to 
carry out what is determined as a ‘reasonable’ task, then an employee will agree 
to do it. As Deleuze makes clear, all of the lawyer’s continued attempts to 
ensure his requests are acceded to by Bartleby are frustrated ‘because they rest 
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on a logic of presuppositions according to which an employer “expects” to be 
obeyed, or a kind friend listened to, whereas Bartleby has invented a new logic, 
a logic of preference, which is enough to undermine the presuppositions of 
language as a whole’.457  
Despite challenging such presuppositions, however, the limited nature of 
Bartleby’s passive resistance, a form of resistance that is exclusively 
characterised by refusal, is vividly illustrated by Melville in recounting the 
events that befall Bartleby. In particular, and in response to his preference not to 
leave the lawyer’s office after being dismissed as a scrivener, and in response to 
his preference not to leave the building after being carried out of the office, 
Bartleby is taken to the Halls of Justice where, stating his preference not to 
accept the dinners offered to him, Melville presents us with a final image of the 
increasingly emaciated Bartleby facing the yard wall who, despite having his 
eyes open, has fallen into a profound, motionless and silent sleep that will end in 
his eventual demise.
458
 In highlighting the limited nature of a form of resistance 
that is exclusively concerned with asserting no, Deleuze suggests that Bartleby 
belongs to that group of Melville’s characters who are ‘creatures of innocence 
and purity, stricken with a constitutive weakness but also with a strange beauty. 
Petrified by nature they prefer…no will at all, a nothingness of the will rather 
than a will to nothingness (hypochondriacal “negativism”)’.459 This is to say that 
Bartleby’s ongoing refusal is not a form of resistance that arises in the service of 
the will to pursue some other aim, it is not a form of resistance that emerges as a 
consequence of the affirmation of some deeper objective, but is instead a form 
of resistance that is riven with negation, an ongoing refusal that expresses a 
profound passivity and nothingness of the will. Indeed, the linguistic 
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formulation that Deleuze employs to describe Bartleby’s continued resistance 
(i.e. ‘a nothingness of the will’), appears in Deleuze’s earlier work to describe 
what he refers to as a condition of ‘passive nihilism’, a condition in which one 
no longer reacts, refuses and resists the promulgation of higher or transcendent 
values in the service of some other aim or value, but is rather a condition of 
profound passivity in which one concludes that: ‘It is better to have no values at 
all than higher values, it is better to have no will at all, better to have a 
nothingness of the will than a will to nothingness. It is better to fade away 
passively’.460 Against this profound passivity, however, the notion of resistance 
to nihilism that I am formulating here is to be understood as a form of active 
resistance that says no in the service of opening up the individual’s field of 
present possibilities, a form of resistance that responds with a decisive no to the 
adherence to, and perpetuation of, Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism, 
psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile representational categories by which 
people come to be identified in order to become aware of and to actively explore 
the individual’s present possibilities for living otherwise.   
As I have suggested, this active resistance to nihilism entails that the 
individual employs the vast cultural and coexistent past that is constituted by 
Habit and Memory as a resource, and does so in order to animate and inspire 
their present concerns, an exploration, discovery and creative employment of the 
strategies, techniques and practices that individuals and groups have employed 
in the past as they attempted to explore their present possibilities for living 
otherwise. However, Deleuze’s work also suggests that this employment of the 
past is not simply concerned with employing the vast cultural and coexistent 
past as a resource, but is also concerned with the manner in which the 
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individual’s own specific coexistent past can be employed to facilitate the 
exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. Importantly, this 
exploration and creative employment of the individual’s own specific past does 
not seek to ignore or deny those often contingent events that have befallen the 
individual and that, on the face of it, seem to restrict the individual’s 
possibilities for living otherwise, such as an event of suffering, illness or injury. 
This is to say that the employment of the contracted and coexistent past is not to 
be understood as simply being concerned with that which would appear to 
facilitate the individual’s exploration of their present possibilities for living 
otherwise, but is also to be understood in terms of a readiness to employ those 
past events that, as a consequence of the dynamic activity of Habit and Memory, 
continue to act upon the present and, to a greater or lesser extent, may be 
perceived as that which obstructs, diverts or prevents the individual from 
exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise. In doing so, I want to 
argue that the notion of resistance entails that the individual displays a readiness 
and a will to employ and creatively transform those seemingly negative and 
restrictive past events so that even they facilitate the individual’s exploration of 
the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise. To illustrate how 
Deleuze’s work entails a notion of resistance that not only calls for the 
employment of those seemingly positive past strategies, techniques and 
practices, but also calls for the employment of those seemingly restrictive and 
contingent events that befall the individual, it is instructive to situate this notion 
of resistance within Deleuze’s notion of ‘the event’ and, in particular, within the 
context of his imperative to ‘will the event’, to will ‘that which occurs insofar as 
it does occur’.461  
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Within the context of a notion of resistance that entails the employment 
of those events which seem to restrict the individual’s present possibilities, the 
imperative to will the event, to will that which occurs insofar as it does occur, 
can provisionally be taken to mean that given, for example, a past event of 
suffering, illness or injury that continues to obstruct, divert or prevent the 
individual from exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise, then 
the imperative to will the event entails, in its simplest terms, that the individual 
ought to accept, rather than reject, that which has occurred. In particular, the 
notion of resistance that I am formulating here suggests that the individual ought 
to resist the tendency to react to a seemingly negative and restrictive past event, 
an event that continues to act upon and restrict the individual’s present 
possibilities for living otherwise, by considering that event as unjust, unfair or 
unwarranted. Indeed, Deleuze suggests that: ‘To grasp whatever happens as 
unjust and unwarranted (it is always someone else’s fault) is, on the contrary, 
what renders our sores repugnant - veritable ressentiment, resentment of the 
event. There is no other ill will’. 462  It is important to note, however, that 
although Deleuze presents the imperative to will the event within the context of 
Stoic ethics,
463
 and although I have suggested that willing the event involves an 
acceptance of that which occurs, rather than the resentful rejection of that which 
occurs, it would be a mistake to understand the imperative to will the event, as 
Stoicism is commonly characterised, in terms of a passive, resigned acceptance 
of that which occurs. As Williams has suggested, ‘to will the event could never 
simply be to accept a state of affairs…Resignation is therefore a form of 
replaying and indeed one that may be a poor way of responding to a given 
event’.464 This is to say that the imperative to will the event, where this is 
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understood as an acceptance of that which occurs, rather than the resentful 
rejection of that which has occurred, ought not to be understood in terms of 
Marcus Aurelius’s famous imperative to ‘withdraw into yourself’,465 if this is 
understood in terms of a resigned indifference to external events, or what Hegel 
characterised as the attempt ‘to maintain that lifeless indifference which 
steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence’.466  
Indeed, rather than a resentful rejection or resigned indifference to that 
which has occurred, such as an event of suffering, illness or injury, the 
imperative to will the event entails that the individual accepts that which occurs 
in order to then creatively engage with that which has occurred. As Williams 
puts it: ‘The challenge is always to conduct the intensity of these events and 
their significance, while resisting their necessary inner compulsion to confirm 
injuries, ideas and values as final and inevitable’.467 This is to say that the notion 
of resistance that is being presented here, a notion of resistance that is to be 
understood in terms of the imperative to will the event, entails that when a 
seemingly restrictive event befalls the individual, an event that seems to obstruct, 
divert or prevent the individual from exploring their present possibilities for 
living otherwise, then the challenge that the individual confronts is to resist the 
tendency to reject that event by considering it as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, 
resisting the inner and habitual compulsion to conclude that the seemingly 
restrictive event that has befallen the individual necessarily circumscribes their 
open field of present possibilities. Instead, I am arguing that Deleuze’s work 
challenges the individual to will the event where this is to be understood not 
only in terms of a non-resentful acceptance of that which occurs, but must also 
be understood in terms of an active engagement with, and creative 
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transformation of, that which occurs, such that the individual wills something in, 
or extracts something from, that which occurs which will facilitate the 
exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. As Deleuze 
proposes, in willing the event the individual is to will ‘not exactly what occurs, 
but something in that which occurs, something yet to come which would be 
consistent with what occurs’.468  This is to say that in willing the event the 
individual resists a resentful rejection of, or a resigned indifference to, the 
occurrence of, for example, an event of suffering, illness or injury, and is instead 
challenged to consider how that event can be employed to facilitate new present 
possibilities for living otherwise, to consider what new and enabling 
perspectives, values and ideas that event can afford the individual such that they 
are able to draw something significant from what, on the face of it, would 
appear to obstruct, divert or restrict the individual’s present possibilities.  
The figure that Deleuze makes reference to across his works when 
discussing what it might mean, in practical terms, to will the event, what it 
might practically mean to creatively transform a seemingly restrictive event 
such that it facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities for living 
otherwise, is Joë Bousquet.
469
 Fighting near the Aisne battlelines in Vailly at the 
end of the First World War, Bousquet suffered a bullet wound that severed his 
spinal cord and left him paralysed and larely bedridden for the rest of his life. 
Within the context of the notion of resistance and the imperative to will the 
event that is being presented here, Bousquet can be understood as suffering an 
event that, by common assessments and evaluations, radically circumscribed the 
possibilities for living that were available to him. However, what is siginificant 
for an understanding of Deleuze’s imperative to will the event, and what it 
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might practically mean to creatively transform a seemingly restrictive event into 
one that facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities for living 
otherwise, is Bousquet’s reaction to this seemingly disastorous event, his 
reaction to a wounding and paralysis that seemed to irremediably hinder, thwart 
and negate his present possibilities for the remainder of his life. In particular, 
and in response to that which had befallen him, ‘Bousquet neither tries to deny 
his wound, nor blame it, nor ignore it. Instead he treats it as a fact or an event 
calling for a reinvention which will run parallel to the event and alter its 
sense’.470 This is to say that rather than a resentful rejection of, or resigned 
indifference to, that which had occurred, and rather than considering that event 
of wounding and paralysis as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, Bousquet responds 
to the seemingly restrictive event that had befallen him by actively engaging 
with, and creatively transforming, that which had occurred, extracting 
something enabling from the event of wounding and paralysis. In particular, the 
event of wounding and paralysis became for Bousquet the starting point for an 
extensive body of poetry and writing in which he returned to that which had 
occurred in artistic, and specifically surreal ways that enabled him to employ the 
seemingly disastorous event of wounding and paralysis in order to facilitate the 
exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise. As Williams 
suggests, Bousquet’s event of wounding and paralysis ‘becomes an artistic event 
as well as a physical one and the life as an artist of acute sensibility and great 
passion rises out of, or hovers with, the curtailed life spent bedridden in deep 
pain’.471 
Understood within the context of the imperative to will the event, 
therefore, Bousquet’s response to the event of wounding and paralysis illustrates 
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the manner in which the employment of the past is not simply concerned with 
that which would appear to facilitate the individual’s exploration of their present 
possibilities, but is also to be understood in terms of a readiness to employ those 
past events that, as a consequence of the dynamic activity of Habit and Memory, 
continue to coexist with the present and, to a greater or lesser extent, may be 
perceived as that which obstructs, diverts or prevents the individual from 
exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise. In particular, it 
illustrates the manner in which the individual is to strive to resist the tendency to 
react to a seemingly restrictive event with resentment or resigned indifference, 
and instead seeks to engage with, and creatively transform, such events so that 
they facilitate the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise. 
Indeed, it is in this sense that we can understand Deleuze’s seemingly enigmatic 
summation of the importance of willing the event in which he suggests that: 
‘Nothing more can be said, and no more has ever been said: to become worthy 
of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the 
offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, 
and to break with one’s carnal birth’. 472  This is to say that rather than 
considering an event of suffering, illness or injury as unjust, unfair or 
unwarranted, the individual is challenged ‘to become worthy’ of what has 
happened to them by transforming such an event into that which facilitates the 
exploration of new present possibilities. As Bogue notes: ‘To be worthy of what 
happens is to…thereby avoid ressentiment and affirm the past events that have 
shaped one’s present’.473 In order to effect such a transformation, however, the 
individual may need to determine what attitudes, values and associations they 
must dispense with, what beliefs, feelings and relationships they may need to 
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retain, and what perspectives, skills and systems of support they may need to 
acquire, a thoroughgoing transformation that may entail a transformation of the 
individual’s current identity. Indeed, it is in this sense, that we can understand 
Deleuze’s somewhat enigmatic repetition of Bousquet’s assertion that: ‘My 
wound existed before me; I was born to embody it’.474 This is to say that the 
transformation of a wound, the transformation of an event of suffering, illness or 
injury, into that which facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities for 
living otherwise, may also necessitate the transformation of the individual’s 
conception of themselves such that a new self-identity, a new ‘I’, is born as a 
consequence of the event without which the individual would never have 
become who or what they currently are.  
This transformation of the individual’s identity in response to the 
occurrence of an event of suffering, illness or injury ought not to be understood 
as entailing that the individual has finally discovered some deep truth within, 
that they have disclosed who or what their essential identity is. Rather, it 
suggests that the individual has had to engage in a process of personal 
transfiguration in order to transform a seemingly restrictive event into one that 
facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities, a transformation that may 
have necessitated a reassessment of their established values and beliefs, a 
disposal of their previous perspectives and attachments, and the development of 
new goals and more enabling relationships. This is to say that the transformation 
of the individual’s identity in response to a seemingly restrictive event is to be 
understood as a strategic manoeuvre, as that which may be necessary in order to 
transform an event which appears to obstruct, divert or restrict the individual’s 
present possibilities into a significant and meaningful ‘life-event’ that opens up 
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new present possibilities for living otherwise. In addition to being a strategic 
manoeuvre, however, the transformation of the individual’s identity in response 
to a seemingly restrictive event is also to be understood as a provisional 
manoeuvre. This is say that although the individual may have already 
transformed their identity in response to a previous event of suffering, illness or 
injury, with the arrival of a new event of suffering, illness or injury it may again 
be necessary for the individual to engage in a process of personal transfiguration 
in order to transform the new and seemingly restrictive event, to once again 
assess their established values and beliefs, dispose of previous perspectives and 
attachments, and develop new goals and more enabling relationships. Therefore, 
as an ongoing, episodic and creative process, the imperative to will the event 
does not seek to somehow provide a single, overarching response to all the 
seemingly restrictive and often contingent events that may befall the individual. 
Rather, the imperative to will the event entails the recognition that every event 
of suffering, illness or injury that befalls the individual, challenges that 
individual to will something in, or extract something from, that which has 
occurred which will facilitate the exploration of new present possibilities for 
living otherwise, and thereby express what Viktor Frankl suggested was ‘the 
uniquely human potential at its best, which is to transform a personal tragedy 
into a triumph, to turn one’s predicament into a human achievement’.475        
Indeed, in Man’s Search for Meaning, Frankl draws upon his three year 
struggle for survival in Auschwitz, Dachau and other Nazi concentration camps 
in order to explore this ‘uniquely human potential’. In particular, he notes the 
manner in which many prisoners sought solace from the event of incarceration 
and their degraded, present existence by longing for a time prior to their pain, 
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suffering and distress, by succumbing to ‘the tendency to look into the past, to 
help make the present, with all its horrors, less real’.476 By responding to their 
present condition in this way, however, Frankl not only suggested that the 
prisoners sought to make their present existence, and the horrors that 
characterised it, increasingly unreal, but also proposed that their strategy for 
survival denied the present the possibility of acquiring worth or meaning; in 
particular, he noted that: ‘Instead of taking the camp’s difficulties as a test of 
their inner strength, they did not take their life seriously and despised it as 
something of no consequence. They preferred to close their eyes and to live in 
the past. Life for such people became meaningless.’477 Understood within the 
context of the notion of resistance formulated here, a notion of resistance 
formulated within the context of the three passive syntheses of time, Frankl’s 
comments with respect to the attempt to retreat from the present into the past 
can be understood in terms of a resistance to the allure of the continued co-
existence and perpetuation of the past with the present that is characteristic of 
the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, of the first synthesis of time 
and the second synthesis of time. As I discussed earlier in relation to the work of 
Beckett, Habit and Memory can be understood as agents of security in so far as 
the continued coexistence of the past with the present, and the expectations of 
the future that this contracted and coexistent past creates, strive to maintain 
stability and security in the face of the unfamiliar and the unknown by bringing 
the present moment under the power of past judgments, established concepts 
and historical assumptions. However, Habit and Memory can also be understood 
as agents of security to the extent that the contracted and co-existent past may 
provide a haven from the present, a haven wherein the individual is able to 
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retreat from the pain, suffering and distress of the present into the stability and 
security of former, ‘better’ times.   
Confronted by their present and enduring horrors, Frankl respected the 
manner in which many prisoners sought refuge in the past, acknowledging his 
own attempts to make the present less real by doing so,
478
 although he stresses 
that such a strategy of survival possessed a certain danger. In particular, he 
suggested that it ‘robbed’ the present of ‘its reality’ to the extent that it obscured 
the possibilities that the present contained, that it led many ‘to overlook the 
opportunities to make something positive of camp life, opportunities which 
really did exist. Regarding our ‘provisional existence’ as unreal was in itself an 
important factor in causing the prisoners to lose their hold on life; everything in 
a way became pointless.’479 Frankl’s work can therefore enable us to understood 
a retreat into the past as a refusal of the constituting dynamism of the formless 
foundation of the passive syntheses of time, a refusal of the manner in which the 
third synthesis of time ensures that the living present is characterised by a 
forever renewed present moment, distinguishable from both the past and the 
future, and which thereby provides each individual with forever renewed present 
possibilities. Indeed, rather than retreating from the pain, suffering and distress 
that his incarceration in the concentration camps engendered, Frankl sought to 
survive, and noted the manner in which others sought to survive, by adopting a 
stance towards incarceration that can be understood in terms of the imperative to 
will the event that has been presented here. This is to say that in seeking to 
continually resist a resentful rejection or resigned indifference to the event of 
incarceration, Frankl sought to discern the opportunities for growth and 
development that the event provided, to consider what new and enabling 
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perspectives, values and ideas could be drawn from an event that seemingly 
destroyed his present possibilities. Even in a situation that appeared hopeless, he 
stressed the need to resist ‘closing one’s eyes’ and ‘living in the past’ and 
instead highlighted the manner in which each present moment - not only in spite 
of, but precisely because of, the enduring existence of pain, suffering and 
distress - provided an opportunity and a challenge, an opportunity and challenge 
‘to grow beyond oneself’, even if this meant learning how to continue living 
when suffering appears to be one’s unalterable fate.480  
Although Frankl’s response to the event of incarceration in the Nazi’s 
concentration camps, and Bousquet’s response to the event of wounding and 
paralysis in the First World War, are extraordinary examples of what it might 
mean, in practical terms, to will the event, they are nevertheless illustrative of 
the manner in which it is possible to actively engage with and creatively 
transform even the most horrific, disastrous and seemingly hopeless of events so 
that even they facilitate the exploration of new present possibilities for living 
otherwise. Therefore, understood as that which orientates the individual to the 
forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise in response to the most 
horrific and disastrous of events, understood as that which challenges the 
individual to actively engage with, and creatively transform, an event that seems 
to obstruct, divert or negate the individual’s exploration of their present 
possibilities for living otherwise, the imperative to will the event is to be 
understood as profoundly life-affirming, necessitating that the individual strives 
to become what Nietzsche referred to as a ‘Yes-sayer’.481 This is to say that the 
notion of resistance formulated here, a notion of resistance formulated within 
the context of the passive synthesis of time and the imperative to will the event, 
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necessitates that the individual responds to those plans of organisation that are 
part of the vast coexistent and cultural past with a decisive ‘no’, resisting the 
adherence to, and the perpetuation of Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism, 
along with psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile segments by which 
people come to be identified. However, I am arguing that the notion of 
resistance also necessitates that the individual says ‘yes’, and not only says yes 
to those strategies, techniques and practices in the cultural and coexistent past 
that can facilitate the exploration of the individual’s present possibilities, but 
also says yes to those often contingent events that befall the individual in the 
course of their life and that engender pain, suffering and distress. This is to say 
that the individual responds with a decisive yes to those events that would seem 
to restrict their present possibilities, and in saying yes affirms those events 
precisely as opportunities for exploring new present possibilities for living 
otherwise, an affirmation and even ‘love’ of those events (comparable to what 
Nietzsche termed amor fati or ‘love of fate’)482 that strives to accept and even 
embrace an event of suffering, illness or injury as an opportunity to explore new 
present possibilities for living otherwise, as ‘an energetic stimulus for life, for 
living more’.483  
Understood as that which challenges the individual to say yes to an event 
that seems to obstruct, divert or negate their present possibilities, to yes and 
affirm an event of suffering, illness or injury as an opportunity to explore new 
present possibilities for living otherwise, the imperative to will the event can be 
understood as radically transfiguring the relation between illness and health 
where those two notions are posited in diametric opposition. In order to clarify 
this, it is productive to consider Deleuze’s brief comments on illness in 
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Nietzsche and Philosophy where he suggests that illness is to be understood as a 
restrictive and reactive force that circumscribes my present possibilities, a force 
that ‘separates me from what I can do…it narrows my possibilities and 
condemns me to a diminished milieu to which I can do no more than adapt 
myself’.484 However, while the event of illness can be understood as that which 
appears to obstruct, divert or restrict the individual’s present possibilities, 
Deleuze also suggests that illness ‘reveals to me a new capacity, it endows me 
with a new will that I can make my own, going to the limit of a strange 
power’.485 This is to say that the event of illness can also be understood as that 
which provides the individual with the opportunity to shift their perspective such 
that, from the position of illness, suffering and injury, they are able to consider, 
explore and move towards, as it were, a more ‘vital’ concept of health, a concept 
of health that is able to affirm and incorporate the event of illness, suffering and 
injury precisely as valuable conditions for the creation of new present 
possibilities for living otherwise. Indeed, in discussing Nietzsche’s self-
proclaimed ability to achieve such a profound and vital form of health and, 
conversely, his loss of this health, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Nietzsche does 
not lose his health when he is sick, but when he can no longer affirm the 
distance, when he is no longer able, by means of his health, to establish sickness 
as a point of view on health’.486 This is to say that Nietzsche’s health, and the 
concept of health that the imperative to will the event can be understood as 
indicating, is not defined by the absence of illness, but is dependent upon the 
confidence and the capacity to be able, when an event of illness, suffering or 
injury befalls the individual, to resist the tendency to consider that event as 
unjust, unfair or unwarranted, and instead consider what new and enabling 
 237 
perspectives, values and ideas that event can afford the individual such that the 
seemingly restrictive event of illness, suffering or injury can be employed to 
facilitate new present possibilities for living otherwise.  
Such a profound form of health, what we might refer to, following 
Nietzsche, as ‘the great health,’487 can be understood as being instantiated in 
Seneca’s image of the wrestler or athlete whose strength is tested and improved 
by the antagonists that he confronts and the adversity and pain that they bring, a 
strength or great health that is not only able to endure antagonists, adversity and 
pain, but is able to value and embrace them as a necessary element of that 
strength or health.
488
 Indeed, for Seneca, the individual’s strength or health is 
not only tested and developed by antagonists, adversity and pain, but would 
diminish without the ongoing threat and presence of those antagonists; as he 
makes clear: ‘Without an antagonist prowess fades away. Its true proportions 
and capacities come to light only when action proves its endurance’.489 It is in 
this sense that we can understand Georges Ganguilhem’s more recent suggestion 
that rather than health being defined in terms of the absence of disease, the 
absence of disease is, paradoxically, said to be the affliction or the ‘disease’ of 
‘the normal man’; as he proposes: ‘By disease of the normal man we must 
understand the disturbance which arises in the course of time from the 
permanence of the normal state, from the incorruptible uniformity of the normal, 
the disease which arises from the deprivation of diseases, from an existence 
almost incompatible with disease.’ 490  In contrast, and in accordance with 
Seneca’s image of the wrestler who embraces adversity in order to test and to 
strengthen his prowess, Canguilhem proposes that the presence of disease - or at 
least the threat, the ‘projected shadow’ of disease - is necessary for the 
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individual to possess an enduring confidence in their health,
491
 such that the 
healthy man ‘does not flee before the problems posed by sometimes sudden 
disruptions of his habits, even physiologically speaking; he measures his health 
in terms of his capacity to overcome organic crises in order to establish a new 
order’.492 This is to say that the threat or the presence of disease, the threat or the 
presence of a physiological disruption of the individual’s habits, is necessary in 
order for the individual to measure their health, in order for the individual to 
develop the confidence that their health is such that instead of perceiving the 
occurrence of disease, suffering and pain as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, they 
are able to affirm that event as an opportunity to explore new present 
possibilities for living otherwise, as an opportunity to establish a new order that 
has incorporated the event of disease, suffering and pain as a stimulus for a vital, 
profound form of health.  
The notion of resistance that I have been developing throughout this 
chapter, a resistance to the presence and the persistence of nihilism that seeks to 
enable the individual to become aware of, and to explore, the forever renewed 
present possibilities for living otherwise, must therefore be understood as a 
multifaceted concept. In particular, I have argued that the notion of resistance 
ought to be understood within the context of the three syntheses of time such 
that an awareness and exploration of the individual’s present possibilities 
necessitates that they resist the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that 
is characteristic of ‘traditional’ plans of organisation, such as Christianity’s 
creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the 
dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that the notion of resistance 
ought to be understood as possessing a technical, ontological and specifically 
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temporal sense in so far as it entails a resistance to the enduring power of plans 
of organisation to act upon the individual’s living present, a resistance to the 
adherence and perpetuation of those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part 
of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the 
constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with 
each individual’s living present. However, to the extent that it has been 
suggested that one of the salient features of contemporary, Western modernity is 
an increasing incredulity towards those nihilistic plans of organisation that are 
part of our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity, Hegelianism and 
Marxism, then resistance ought not to be understood exclusively in terms of a 
resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of 
the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a vertical and/or horizontal 
transcendence. Rather, the notion of resistance must also be understood in terms 
of both a sensitivity to, and vigilance against, the manner in which the nihilistic 
reaction against Life that characterises plans of organisation is able to adopt new 
forms and new configurations that continue to occlude and constrain the forever 
renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. This 
is to say that resistance to nihilism is also to be understood in terms of a 
resistance to the emergence, adherence and perpetuation of new nihilistic plans 
of organisation, such as psychoanalysis, that propagate an account of the 
subjective organisation of each individual’s psychic reality that is no longer 
bound to the overarching, objective organisation of reality, and the notions of 
vertical transcendence and/or horizontal transcendence that characterises 
‘traditional’ plans of organisation. In addition, resistance to nihilism is also to be 
understood in terms of a resistance to the manner in which nihilism manifests 
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itself in increasingly mobile, fluid configurations, in a profusion of broad 
representational categories or segments that are no longer bound to the universal 
accounts of the objective and/or subjective organisation of reality that 
characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis. 
To respond to the adherence to, and perpetuation of, Christianity, 
Hegelianism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile 
representational categories by which people come to be identified with a 
decisive ‘no’ is an important feature of the notion of resistance that has been 
formulated here, but to simply continue to say no, as was illustrated with 
Bartleby’s ‘passive resistance’, is to be understood as a minimum and limited 
form of resistance. Beyond this minimum form, however, and understood within 
the context of the three passive syntheses of time, resistance to the nihilistic 
reaction against Life also entails that the individual employs the vast cultural 
and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory as a resource, and 
does so in order to animate and inspire their present concerns, an exploration, 
discovery and creative employment of the strategies, techniques and practices 
that individuals and groups have employed in the past as they attempted to 
explore their present possibilities for living otherwise. This employment of the 
past, however, is not to be understood as simply being concerned with 
employing the vast cultural and coexistent past as a resource, but is also 
concerned with the manner in which the individual’s own specific coexistent 
past can be employed to facilitate the exploration of their present possibilities 
for living otherwise. Understood within the context of the imperative to will the 
event, the imperative to will that which occurs insofar as it does occur, I have 
argued that the employment of the individual’s own specific past does not seek 
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to ignore or deny those often contingent events that have befallen the individual 
and that, on the face of it, seem to restrict the individual’s present possibilities 
for living otherwise, such as an event of suffering, illness or injury. On the 
contrary, understood within the context of the imperative to will the event, the 
notion of resistance entails that when a seemingly restrictive event befalls the 
individual, an event that seems to obstruct, divert or prevent the individual from 
exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise, then the challenge that 
the individual confronts is to resist the tendency to reject that event by 
considering it as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, resisting the inner and habitual 
compulsion to conclude that the seemingly restrictive event that has befallen the 
individual necessarily circumscribes their open field of present possibilities. 
Instead, the notion of resistance that I have developed throughout this chapter 
entails that the individual is challenged to will the event, where this is to be 
understood not only in terms of a non-resentful acceptance of that which occurs, 
but must also be understood in terms of an active engagement with, and creative 
transformation of, that which occurs, a decisive ‘yes’ to those events that would 
seem to restrict the individual’s possibilities and, in saying yes, an affirmation of 
those events precisely as opportunities for exploring new present possibilities 
for living otherwise. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s 
individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being 
concerned with the question of living well, where it was suggested that living 
well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the 
forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment 
brings, therefore moving beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life 
that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to 
occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. In particular, I have sought to 
make an original contribution to existing Deleuzian studies by arguing that what 
legitimises this conception of living well, and what can motivate us to engage in 
such a practice, is that a life that becomes aware of and explores the open field 
of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings is a life that 
reflects, or that is lived in accordance with, the challenging ontological account 
that is present in Deleuze’s work; a life lived in accordance with his open, 
dynamic and thoroughly temporal theory of Being or what I will suggest he later 
came to refer to simply as ‘Life’. To live in accordance with Life, however, does 
not entail a fixed, overarching plan of how the possibilities for our lives ought to 
be actualised in so far as Life is to be understood as that which is continually 
becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal 
power that continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its 
interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities. Moreover, 
in so far as each individual is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent 
expression of Life, then a life that strives to explore the forever renewed present 
possibilities that each moment engenders, a practice that also necessitates that 
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each individual seeks to resist the diverse ways in which their present 
possibilities are continually hindered, thwarted and negated, is not only a life 
that strives to live in accordance with the dynamism of Life, but is also a life 
lived in accordance with our own dynamic and thoroughly temporal being. This 
is to say that Life is to be understood in terms of a universal, impersonal and 
thoroughly temporal dynamic power and, in particular, in terms of a complex 
temporal structure that Deleluze refers to as the passive syntheses of time, a 
temporal dynamism that constitutes the dynamic form or temporal character of 
each individual’s living present.  
In developing and seeking to fulfil these interconnected claims, the 
objective of chapter one was to formulate an account of the manner in which 
each human being is to be understood as an immediate and ongoing expression 
of Life, a continual and immanent expression of this thoroughly temporal power. 
In particular, I suggested that a productive context in which to do so was the 
Platonic problem of participation in so far as an account of the thoroughly 
dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which our living present is to be 
understood as an immanent expression of this dynamism, necessitated an 
overcoming of the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical 
responses to the problem of participation; namely, the presupposition of 
transcendence, equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the positing of an immutable 
foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity over difference and, 
ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. In seeking to formulate an 
account of the relation between human beings and Life that addresses, 
challenges and overcomes these Platonic presuppositions - presuppositions 
retained by both Neo-Platonism’s emanative, and Christianity’s creationist, 
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response to the problem of participation - I argued that the immanent relation 
between Life and human beings ought to be understood in terms of the Spinozist 
concept of expression, an expressive relation that entails a challenging 
conception of ontological univocity. In particular, the conception of univocity 
that I proposed Deleuze seeks to maintain was presented in terms of a complex, 
subtle and challenging attempt to distinguish an expressive ontological ground 
from the plurality of beings that it expresses without that ground thereby being 
distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression. However, 
it is precisely this attempt to maintain an ontological position of univocity, while 
holding that there is an expressive ontological ground that is distinguishable 
from the multitude of beings that are its expression, that Alain Badiou can be 
understood as suggesting that Deleuze is unable to sustain. This is to say that for 
Badiou, Deleuze’s attempt to determine an expressive ontological ground as the 
distinguishable ground of the plurality of actual beings that it expresses, without 
that ontological ground thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of 
beings that are its expression, collapses into the traditional, opposing relation 
between the One and the many, reintroducing the Platonic ontological 
presupposition of transcendence along with the remaining ontological 
presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of 
participation.
493
 
To accept Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, therefore, would be to accept the 
reintroduction of the ontological presupposition of transcendence into the 
latter’s work, thereby threatening to negate this study’s objective to formulate an 
account of Life as a universal, impersonal and temporal dynamism, and the 
manner in which each individual’s living present is to be understood as an 
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immanent expression of this dynamism. By reintroducing the concept of 
transcendence, along with the ontological, Platonic presuppositions associated 
with that concept, then the manner in which Life is to be understood as 
continually overcoming any present determination or identity in its interminable 
drive to continually produce new present possibilities, to engender forever 
renewed present possibilities for the human being to live otherwise, is frustrated. 
This is to say that one’s possibilities for living otherwise give way to the 
obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance with that 
dictated to it by the transcendence characteristic of Platonism. The objective of 
chapter two, however, was to argue that it is possible to provide a coherent 
account of the expressive and univocal nature of Life, to understand Life in 
terms of a distinguishable ground that is nevertheless not distinct from the actual 
beings that are its ongoing expression, and that by doing so the opposing 
relation between the One and many can be addressed - along with the 
ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the 
problem of participation. However, I proposed that this necessitates a 
thoroughgoing temporalisation of Life, a conceptualisation of Life in terms of 
the three passive syntheses of time and, within the context of these syntheses, a 
reconsideration of Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the 
actual. It is this temporalisation of Life that enables a coherent formulation of 
the manner in which each individual’s living present is to be understood as an 
immediate and ongoing expression of Life, a continual and immanent expression 
of that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given 
moment. In particular, I argued that a reconceptualisation of Life within the 
context of the three passive syntheses of time enables an understanding of Life 
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in terms of a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that constitutes the 
dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, as well 
as enabling an understanding of the manner in which each moment of our lives 
provides us with the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.  
In presenting the three passive syntheses of time as that which 
constitutes the temporal character of each individual’s living present, I proposed 
that the first synthesis of time or Habit contracts every present moment that 
passes, creating expectations of the future, while the second synthesis of time or 
Memory ensures that every present moment is able to pass, and yet retains those 
particular former present moments that pass so that they can be recollected, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily, in the present moment. However, in addition 
to the first and second syntheses of time, I argued that each individual’s living 
present is also an expression of, and constituted by, a thoroughly dynamic third 
synthesis of time, a third synthesis of time that is to be understood as an ongoing 
caesural cutting that is to be identified with the present moment and, in 
particular, with the continual or eternal return of a new or different present 
moment. This is to say that the third synthesis of time is to be understood as an 
ongoing caesural cutting that continually engenders a new or different present 
moment which, in its eternal recurrence, continually establishes the formal, 
fixed or static characteristics of the living present, the manner in which each 
individual’s living present is always characterized by a distinguishable past and 
future either side of a present moment. The first and second syntheses of time, 
therefore, must be understood as referring to, and as being grounded upon, the 
third synthesis of time in so far as it is this latter synthesis that ensures that our 
living present is continually characterized by a new present moment, 
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distinguishable from the past and the future. Without the activity of the third 
synthesis of time there would be no present moment, no continually renewed 
present moment that the second synthesis of time could ensure passes and the 
first synthesis of time could continually contract into a forever renewed present 
moment. Therefore, although the character of the ground or foundation that the 
third synthesis of time constitutes challenges the traditional, Platonic 
conceptualisation of what it means to be a ground, the third synthesis of time is 
to be understood as the ground of time in so far as it is the temporal synthesis 
that the first and second syntheses of time must be understood as referring to, a 
temporal synthesis that engenders a continually renewed present moment 
without which Habit and Memory would be unable to conduct their respective 
syntheses.  
The passive syntheses of time, however, are not to be understood in 
terms of a temporality that is confined to the temporal character of the 
individual’s living present. Rather, the three passive syntheses of time are to be 
understood as the universal and impersonal temporality of Life itself, such that 
the temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understand as 
an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life and, in particular, as an 
immediate or immanent expression of this universal temporal dynamic. 
However, in order to formulate an account of this immanent, expressive relation 
between Life and the dynamic form of each individual’s living present, I 
proposed that it was necessary to provide a reconsideration of Deleuze’s 
important distinction between the virtual and the actual. In particular, I argued 
that the first, second and third synthesis of time ought to be determined as 
virtual, such that all three syntheses comprise a dynamic and temporal virtual 
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structure, while the temporal character of each individual’s living present - the 
manner in which it is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a 
present moment that passes, and by particular expectations of the future - ought 
to be understood in terms of the actual. This is to say that as that which 
establishes the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s 
living present, the dynamic activity of the three passive syntheses of time is not 
actual in so far as it is the virtual condition for the actual temporal 
characteristics of the individual’s living present. Therefore, in so far as the 
actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood 
as being constituted by a universal and virtual temporal structure - the three 
passive syntheses of time - then the living present is constituted by, and an 
expression of, that which exceeds the living present. However, while exceeding 
the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, the virtual 
structure that is the condition for it is to be understood as the universal and 
impersonal temporal dynamic that remains immanent, involved or implicated 
within those living presents. This is to say that each individual’s living present is 
an expression of a universal and virtual temporal structure, the universal and 
impersonal temporality of Life itself, and precisely because that structure 
possesses a virtual character then it is not unreal or ideal, but ought to be 
determined as the fully real and immanent condition for the actual temporal 
character of each individual's living present.  
An understanding of the passive syntheses of time as the virtual, 
distinguishable and yet not distinct ground of the actual temporal character of 
each individual’s living present can therefore be understood as radically 
problematising the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many 
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that Badiou proposes continues to be present in Deleuze’s work. As a virtual 
ground, the passive syntheses of time - understood in terms of the universal and 
impersonal temporality of Life itself - is not to be understood in terms of a One 
that is above or transcendent to the many living presents that the virtual ground 
is the dynamic condition for. Rather, while the virtual can be understood as the 
distinguishable ground of the actual temporal character of the plurality of living 
presents that it constitutes, this distinction is made within the context of a 
thoroughgoing univocity. This is to say that there is no ontological division, no 
equivocity and no ontological hierarchy, between Life as that virtual structure 
comprised of the passive syntheses of time and the actual temporal character of 
each individual’s living present that is an expression of that virtual structure, but 
solely one reality, a single plane of immanence, that is to be understood as 
possessing two sides or a double aspect to it. This is to say that while it is not 
actual, the virtual is fully real and so to determine the passive syntheses of time 
as the distinguishable, virtual ground of the actual temporal character of each 
individual’s living present is not to understand that ground as possessing a 
distinct or separate reality, it is not to revert to the traditional, opposing relation 
between the One and the many where the former is the transcendent 
precondition for the former. Rather, to distinguish the passive syntheses of time 
as the virtual ground of each individual’s living present is to determine both the 
virtual ground and the actual temporal character of the living present as 
belonging to the same thoroughly temporal, univocal reality, but it is to 
distinguish the former as the virtual side or aspect of that univocal reality and 
the latter as the actual side or aspect of that univocal reality.  
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The temporal character of each individual’s living present is therefore to 
be understood as an immediate an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life 
itself, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is to be understood in 
terms of the three passive syntheses of time. Distinguishable and yet not distinct 
from the living present, the three syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure 
that is the fully real, universal and immanent condition for the actual dynamic 
form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, the manner in 
which each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed 
present moment, a present moment that passes, and by expectations of the future. 
However, in its ongoing caesural cutting, it is the third synthesis of time which 
ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever renewed present 
moment, distinguishable from both the past and the future, and which thereby 
provides each individual with continually renewed present possibilities for 
living otherwise. To strive to become aware of and to explore the open field of 
present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders is 
therefore not simply to live in accordance with the actual temporal character of 
our own individual living present. Rather, in so far as the forever renewed 
present moment that characterises the living present is constituted by the third 
synthesis of time, by the foundation of that virtual structure that constitutes the 
temporality of Life itself, then to strive to explore the present possibilities for 
living otherwise is to strive to live in accordance with the universal ungrounding 
that characterises the formless foundation of Life itself. To live in accordance 
with Life, therefore, does not entail a fixed, overarching plan of how our present 
possibilities ought to be realised. Understood in terms of the three passive 
syntheses of time - understood as a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic 
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that, at its foundation, is characterised by an ongoing caesural cutting, by the 
eternal return of the new or different - Life does not possess some definite, fixed 
determination that would oblige us to realise our possibilities in accordance with 
that determination. Rather, Life is to be understood as that which is continually 
becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal 
power that, at its formless foundation, continually resists the establishment of 
any fixed determination, continually overcoming the establishment of any fixed 
identity, in its interminable drive to produce forever renewed present 
possibilities for being.  
Having formulated an account of the manner in which the actual 
temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an 
immanent and ongoing expression of the virtual temporality of Life itself, the 
objective of chapter three was to investigate how Deleuze’s individual and 
collaborative work can also be understood as being concerned with the manner 
in which the individual’s forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise are hindered, thwarted and negated. However, to the extent that I 
sought to do so within the context of nihilism, I argued that rather than a 
reaction to the loss of belief in the existence of God, and the Judeo-Christian 
form of life that was established upon that belief, nihilism is to be understood as 
possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense in so far as it is to be 
determined as a reaction against the universal and impersonal temporal 
dynamism of Life itself. This is to say that nihilism is to be understood in terms 
of a reaction against the universal ungrounding or excessive formlessness that 
characterises the temporality of Life itself, a reaction against the third synthesis 
of time and the manner in which it ensures that Life, at its formless foundation, 
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is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, continually 
resisting and overcoming the establishment of any fixed determination or 
identity. In particular, as a reaction against the formless foundation of Life, 
nihilism becomes manifest in the positing of an overarching account of the 
objective organisation of reality, accounts of reality that are characteristic of 
what Deleuze refers to as plans of organisation and that variously appeal to 
vertical transcendence - such as the Platonic Forms, the neo-Platonic One or the 
God of Christianity - or horizontal transcendence - as is evidenced in the 
eschatological concerns of Christianity, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit or the 
dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that the nihilism characteristic 
of a plan of organisation manifests itself in accounts of the objective 
organisation of reality that react against the open dynamism that characterises 
the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence - by 
positing an immutable, fixed foundation that is to be understood as the ideal and 
ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world - or by appealing 
to a horizontal transcendence - by positing an overarching and fixed pattern of 
development that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition and 
guiding principle that directs the whole of reality, including all historical and 
societal developments, towards a predetermined end. 
I also argued, however, that the nihilistic reaction against Life that 
characterises a plan of organisation is not merely manifest in the positing of an 
overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a 
vertical and/or horizontal transcendence and, in doing so, reacts against the 
manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, 
is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with the 
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advent of Christianity, and for the new plans of organisation that follow in the 
wake of the death of God, there is also an increased concern with subjectivity, 
an increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, that 
enlarges and intensifies the nihilistic reaction against Life. This is to say that in 
addition to their particular account of the objective organisation of reality, plans 
of organisation also present and promulgate an account of the fundamental 
identity of all human beings, an account of the supposedly deep truth within us 
all, and do so in terms of a universal and essential condition of dispossession, 
privation or lack. In concert with their specific account of the objective 
organisation of reality, plans of organisation occlude, constrain and constrict 
both the awareness and exploration of the open field of present possibilities for 
living otherwise that each moment brings by means of the promise of salvation 
from this condition of dispossession, a redemption from this condition of 
privation to the extent that the individual actualises their present possibilities in 
accordance with that form of life promulgated by the plan of organisation. 
Therefore, the nihilistic reaction against Life that is characteristic of Christianity 
as a plan of organisation, as well as those new plans of organisation that emerge 
in the wake of the death of God, is not merely manifest in the form of an 
account of the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless 
foundation of Life, a foundation that is constituted by the third synthesis of time 
and is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, 
with its turning or increased concern with the subjective aspects of human 
existence, those plans of organisation also circumscribe the open field of present 
possibilities that are available to human beings and, in doing so, are also to be 
understood as a nihilistic reaction against the manner in which the third 
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synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by 
forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. 
Having formulated an account of the manner in which the open field of 
present possibilities that each moment brings is occluded and constrained by the 
nihilistic reaction against Life, a nihilism that finds its most systematic 
expression in plans of organisation, I then moved on to consider how we are to 
respond to the presence and the persistence of nihilism. This is to say that in 
order to strive to become aware of and to explore our forever renewed present 
possibilities, and therefore strive to live in accordance with the universal 
ungrounding that characterises the temporality of Life itself, my objective in 
chapter four was to consider how we might respond to the presence and the 
persistence of nihilism and, in particular, how we might respond to the manner 
in which plans of organisation, in concert with their account of the objective 
organisation of reality, seek to organise how we actualise our present 
possibilities. In particular, I suggested that in order to become aware of and to 
explore the forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise that each 
moment brings then the response to the presence and the persistence of nihilism 
ought to be understood in terms of resistance and, in particular, in terms of a 
resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that is 
characteristic of plans of organisation. In doing so, however, I proposed that as 
with the notion of nihilism, the notion of resistance ought to be understood as 
possessing a technical, ontological and specifically temporal sense. This is to 
say that in order to begin to explore the forever renewed present possibilities 
that each moment brings, in order to strive to live in accordance with the 
universal dynamism of Life itself, then the resistance to nihilism that this 
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necessitates must not only be understood within the context of the eternal return 
of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of time, but must 
also be understood within the context of Habit and Memory, the first and second 
synthesis of time.  
In particular, I argued that an awareness and exploration of the 
individual’s present possibilities necessitates that they resist the inheritance and 
perpetuation of the nihilism that is characteristic of ‘traditional’ plans of 
organisation, such as Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s 
dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that 
the notion of resistance ought to be understood as possessing a technical, 
ontological and specifically temporal sense in so far as it entails a resistance to 
the enduring power of plans of organisation to act upon the individual’s living 
present, a resistance to the adherence and perpetuation of those nihilistic plans 
of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits 
and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are 
contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. In particular, this 
resistance ought to be understood as a selective resistance to the perpetuation of, 
and adherence to, any overarching account of the objective organisation of 
reality that reacts against the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a 
vertical transcendence - such as an immutable, fixed foundation that is the ideal 
and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world - or by 
appealing to a horizontal transcendence - such as an overarching and fixed 
pattern of development that directs the whole of reality towards a predetermined 
end. Moreover, I argued that resistance must also be understood in terms of a 
resistance to, and renouncement of, the manner in which those plans of 
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organisation promulgate an account of the fundamental identity of all human 
beings, an account of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and do so in terms 
of a universal and essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack from 
which we can be redeemed. This is to say that the resistance ought to be 
understood as a resistance to manner in which plans of organisation provide the 
hope of salvation from an ostensible condition of privation, and seek to 
circumscribe an awareness of the forever renewed present possibilities for living 
otherwise that each moment brings by instructing the individual to actualise 
their present possibilities in accordance with the form of life promulgated by 
that plan of organisation 
Resistance to the inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilistic 
reaction against Life, however, a resistance that necessitates a renouncement of 
the adherence to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of 
organisation, ought to be understood as particularly challenging. Indeed, 
Deleuze notes that the loss of security that the objective and subjective aspects 
of a plan of organisation provide, the loss of those ready answers to questions 
concerning the meaning, purpose and direction that our lives ought to take, can 
potentially be so difficult for some individuals that not only may they be unable 
to engage in the resistance to the nihilism that characterises plans of 
organisation, but it may even be preferable for some to continue to adhere to a 
plan of organisation and the nihilistic notions of which it is composed. Moreover, 
to the extent that it has been suggested that one of the salient features of 
contemporary, Western modernity is an increasing incredulity towards those 
nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, 
such as Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism, I argued that resistance ought 
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not to be understood exclusively in terms of a resistance to the perpetuation of, 
and adherence to, any overarching account of the objective organisation of 
reality that appeals to a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence. Rather, the 
notion of resistance must also be understood in terms of both a sensitivity to, 
and vigilance against, the manner in which the nihilistic reaction against Life 
that characterises plans of organisation is able to adopt new forms and new 
configurations that continue to occlude and constrain the forever renewed 
present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. This is to say 
that resistance to nihilism is also to be understood in terms of a resistance to the 
emergence, adherence and perpetuation of new nihilistic plans of organisation, 
such as psychoanalysis, that propagates an account of the subjective 
organisation of every individual’s psychic reality that is no longer bound to the 
overarching, objective organisation of reality, and the notions of vertical 
transcendence and/or horizontal transcendence, that characterises traditional 
plans of organisation such as Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism. In 
addition, I proposed that resistance to nihilism is to be understood in terms of a 
resistance to the manner in which nihilism manifests itself in increasingly 
mobile, fluid configurations, in a profusion of broad representational categories 
or segments that are no longer bound to the universal accounts of the objective 
and/or subjective organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, 
Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis. 
Finally, I argued that to respond to Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism, 
psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile representational categories by which 
people come to be identified with a decisive ‘no’ is an important feature of the 
notion of resistance, but to simply continue to say no is to be understood as a 
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minimum and limited form of resistance. Beyond this minimum form, however, 
and understood within the context of the three syntheses of time, resistance to 
the nihilistic reaction against Life also entails that the individual employs the 
vast cultural and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory as a 
resource, and does so in order to animate and inspire their present concerns, an 
exploration, discovery and creative employment of the strategies, techniques and 
practices that individuals and groups have employed in the past as they 
attempted to explore their present possibilities for living otherwise. In addition, I 
suggested that Deleuze’s work also entails that this employment of the past is 
not simply concerned with employing the vast cultural and coexistent past as a 
resource, but is also concerned with the manner in which the individual’s own 
continually contracted and coexistent past can be employed to facilitate the 
exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. Formulated within 
the context of Deleuze’s imperative to will the event, the employment of the 
individual’s own specific past does not seek to ignore or deny those often 
contingent events that have befallen the individual and that seemingly restrict 
the individual’s present possibilities for living otherwise, such as an event of 
suffering, illness or injury, and neither does it seek to respond to those events by 
considering them as unjust, unfair or unwarranted. On the contrary, understood 
within the context of the imperative to will the event, the notion of resistance 
entails that when a seemingly restrictive event befalls the individual, an event 
that seems to obstruct, divert or negate the exploration of their present 
possibilities for living otherwise, then the challenge that the individual confronts 
is to actively engage with, and creatively transform, that which occurs, to 
respond to those events that would seem to restrict their present possibilities 
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with a decisive yes and, in saying yes, affirm those events precisely as 
opportunities for exploring new present possibilities for living otherwise. 
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men-women, adults-children, and so on. We are segmented in a circular fashion, in 
ever larger circles, ever wider discs or coronas…my affairs, my neighbourhood’s 
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affairs, my city’s, my country’s, the world’s…We are segmented in a linear fashion, 
along a straight line or a number of straight lines, of which each segment represents 
an episode or “proceeding”: as soon as we finish one proceeding, we begin another, 
forever proceduring or procedured, in the family, in school, in the army, on the job’ 
(A Thousand Plateaus, p. 210, 256).  
 
447
  Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,’ pp. 595-596.  
448
  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 90, 121.  
449
  Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,’ p. 596 
450
  In particular, Foucault proposed that: ‘To say no is the minimum for of resistance. But, of 
course, at times that is very important. You have to say no as a decisive form of resistance’ 
(‘Sex, power, and the politics of identity,’ p. 168).      
451
  Grosz, The Nick of Time, p. 256. 
452
  Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, pp. 3-4.  
453
  Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 8. 
454
  Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 9. 
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  Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 10. 
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  Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 15. 
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  Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 73.  
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  Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 33. 
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  Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 80, 88.  
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  Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 150, 173. 
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  Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 143, 168.  
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  Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 149, 174-175. 
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  Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 143, 168. 
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  Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p.141.  
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  Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII, 28. 
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  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 199. 
467
  Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 140.  
468
  Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 149, 175. 
469
  Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 148, 174; Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 
159, 151; Deleuze, ‘Immanence: A Life,’ pp. 31-32. 
470
  Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 155. 
471
  Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 155. 
472
  Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 149-150, 175.  
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  Bogue, Deleuze’s Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics, p. 9   
474
  Bousquet, Les Capitales, p. 103. On Deleuze’s repetition of Bousquet’s assertion see, for 
example, Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 148, 174; Deleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, p. 159, 151 and Deleuze, ‘Immanence: A Life,’ pp. 31-32. 
475
  Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 116.  
476
  Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 80. 
477
  Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 80.  
478
  For example, he writes that: ‘In my mind I took bus rides, unlocked the front door of my 
apartment, answered my telephone, switched on the electric lights. Our thoughts often 
centred on such details’ and, in doing so, helped ‘the prisoner find refuge from the 
emptiness, desolation and spiritual poverty of his existence, by letting him escape into the 
past’ (Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 50). 
479
  Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 80. 
480
  Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 81. 
481
  Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 276. 
482
  Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1041. To the extent that Deleuze makes reference to 
Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati within the context of his discussion of Bousquet’s wounding 
and paralysis (Logic of Sense, pp. 149-151, 175-177) then amor fati should not be 
understood as simply a love of fate or destiny, where this is understood as a resigned 
acceptance of that which has occurred, but ought to be understood in terms of a love of that 
which happens precisely as an opportunity to explore new present possibilities. As Williams 
has made clear, amor fati ‘is never a love of destiny, but always a love of the event. To love 
the event is never to accept it in its significance, or to seek to bend it in its entirety, or even 
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to make it deeper in its wounding…Instead it is to select something to be affirmed within 
the physical event’ (Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 156).       
483
  Nietzsche, ‘Ecce Homo,’ 2. 
484
  Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 66, 75. 
485
  Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 66, 75.  
486
  Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 173, 203. 
487
  Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 382. 
488
  Seneca, ‘On Providence,’ 2.  
489
  Seneca, ‘On Providence,’ 2. 
490
  Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, p. 286.  
491
  As Canguilhem asserts: ‘The menace of disease is one of the components of health’ (The 
Normal and the Pathological, p. 287). 
492
  Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, p. 200.  
493
  As May makes clear, ‘it is transcendence that Badiou thinks haunts Deleuze’s thought…It is 
the problem that threatens the entirety of Deleuze’s philosophical approach’ (‘Badiou and 
Deleuze on the One and the Many,’ p. 70).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 279 
                                                                                                                                            
References 
Agamben, G. (1999) Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy (tr. D.  
Heller-Roazen), Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Ansell-Pearson, K. (1999) ‘Bergson and Creative Evolution/Involution: 
Exposing the Transcendental Illusion of Organismic Life,’ in The New 
Bergosn (ed. J. Mullarkey), Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
pp. 146-167. 
Ansell-Pearson, K. (1999) Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of 
Gilles Deleuze, London: Routledge.   
Ansell-Pearson, K. (2002) Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson 
and the Time of Life, London: Routledge.   
Ansell-Pearson, K. (2005) How to Read Nietzsche, London: Granta.  
Aristotle (2001) ‘Metaphysics’ (tr. W. D. Ross), in The Basic Works of Aristotle 
(ed. R. McKeon), New York: Random House, pp. 681-926.  
Aristotle (2001) ‘Physics’ (tr. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye), in The Basic Works 
of Aristotle (ed. R. McKeon), New York: Random House, pp. 213-394.  
Armstrong, K. (1999) A History of God, London: Vintage.  
Badiou, A. (2000) Deleuze: The Clamour of Being (tr. L. Burchill), Minneapolis: 
The University of Minnesota Press.   
Badiou, A. (2000) ‘Of Life as Name of Being, or, Deleuze’s Vitalist Ontology,’ 
Pli, pp. 191-199,    
Badiou, A. (2006) ‘One, Multiple, Multiples,’ in Theoretical Writings: Alain 
Badiou (eds. R. Brassier and A. Toscano), London: Continuum, pp. 68-
82.    
Baumann, Z. (2007) Consuming Life, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beckett, S. (1999) Proust and Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuit, London: 
John Calder.  
Beistegui, de M. (2005) ‘The vertigo of immanence; Deleuze’s Spinozism,’ 
Research in Phenomenology, 35, pp. 77-100.   
Bergson, H. (1998) Creative Evolution (tr. A. Mitchell), New York: Dover 
Publications. 
 280 
                                                                                                                                            
Bergson, H. (2001) Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness (tr. F. L. Pogson), Mineola: Dover Publications.    
Bergson, H. (2002) Matter and Memory (tr. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer), New 
York: Zone Books.  
Bogue, R. (2007) Deleuze’s Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics, 
Aldershot: Ashgate.    
Bogue, R. (2009) ‘The betrayal of God,’ in Deleuze and Religion (ed. M. 
Bryden), Oxon: Routledge, pp. 9-29.   
Bonney, S. and Stickley, T. (2008) ‘Recovery and mental health: a review of the 
British Literature,’ Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 
15, pp. 140-153.    
Borg, M. J. (2002) Reading the Bible Again for the First Time, New York:  
Harper Collins. 
Borg, M. J. (2008) Jesus, New York: Harper Collins.  
Boundas, C. V. (1997) ‘Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual,’ in 
Deleuze: A Critical Reader (ed. P. Patton), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 81-
106.   
Bousquet, J. (1995) Les Capitales, Paris: Le Circle du Livre.  
Bowlby, R. (2006) ‘Family Realisms: Freud and Greek Tragedy,’ Essays in 
Criticism, 56, pp. 111-138.    
Burnham, D. and Young, H. (2007) Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Camus, A. (2000) The Rebel (tr. A. Bower), London: Penguin.  
Canguilhem, G. (2007) The Normal and the Pathological (tr. C. R. Fawcett), 
New York: Zone Books. 
Capra, F. (1997) The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter, London: 
Flamingo.  
Capra, F. (2005) ‘Complexity and Life,’ Theory, Culture and Society, 22, pp. 
33-44.  
Caputo, J. D. (2007) ‘Spectral Hermeneutics,’ in After the Death of God (ed. J. 
W. Robbins), New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 47-85. 
 281 
                                                                                                                                            
Cohen, S. M., Curd, P. and Reeve, C. D. C. (eds.) (2000) Readings in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle, Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company.     
Colebrook, C. (2006) ‘Deleuze and the Meaning of Life,’ in Deleuze and 
Philosophy (ed. C. V. Boundas), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
pp. 121-132.      
Colebrook, C. (2010) Deleuze and the Meaning of Life, London: Continuum. 
Dawkins, R. (1983) The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
DeLanda, M. (1992) ‘Nonorganic Life,’ in Incorporations (eds. J. Crary and S. 
Kwinter), New York: Zone Books, pp. 129-167.  
DeLanda, M. (2002) Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London: 
Continuum.    
Deleuze, G. (1988) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (tr. R. Hurley), San Francisco: 
City Light Books. French ed.: Spinoza: Philosophie pratique, Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1981.   
Deleuze, G. (1995) Negotiations: 1972-1990 (tr. M. Joughin), New York: 
Columbia University Press. French ed.: Pourparlers 1972-1990, Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1990.   
Deleuze, G. (1997) Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (tr. M. Joughin), New 
York: Zone Books. French ed.: Spinoza et le probleme de l’expression, 
Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1968.      
Deleuze, G. (1998) Essays Critical and Clinical (tr. D. W. Smith and M. A. 
Greco), London: Verso. French ed.: Critique et clinique, Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1993.      
Deleuze, G. (2000) Cinema 2: The Time-Image (tr. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta), 
London: The Althone Press. French ed.: Cinema 2: L’Image-Temps, 
Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1985.    
Deleuze, G. (2001) Difference and Repetition (tr. P. Patton), London: The 
Althone Press. French ed.: Différence et répétition, Paris: PUF, 1968.  
Deleuze, G. (2002) Bergosnism (tr. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam), New 
York: Zone Books. French ed.: Le Bergsonisme, Paris: PUF, 1966. 
 282 
                                                                                                                                            
Deleuze, G. (2002) ‘Immanence: a Life’ (tr. A. Boyman), in Pure Immanence: 
Essays on a Life (tr. A. Boyman), New York: Zone Books, pp. 25-33. 
Originally published in France as: ‘L’immanence: une Vie…,’ 
Philosophie, 1995, 47(1), pp. 3-7. 
Deleuze, G. (2002) ‘Nietzsche’ (tr. A. Boyman), in Pure Immanence: Essays on 
a Life (tr. A. Boyman), New York: Zone Books, pp. 53-102. Originally 
published in France as: Nietzsche, Paris: PUF, 1965.  
Deleuze, G. (2002) Nietzsche and Philosophy (tr. H. Tomlinson), London: The 
Althone Press. French ed.: Nietzsche et la philosophie, Paris: PUF, 1962. 
Deleuze, G. (2003) Kant’s Critical Philosophy (tr. H. Tomlinson and B. 
Habberjam), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. French ed.: La 
Philosophie Critique de Kant, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1963.  
Deleuze, G. (2003) The Logic of Sense (tr. M. Lester and C. Stivale), London: 
The Althone Press. French ed.: Logique du sens, Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1969.    
Deleuze, G. (2004) ‘Bergson’s conception of difference,’ in Desert Islands and 
Other Texts: 1953-1974 (tr. M. Taormina), Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
pp. 32-51. French ed.: L’ile Deserte et Autres Textes: 1953-1974, Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 2002.    
Deleuze, G. (2004) ‘The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics,’ in Desert Islands 
and Other Texts: 1953-1974 (tr. M. Taormina), Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), pp. 56-71. French ed.: L’ile Deserte et Autres Textes: 
1953-1974, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 2002.    
        Deleuze, G. (2004) Foucault (tr. S. Hand), London: The Althone Press. French 
ed.: Foucault, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1986. 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2000) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (tr. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane), London: The 
Althone Press. French ed.: L'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrenie, 
Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972.  
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2002) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (tr. B. Massumi), London: The Althone Press. French ed.: 
 283 
                                                                                                                                            
Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et schizophrenie, Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1980. 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2003) What is Philosophy? (tr. H. Tomlinson and 
G. Burchell), London: Verso. French ed.: Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? 
Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1991.  
Deleuze, G. and Parnet, C. (2002) Dialogues (tr. H. Tomlinson and B. 
Habberjam), London: The Althone Press. French ed.: Dialogues, Paris: 
Flammarion, 1977.  
Derrida, J. (2004) Positions (tr. A. Bass), London: Continuum. 
Descartes, R. (1998) ‘Discourse on Method’ (tr. D. A. Cress), in Discourse on 
Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, pp. 1-44.  
Diogenes Laertius, (1997) ‘Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers,’ in 
Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings (eds. B. Inwood and L. P. 
Gerson), Indianapolis, Hackett, pp. 190-203. 
Dostal, R. J. (1993) ‘Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger,’ in 
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (ed. C. Guignon), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 141-169.    
Drolet, M. (2004) The Postmodernism Reader: Foundational Texts, London: 
Routledge.    
Dufresne, T. (2005) Killing Freud: Twentieth Century Culture and the Death of 
Psychoanalysis, London: Continuum.   
Durie, R. (2000) ‘Splitting Time: Bergson’s Philosophical Legacy,’ Philosophy 
Today, pp. 152-168.   
Epictetus, (1997) ‘Discourses,’ in Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory 
Readings (eds. B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson), Indianapolis, Hackett, p. 
233. 
Foucault, M. (1982) ‘The Subject and Power,’ in Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Heremeneutics (eds. H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow), 
Brighton: The Harvester Press, pp. 208-226. 
Foucault, M. (1991) ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics,’ in The Foucault Reader (ed. 
P. Rabinow), London: Penguin, pp. 340-372. 
 284 
                                                                                                                                            
Foucault, M. (1991) ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power,’ in The Foucault Reader 
(ed. P. Rabinow), London: Penguin, pp. 239-256. 
Foucault, M. (1991) ‘What Is Enlightenment?’ in The Foucault Reader (ed. P. 
Rabinow), London: Penguin, pp. 32-50. 
Foucault, M. (1997) ‘Theatrum Philosophicum,’ in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (ed. D. F. Bouchard), Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, pp. 165-196.  
Foucault, M. (2000) ‘Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,’ in Ethics: 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (ed. P. Rabinow), London: 
Penguin, pp. 163-173.    
Foucault, M. (2005) The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College 
de France 1981-1982 (tr. G. Burchell), New York: Picador.   
Frankl, V. E. (2004) Man’s Search for Meaning, London: Rider.  
Freud, S. (1995) ‘An Autobiographical Study,’ in The Freud Reader (ed. P. 
Gay), New York: W. W. Norton and Company, pp. 3-41. 
Freud, S. (1995) ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (“Wolf Man”),’ in 
The Freud Reader (ed. P. Gay), New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 
pp. 400-426. 
Freud, S. (1995) ‘The Question of a Weltanschauung,’ in The Freud Reader (ed. 
P. Gay), New York: W. W. Norton and Company, pp. 783-796. 
Freud, S. (1995) ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,’ in The Freud 
Reader (ed. P. Gay), New York: W.W. Norton and Company, pp. 239-
291. 
Gleick, J. (1998) Chaos, London: Vintage.  
Goodchild, P. (1998) Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of 
Desire, London: Sage.    
Gottlieb, A. (2001) The Dream of Reason: A History of Western Philosophy 
from the Greeks to the Renaissance, London: Penguin.   
Grant, A. (2006) ‘Testimony: god and aeroplanes: my experience of breakdown 
and recovery,’ Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 13, pp. 
456-457.  
 285 
                                                                                                                                            
Grosz, E. (2004) The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely, 
London: Duke University Press. 
Hardt, M. (1993) Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, London: 
University College London.  
Haraway, D. J. (1991) Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 
London: Free Association Books.    
Hazlitt, W. (1970) ‘On Prejudice,’ in Men and Manners: Sketches and Essays, 
London: Redwood Press, pp. 83-104.   
Hegel, G. W. F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit (tr. A. V. Miller), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.   
Hegel, G. W. F. (2006) ‘Encyclopaedia Logic’ (tr. T. F. Geraets., W. A. 
Suchting., and H. S. Harris), in The Hegel Reader (ed. S. Houlgate), 
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 139-174.  
Heidegger, M. (1977) The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays 
(tr. W. Lovitt), London: Harper Perennial.  
Heidegger, M. (1999) ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ (tr. T. Sheehan), in Pathmarks 
(ed. W. McNeill), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155-182.    
Heidegger, M. (2000) Being and Time (tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson), 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.   
Holland, E. W. (1999) Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to 
Schizoanalysis, London: Routledge.  
Hughes, J. (2008) Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, London: 
Continuum. 
Hughes, J. (2009) Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, London: Continuum.   
Husserl, E. (1992) On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 
(tr. J. B. Brough), Dordrecht: Kluver Academic Publishers. 
Irigaray. L. (1985) This Sex Which is Not One (tr. C. Porter), New York: Cornell 
University Press.  
Jamison, K. R. (1997) An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness, 
London: Picador.   
Kant, I. (1996) Critique of Pure Reason (tr. W. S. Pluhar), 
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hacket.  
 286 
                                                                                                                                            
Kaufmann, W. (1974) Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kerslake, C. (2002) ‘The Vertigo of Philosophy,’ Radical Philosophy, 113, pp. 
10-28. 
Levinas, E. (2006) Entre Nous (tr. M. B. Smith and B. Harshav), London: 
Continuum. 
Lloyd, G. (2004) Spinoza and the Ethics, London: Routledge. 
Lyotard, J. F. (1997) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.   
Macherey, P. (1997) ‘The Encounter with Spinoza,’ In Deleuze: A Critical 
Reader (ed. P. Patton), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 139-161.   
Macherey, P. (1998) ‘Deleuze in Spinoza,’ in In a Materialist Way: Selected 
Essays, London: Verso, pp. 119-124.       
Marcus Aurelius. (1964) Meditations (tr. M. Staniforth), London: Penguin.   
Marx, K. (1978) ‘Contribution to the critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: 
Introduction,’ in The Marx-Engels Reader (ed. R.C. Tucker), London: 
W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 53-65.   
Marx, K. (1978) ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844’ (tr. M. 
Milligan), in The Marx-Engels Reader (ed. R. C. Tucker), London: 
W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 67-125.   
Marx, K. (1978) ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,’ in The Marx-
Engels Reader (ed. R. C. Tucker), London: W. W. Norton & Company, 
pp. 594-617.    
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1978) ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party,’ in The 
Marx-Engels Reader (ed. R. C. Tucker), London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, pp. 469-500.   
May, T. (1994) ‘Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze,’ in Gilles Deleuze and 
the Theater of Philosophy (eds. C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski), 
London: Routledge, pp. 33-50.  
May, T. (2000) ‘Philosophy as a spiritual exercise in Foucault and Deleuze,’ 
Angelaki, 5, pp. 223-229.    
 287 
                                                                                                                                            
May, T. (2004) ‘Badiou and Deleuze on the One and the Many,’ in Think Again: 
Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy (ed. P. Hallward), London: 
Continuum, pp. 67-76.    
May, T. (2005) Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
McGrath, A. E. (2007) Christian Theology: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing.   
Melville, H. (1990) Bartleby and Benito Cereno, New York: Dover Publications. 
Miller, H. (1993) Sexus, London: Flamingo.  
Nietzsche, F. (1968) The Will to Power (tr. W. Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale), 
New York: Vintage Books. 
Nietzsche, F. (1974) The Gay Science (tr. W. Kaufman), New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Nietzsche, F. (1976) ‘The Antichrist’ (tr. W. Kaufman), in The Portable 
Nietzsche (ed. W. Kaufmann), London: Penguin, pp. 565-656.   
Nietzsche, F. (1976) ‘Twilight of the Idols’ (tr. W. Kaufman), in The Portable 
Nietzsche (ed. W. Kaufmann), London: Penguin, pp. 463-563. 
Nietzsche, F. (1990) Beyond Good and Evil (tr. R. J. Hollingdale), London: 
Penguin. 
Nietzsche, F. (1993) ‘Ecce Homo’ (tr. W. Kaufman), in Nietzsche: Selections 
(ed. R. Schacht), New York: Macmillan, pp. 383-389.   
Nietzsche, F. (1998) Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (tr. M. Cowan), 
Washington: Regnery Publishing.   
Nietzsche, F. (2005) On the Genealogy of Morality (tr. C. Diethe), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.   
Olma, S. and Koukouzelis, K. (2007) ‘Introduction: Life’s (Re-)Emergences,’ 
Theory, Culture and Society, 24, pp. 1-17.   
Piercey, R. (1996) ‘The Spinoza-intoxicated man: Deleuze on expression,’ Man 
and World, 29, pp. 269-281.  
Plato (2005) ‘Charmides’ (tr. F. M. Cornford), in The Collected Dialogues of 
Plato (eds. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 99-122.   
 288 
                                                                                                                                            
Plato (2005) ‘Euthyphro’ (tr. F. M. Cornford), in The Collected Dialogues of 
Plato (eds. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 169-185.   
Plato (2005) ‘Laches’ (tr. F. M. Cornford), in The Collected Dialogues of Plato 
(eds. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
pp. 123-144.  
Plato (2005) ‘Parmenides’ (tr. F. M. Cornford), in The Collected Dialogues of 
Plato (eds. Hamilton and H. Cairns), Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 920-956.   
Plato (2005) ‘Republic’ (tr. P. Shorey), in The Collected Dialogues of Plato (eds. 
E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 
575-844.   
Plato (2005) ‘Sophist’ (tr. P. Shorey), in The Collected Dialogues of Plato (eds. 
E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 
957-1017. 
Plato (2005) ‘Timaeus’ (tr. B. Jowett), in The Collected Dialogues of Plato (eds. 
E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 
1151-1211. 
Plotinus (2004) ‘Enneads’ (tr. J. Dillon and L. P. Gerson), in Neoplatonic 
Philosophy: Introductory Readings (eds. J. Dillon and L. P. Gerson), 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 1-177.    
Proust, M. (2002) The Way by Swann’s (tr. L. Davis), London: Penguin.   
Rand, N. (2004) ‘Did women threaten the Oedipus complex between 1922 and 
1933?’ Angelaki, 9, pp. 53-66.  
Roberts, M. (2005) ‘The production of the psychiatric subject: power, 
knowledge and Michel Foucault,’ Nursing Philosophy, 6, pp. 33-42. 
Roberts M. (2005) ‘Time, human being and mental health care: an introduction 
to Gilles Deleuze,’ Nursing Philosophy, 6, pp. 161–173. 
Roberts, M. (2006) ‘Gilles Deleuze: psychiatry, subjectivity and the passive 
synthesis of time,’ Nursing Philosophy, 7, pp. 91-204.  
Roberts, M. (2007) ‘Capitalism, psychiatry and schizophrenia: a critical 
introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus,’ Nursing 
Philosophy, 8, pp. 114-127. 
 289 
                                                                                                                                            
Roberts, M. (2007) ‘Modernity, mental illness and the crisis of meaning,’ 
Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 14, pp. 277-281.   
Roberts, M. (2008) ‘Facilitating recovery by making sense of recovery: a 
Nietzschean perspective,’ Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health 
Nursing, 15, pp. 743-748.     
Roberts, M. (2010) ‘Service user involvement and the restrictive sense of 
psychiatric categories: the challenge facing mental health nurses,’ 
Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 17, pp. 289-294.    
Saint Augustine (1996) Confessions (tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin), London: Penguin 
Books. 
Saint Augustine (2008) The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love (tr. B. 
Harbert), New York: New City Press.   
Schacht, R. (1992) Nietzsche, London: Routledge.   
Schofield, M. (2006) ‘Stoic Ethics,’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics 
(ed. B. Inwood), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 233-256.    
Sellars, J. (2006) Stoicism, Chesham: Acumen.  
Seneca (1968) ‘On Providence’ (tr. M. Hadas), in The Stoic Philosophy of 
Seneca: Essays and Letters, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 
27-45.   
Shakespeare, W. (2007) ‘Hamlet,’ in The Complete Works of William 
Shakespeare, London: Midpoint Press, pp. 99-142.  
Sherman, J. H. (2009) ‘No werewolves in theology? Transcendence, immanence, 
and becoming-divine in Gilles Deleuze,’ Modern Theology, 25, pp. 1-20.    
Smith, D. W. (2009) ‘The doctrine of univocity: Deleuze’s ontology of 
immanence,’ in Deleuze and Religion (ed. M. Bryden), Oxon: Routledge, 
pp. 167-183.    
Sokolowski, R. (2000) Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.   
Spinoza, B. (1996) Ethics (tr. E. Curley), London: Penguin. 
Staniforth, M. (1964) ‘Introduction to Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations,’ in 
Meditations (tr. M. Staniforth), London: Penguin, pp. 7-27.   
 290 
                                                                                                                                            
Stobaeus, J. (1997) ‘Anthology,’ in Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory 
Readings (eds. B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson), Indianapolis, Hackett, pp. 
203-232. 
Turetzky, P. (2000) Time, London: Routledge.   
Vattimo, G. (1999) Belief (tr. L. D’Isanto and D. Webb), Oxford: Blackwell.    
Vattimo, G. (2007) ‘Toward a Nonreligious Christianity,’ in After the Death of 
God (ed. J. W. Robbins), New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 27-
46.     
Wasser, A. (2007) ‘Deleuze’s Expressionism,’ Angelaki, 12, pp. 49-66.    
Williams, J. (2003) Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical 
Introduction and Guide, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Williams, J. (2009) Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense: A Critical Introduction and 
Guide, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Young, J. (2005) The Death of God and the Meaning of Life, London: Routledge.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
